








Human communication is highly fault tolerant: although words and phrases that are not
jointly understood are often used, a shared common language can be used to explain
these differences. In agent communication, however, mutual comprehension usually
depends on a perfect matching of messages to internal ontologies. Thus any kind
of ontological mismatch will lead to communication failure, even though large sec¬
tions of the ontologies may be common to both parties. Ontologies, once envisaged
as definitive descriptions of what exists in a domain, are commonly not static but are
continually updated and altered, both centrally and by individual users. As the envi¬
ronments in which agents interact become increasingly diverse and distributed, with
agents being designed by a large number of different users, ontology mismatch be¬
comes increasingly common.
Standard approaches to resolving this problem assume that the mismatched ontologies
can be fully observed and often assume that it is desirable to match large sections, or
even all, of the ontologies. However, this is not always a reasonable assumption, as
many of these changes are not made public, and the computational cost of mapping
entire ontologies is often prohibitive. We believe that it is more appropriate to assume
that the ontologies of external agents are not available for observation, except for the
specific parts of their ontologies revealed through normal agent communication. Con¬
sequently, a real-world solution, which we propose, is to patch specific instances of
ontology mismatch when these particular mismatches lead to communication prob¬
lems.
This thesis describes the development of ORS (Ontology Refinement System), a sys¬
tem designed to dynamically refine ontologies whenever mismatches lead to commu¬
nication problems during agent interaction. ORS contains a framework for agents to
diagnose and refine ontological mismatch, integrated within an environment where
iii
planning agents can use this ability to achieve goals that would otherwise have been
unreachable. These abilities are evaluated against genuine examples of ontological
mismatch to demonstrate that they are useful and can be successfully performed.
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A central part of the ability to communicate is a shared understanding of the world.
An important aspect of this shared understanding is the use of a common language
in which to represent knowledge about the world. It is a widely held assumption that
humans who share a common language can interact successfully with one another.
However, two humans who claim to share a language may not always have identical
ways of describing the world. It is a common experience in human interaction that
people from a different background, or with different levels of expertise in a subject
area, may have problems with communication. For example, a specialist describing his
area of expertise may use many words and phrases that are not part of the vocabulary
of a non-specialist; if he wishes to describe his ideas to a general audience, he must
explain what these words and phrases mean in terms of commonly-used words and
phrases that he can expect the whole audience to understand. Equally, a speaker of
American English and a speaker of British English may believe they speak the same
language, but often they will need to translate words and idioms into a shared part
of the language before they can be fully understood. In general, the wider the gap
between the two dialects, the smaller the shared understanding, and thus the greater
the difficulty in communication.
1
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Likewise, in an agent communication system, a widely held assumption is that the
agents will have identical ways of describing the world and thus can communicate
successfully. For an agent, its language, or way of describing the world, is determined
by its ontology. A common restriction of agent systems is that agents must have iden¬
tical ontologies: the way in which they represent the world must be the same. How¬
ever, this is not always a reasonable assumption. Large scale systems that facilitate
multi-agent communication, such as the Semantic Web, are far more successful if they
place less rigid constraints on the agents that make use of them. It is essential to such
systems that agents are created and owned by many different users, and forcing tight
ontological constraints on potential users greatly reduces the usability of the system.
We believe that these tight ontological restrictions are not necessary. As with human
communication, agents that share a large part of their ontology but differ in some
aspects can use this shared part of their ontology as a basis for discussing those parts
in which they differ. Agents can thus refine their ontologies so that a representational
difference that led initially to failed or problematic communication can be resolved so
that communication proceeds smoothly.
For example, an ontology that had been developed in the US might have a Money pred¬
icate that made no reference to currency, because it was implicitly assumed that the
currency would always be dollars. However, if this ontology is made use of in Europe,
it might be considered necessary to include some currency information related to the
Money predicate, since the implicit assumption no longer holds. Thus these two ver¬
sions of the ontology would have conflicting representations for the predicate Money,
perhaps: (Money ?Amount ?Owner) and (Money ?Amount ?Owner ?Currency).
This difference will cause problems when agents using these two ontologies are at¬
tempting to communicate. However, there is sufficient information in both ontologies
to determine that these two uses of money are related, and to determine the link be¬
tween them. Thus, if agents are equipped with the ability to identify and solve these
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problems, it is possible for them to represent money in these different ways and still
communicate successfully.
This project investigates the techniques we might need to build into an agent communi¬
cation system to facilitate this kind of diagnostic and refinement process, and builds a
system, ORS (Ontology Refinement System), that can automatically perform this task.
1.1 Motivation
Ontological mismatches between agents can be a serious problem in agent communi¬
cation, particularly where agents come from different sources, different users or are
adapted to different tasks. Even where agents' ontologies have originated from the
same source, updates and alterations may make communication impossible. At the
same time, since it is advantageous that agents are adapted to their particular tasks,
forcing all agents to use identical ontologies is not a sensible or practical solution, nor
are there any established mechanisms to enable this. In addition, large scale systems
like the Semantic Web will only become successful through attracting many and di¬
verse users. This can only be practically achieved through making it easy for people to
use the system and by placing as few restraints on their joining as possible; this is the
approach that is behind the enormous success of the World Wide Web.
A key concept of the Semantic Web is the automated processing of ontological knowl¬
edge by agents and services. [Berners-Lee et al., 2001] outlines how these are central
to the role of the Semantic Web, and how they require ontological matching to perform
appropriately. However, the nature of the Semantic Web means that strict controls on
these ontologies are impractical: it must allow for, amongst other things, partial infor¬
mation, erroneous information and the evolution of ontologies [Koivunen and Miller,
2001], Additionally, it is not always reasonable to assume that complete ontological
information is available for agents encountered on the Semantic Web. Their ontologies
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may be security or commercially sensitive, or they may simply not have been made
publicly available. All of these requirements cause difficulties for agent communica¬
tion. In this project, we develop a method of dealing with these ontological mismatches
without enforcing tight ontological controls on agents and without assuming that any
information about other agents' ontologies, other than what can be gleaned during
agent communication, is available. It is intended to automatically solve a subset of the
many challenges surrounding ontology mapping, merging and alignment, which are all
essential for communication in multi-agent systems. It allows agents to learn about the
area in which they are currently active, and thus be more capable of acting successfully
within it, without receiving any extraneous information. This is particularly useful in
complex and dynamic domains, where a complete and up-to-date representation of the
entire domain may be intractable or undesirable. We have developed a system, ORS,
with which agents can identify the specific ontological causes of communication fail¬
ure and adapt these parts of their ontologies dynamically during interactions so that
communication becomes possible.
1.2 Context of the System
"To learn, a learner needs to formulate plans, monitor the plan execution to detect
violated expectations, and then diagnose and rectify errors which the disconfirming
data reveal." Frederick Hayes-Roth [Hayes-Roth, 1983]
This project is concerned with the resolution of the problem of ontological mismatch
within a planning context. An agent forms plans to achieve a goal based on its under¬
standing of the domain, and then attempts to execute these plans through communica¬
tion with other agents. Planning in complex and dynamic environments is very difficult
because any incomplete, incorrect or out-of-date information can cause an inexecutable
plan to be developed. However, by adopting our approach to ontological refinement,
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these cases of plan execution failure can be considered to be opportunities to learn more
about the domain. Information about the cause of failure is extracted from observation
of how and why the plan failed, augmented by further communication with the other
agents involved. Once the point of failure has been located, refinement techniques are
implemented to fix the problem, and a new plan is developed using the updated ontol¬
ogy. This plan is more likely to succeed than the previous plan, although success is not
guaranteed. This procedure is repeated until the goal is successfully reached, or until
it becomes impossible to form a plan to achieve the goal from the updated ontology.
We consider that there are three essential elements to creating such a dynamic ontology
refinement system:
1. the ability to link the relevant information about the underlying ontology to the
plan;
2. the ability use this information to locate the exact source of the problem;
3. the ability to select and apply appropriate techniques for altering the ontology.
These abilities are implemented in different sub-systems within the dynamic ontology
refinement system [McNeill et al., 2003a]: the planning system, which forms and in¬
terprets plans; the diagnostic system, which locates the source of the problem; and the
refinement system, which implements the necessary changes to the ontology. The en¬
vironment in which plans are executed, and the necessary communication carried out,
is part of the agent communication system.
Such a system is inherently limited: it is very difficult or perhaps impossible to de¬
fine every possible kind ontological mismatch, and additionally it may be impossible
to diagnose differences that are chaotic in nature; for example, names that are altered
arbitrarily. Our system relies on there being some method to the changes made: for ex¬
ample, an argument's class restricted to a subclass. Additionally, we have made many
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assumptions in order to simplify the problem to the extent where we can produce a
working system. Some of these assumptions are necessary because they concern parts
of ORS that are not the focus of the research, and thus should not detract from the main
work of the thesis. These assumptions are mostly concerned with agent behaviour and
interaction. For example, we have assumed that agents are honest and helpful. We
have assumed that they will: perform tasks they are capable of performing, if relevant
preconditions are fulfilled; give truth values for specific statements; instantiate vari¬
ables in a specific predicate, according to their ontology; and give class information
about specific objects. We do not assume that they will reveal large sections of their
ontology; since these agents are from different sources, we feel that this is too high a
level of trust to assume. Additionally, this approach must work with all agents that are
encountered, not merely those that are specifically programmed to behave appropri¬
ately, and therefore we cannot assume that agents are able to reveal their ontologies in
this way. These refinement techniques are intended for agents which are using similar
ontologies that differ slightly; for example, one agent has an ontology that has been
updated or altered, or perhaps one agent is using an old version of an ontology. They
are not intended for facilitating communication between agents with completely differ¬
ent ontologies; there must be a reasonable degree of shared ontology from which the
differences can be inferred. We have also assumed that the agents that are attempting
to execute the plans are willing to believe the other agents with which they are commu¬
nicating and alter their ontology accordingly. There is currently no analysis of which
of the agents is more likely to have a correct ontology. The assumptions are explained
in more detail in Section 6.2
These assumptions have been made in order to avoid too much of the research being
focused on non-central issues. In addition, other assumptions are necessary to limit
the scope of the problem and make it more tractable. These are concerned with the
domain in which we are investigating the problem and the ontological representations
we expect to encounter; they are detailed in Chapter 4.
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The system could later be made more sophisticated to eradicate these assumptions, but
in the meantime they reduce the problem to a solvable subset. Discussions about how
to extend this subset can be found in Chapter 8.
1.3 Ontologies
There is some ambiguity and dissension over the meaning of ontology. We define here
the way in which we use the term. Further discussion of other uses of the term, and the
field of ontologies in general, can be found in Section 2.2.
We use the term ontology to refer to the whole of the domain knowledge. This consists
of two parts:
• the signature, which describes the representation language in which the ontol¬
ogy is written: what predicates exist, what arity they have, what classes their
arguments have, the class hierarchy and so on;
• the theory, which contains the formulae written in the representation language.
We are primarily interested in mismatches in the signature. However, alterations in the
signature will normally also entail alterations in the theory, where the particular sig¬
nature object is instantiated. There are many different levels of expressiveness which
can be contained in an ontological representation. Standard ontology representations
range from full first-order to considerably restricted representations; higher-order on¬
tological representations are not commonly used as reasoning with them is intractable.
This project focuses exclusively on first-order ontologies.
ORS works with a restricted version of KIF (Knowledge Interchange Format). The
motivation for this choice is detailed in Section 4.5, and further detail about KIF can be
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found in Section 2.2.1. KIF ontologies include classes, relations, functions, individuals
and axioms. Functions are relations for which, if there are n arguments, and (n —
1) arguments are instantiated, then the nth argument is determined. Axioms can be
thought of as implication rules that have a conjunction of relations determining when
the rule is applicable, and a conjunction of relations describing the situation after the
rule has been applied. Much of the research of the project is focused on identifying
what potential mismatches could arise between these ontological objects.
1.4 Results
In this thesis, we outline potential ontological mismatches that we believe can occur
between ontologies represented in first-order logic. We have implemented the ability
to detect most of these in ORS; for those that are not implemented, we provide expla¬
nations for why this has not been done. ORS is demonstrated to successfully perform
all of these potential mismatches except for those which we have justified reasons for
not implementing. We have evaluated ORS against off-the-shelf ontologies for which
we have access to different versions, and have demonstrated that ORS can successfully
refine the mismatches that occur between these different versions in a high percentage
of cases. For those cases that it cannot successfully perform, we have provided an
explanation for why this has not been achieved. This evaluation process is outlined in
Chapter 7.
1.5 Research Aims
The aim of the project is to demonstrate the following:
Using dynamic ontology refinement to locate and correct ontological
mismatches between agents can enable successful communication which
would otherwise be impossible.
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The area of ontological mismatch is a key issue in agent technology, particularly in
application areas such as the Semantic Web. In a more general context, the issues
surrounding learning through experience, and using failure of expectations to develop
a more sophisticated view of the world have been central to Artificial Intelligence for
much of its history. Even when these issues are limited to the specific context of agent
interaction, they still generate huge and difficult problems on which a large number of
people in the agent community are working. This thesis does not attempt to solve such
issues in a complete and general manner; rather, we have developed a new approach to
them. A theory has been developed about what kinds of mismatches one might expect
to encounter, how these could be recognised and what kind of techniques would help
to fix them. We have created a system to illustrate the implementation of this theory
within a restricted context.
This system can, for agents using a certain platform and communication language,
identify ontological mismatch and, in many cases, diagnose the cause of the failure
and refine it appropriately. This is not guaranteed to work in all situations, since in
some cases there is not enough information for fully automated ontology refinement.
However, we consider the main contribution of this thesis to be the new approach to
these issues that we present here. Although the actual implementation is limited, the
theory behind it could potentially apply to much more sophisticated systems.
The key aims, then, of this project are:
1. To provide a framework in which agents with first-order, largely similar ontolo¬
gies can diagnose ontological mismatches between them;
2. To integrate this framework into a system, ORS, that enables an environment
where planning agents can use this ability to reach goals that would otherwise
have been unreachable. This system must be fully automated;
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3. To evaluate these abilities against genuine examples of ontological mismatches,
to demonstrate that these abilities are useful and can be successfully performed.
All of these aims have been achieved; this is discussed further in Chapter 9.
1.6 Organisation of Thesis
The organisation of the thesis is as follows:
Chapters 2 and 3 review the relevant literature. Chapter 2 outlines the background
of this project, describing the AI techniques on which this project is building, whilst
Chapter 3 describes the work that has been done to achieve similar aims to those of
this project, in order to explain how our work fits in with the field.
Chapter 4 provides an overview of ORS. It describes the various sub-systems and ex¬
plain how they interact.
Chapter 5 explains in more detail the diagnostic and refinement aspects of ORS. This
constitutes the heart of the research.
Chapter 6 details the other sub-systems of ORS; it explains their importance to ORS
and describes the theory on which they are based and the implementational issues
surrounding them.
Chapter 7 provides an evaluation of ORS, both from a practical viewpoint (how well
does it work?) and a theoretical viewpoint (how useful is it?). This chapter also pro¬
vides a discussion of work that is closely related to the work of this project to assess
the contribution of ORS.
Chapter 8 discusses directions in which this research could be expanded.
Chapter 9 summarises the thesis and draws conclusions.
Chapter 2
Background
The scope of this project is broad, and there are many different areas in Artificial
Intelligence that are of some relevance to the work; in particular: agents, ontologies,
the Semantic Web, peer-to-peer systems and planning. In this chapter, we introduce the
fields on which our project depends, in order to ensure that the reader has a sufficient
understanding of the technology we are making use of. The fields described in this
chapter are not those in which the focus of the project is principally concerned, but
rather the background that provides a platform from which ORS can operate and the
motivation for the functionality of ORS. The fields to which this project makes a direct
research contribution are discussed in Chapter 3.
After each section in this chapter, we explain how the field is of relevance to the project,
firstly by explaining what aspects of the field we need to use in the system, and sec¬
ondly by explaining how our research contributes to that field. In many cases, these
contributions are not significant; the major contributions of the project lie in the fields





There is much debate over the issue of exactly what an agent is and there is no precise,
universally accepted definition [Franklin and Graesser, 1997], However, in Artificial
Intelligence an agent is generally considered to be a computer system that is situated
in some environment and that is capable of autonomous action in this environment in
order to meet its design objectives [Wooldridge, 2002]. Intelligent agents are generally
considered to exhibit [Wooldridge, 1999, Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995]:
• Autonomy: agents act without direct intervention and have some control over
their actions and internal states;
• Reactivity: agents respond to their environment in suitable ways;
• Pro-activeness: agents exhibit goal-directed behaviour by taking the initiative;
• Social ability: agents interact with other agents and possibly humans to satisfy
design objectives.
In addition, agents might be assumed to exhibit the following:
• mobility - the ability to move around an electronic network;
• veracity - the propensity to avoid communicating information that is known to
be false;
• benevolence - the propensity for an agent to try to do what is asked of it;
• rationality - the propensity for an agent to act in order to achieve its goals to the
best of its ability and understanding;
• learning - the ability to infer new or improved information about the domain as
a result of interactions within it.
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These attributes are not essential to agents; in particular, benevolence may not occur if
agents have conflicting goals, which is certainly possible if the agents are from differ¬
ent sources.
Complex systems consist of a number of related sub-systems which are modular in
terms of the objectives they achieve and have multiple loci of control [Jennings, 1999].
Thus it is useful to consider each part of a system to be an agent with its own objec-
tive(s) and autonomy. Since it is impossible to know a priori about all potential links,
it is helpful to endow the components with the ability to make decisions about their
behaviour.
However, there are many difficult issues surrounding the use of agents [Wei8, 1999],
which include:
• agent communication (see Section 2.1.1);
• how agents should represent and reason about the knowledge, plans and actions
of other agents;
• how agents should represent and reason about the interaction process;
• how agents should recognise and reconcile disparate viewpoints and conflicts
and how to synthesise views and results;
• how agents can negotiate and make contracts with other agents;
• how to formally describe multiagent systems and interactions among agents;
• how to realise 'intelligent processes' such as problem solving, planning, decision
making and learning in multiagent contexts.
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2.1.1 Agent Communication
One of the basic functions of an agent is the ability to communicate, primarily with
other agents. Enabling successful communication between diverse agents can be diffi¬
cult, and a large amount of research within the agent community is focused on this
issue. In keeping with the idea of anthropomorphising computer systems to pro¬
duce agents, agent communication theory is based on spoken human communication
theory [Huhns and Stephens, 1999], which is formally described in speech act the¬
ory [Austin, 1962,Searle, 1970].
There are three levels of structure involved in agent communication:
1. Message content, which contains the locution which the agent wishes to make;
for example, "it is cold";
2. Performatives, which describe what kind of message is being passed; for exam¬
ple:
{Tell: "it is cold"}, or
{Query: "it is cold"}.
Common examples of performatives include confirm, disconfirm, promise, tell,
request, report, etc. Performatives make explicit what the purpose of the mes¬
sage is, allowing agent communication to avoid the confusion and ambiguity that
is often found in human speech. In agent communication, messages must always
have some purpose. Whilst the message content can be viewed as a locution, the
performative can be viewed as an illocution: it conveys the intended meaning of
the message. Performatives are analogous to real-world actions.
3. The Protocol, which determines how the conversation is to be carried out be¬
tween the agents. This dictates the exact structure of each message, and deter¬
mines which particular speech acts are permissible to agents in a given situation.
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The permissible performatives and their precise meanings are defined within the
protocol, as are the parameters that are permissible or necessary within the mes¬
sage.
The most common agent communication protocols are FIPA-ACL [FIPA-ACL, 2002]
and KQML [KQML, 2005],
KQML
KQML (Knowledge Query and Manipulation Language) is a protocol for exchanging
knowledge and information. There are several different versions of KQML, each of
which contain different performatives. This proved to be a disadvantage of KQML, be¬
cause it lead to situations where agents with different versions of KQML were not able
to interact successfully, because they did not have the same performatives [Wooldridge,
2002],
KQML depends on the notion of a virtual knowledge base (VKB). In order for agents to
communicate successfully using KQML, it is not necessary for them to have the same
internal representation of knowledge. However, communication is much facilitated if
the agents behave as if they had some internal representation of knowledge. The VBK
is the attribution of knowledge by the agents to other agents.
KQML has been very successful, and its introduction was an extremely significant
development in multiagent system development. However, it has received criticism.
The semantics are not rigorously defined and sometimes leave meaning open to in¬
terpretation; there are performatives that are not represented at all in KQML, and the
performative set is considered to be too large and rather ad hoc.
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FIPA-ACL
FIPA (Foundations for Intelligent Physical Agents) is an influential organisation aimed
at producing standards for the interoperation of heterogeneous software agents [FIPA,
2005]. Their Agent Communication Language (ACL) has become a standard agent
protocol. FIPA describes FIPA-ACL as "A language with precisely defined syntax,
semantics and pragmatics that is the basis of communication between independently
designed and developed software agents" [FIPA, 1997].
It is superficially similar to KQML; the relationship between these two protocols is
discussed in [FIPA, 1997]. The main difference between them is in the performatives.
FIPA-ACL addressed many of the criticisms of KQML, such as the lack of formal
semantics. It contains twenty-two performatives, which can be grouped into five cat¬
egories: passing information, requesting information, negotiation, performing actions
and error handling.
Agent Ontologies
In order to communicate successfully, it is not only necessary for agents to have proto¬
cols and performatives that they can both understand, but also for the message content
to use terminology which they both understand. The knowledge of an agent about the
world, and the terminology which is used to represent this, is contained in the agent's
ontology. This is discussed in Section 2.2.
2.1.2 Multiagent Systems
In order to be able to function in a useful way, agents normally exist within multiagent
systems [Huhns and Stephens, 1999], It is within these systems that they perform their
tasks and attempt to achieve their goals by cooperating with other agents and gaining
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access to services that are controlled and maintained by other agents. Agents represent
their users or owners, and receive their goals from them. To a large extent, they also
receive their ontologies and protocols from their owners or designers, although these
may be altered to some extent by the agents, independent of their owners, if they are
learning about the domain. The concept of agents and multiagent systems provides
a basis for large-scale automated interaction between users who are geographically,
functionally and intentionally diverse. In order to enable easy visualisation of the
interactions that are possible within a multiagent system, they are often modelled on
standard platforms for human interactions: for example, an auction house or a market
place. This anthropomorphisation of agents provides a simple way to understand and
talk about what is happening within these large, complex systems, and hence facilitates
their design. It allows terms such as cooperation, negotiation, intention, and so on, to
become meaningful in the context of computer systems interacting, which allows users
to model their own desires and intentions easily.
In order for multiagent systems to function, we require [Durfee, 1999]:
• Coherence - agents need to want to work together;
• Competence - agents need to know how to work well together.
Coherence does not rule out the possibility of agents being competitive or self-interested;
in fact, these aspects are central to many agents in multiagent systems, such as those
involved in commercial activities. If the agents do not wish to work together purely for
the benefit of others then there must be other reasons for them to wish to interact: for
example, their aims are served through interaction with particular agents, or they gain
more benefit from collective efforts, or there are disincentives introduced to the system
for agent individualism.
Competence is a fairly simple issue if the agents are all designed to the same pattern.
However, if agents use different languages, protocols or ontologies then this issue can
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become extremely complex. The aim of this project could be considered as an attempt
to ease the problem of competence in a multiagent system where the agents do not all
share the same ontology.
2.1.3 Relevance to the Project
• What the project requires from agent technology:
The processes of diagnosis and refinement, which are the central interest of this
project, are set, for this project, within an agent communication system. The
refinements are being performed on agent ontologies, and are necessary due to
plan execution failure within the multiagent system. Thus the project depends
heavily on the ability to build agents and a multiagent system within which they
can interact. However, since the multiagent system is the platform for the more
central focus of the project, rather than the central focus itself, we have kept it
as simple as possible, and have not investigated the more complex problems that
multiagent systems entail.
• What the project contributes to agent technology:
The central aim of ORS—to enable communication between agents that would
otherwise be unable to communicate due to ontological mismatch—is a useful
addition to communication within a multiagent system. Since we have not at¬
tempted to do anything complex with agents in this project, but we have rather
borrowed the research that allows us to build a simple agent communication sys¬




The concept of ontologies is central to our work. In this section, we introduce the
notion of ontologies, to ensure that the reader has a sufficient understanding of the
underlying concepts on which this project is based. We do not, in this section, examine
the sub-issues of ontology mapping and refining, which are closely related to the work
of this project; these are explored in Chapter 3.
The AI term ontology is derived from the philosophical term of the same name, mean¬
ing a systematic account of existence. Ontology, in philosophy, is concerned with what
exists and how things that exist are related to one another, and is clearly distinct from
epistemology, meaning what is known about or believed to exist. The word ontology
was adapted by AI to refer to a formal specification of what exists: for example, for¬
malising concepts, objects and relationships between them. Because ontologies must
completely and explicitly describe what exists, they are not universal, describing ev¬
erything that exists, but instead describe a specific domain. Such domains are typically
fairly small, as it is laborious and difficult to describe domains completely and explic¬
itly, and extremely large ontologies are difficult to reason with.
An ontology could be considered to be a description of a domain: what exists in a
domain is defined by what it is in the ontology. However, as agent technology has
developed, and multiagent systems commonly consist of agents owned and designed
by multiple users, it is often the case that the ontologies of agents diverge; both the
knowledge contained in an ontology and the representation of that knowledge may dif¬
fer due to the different aims and needs of the agents. In such situations, an agent's
ontology cannot be considered to be an objective definition of what exists, but rather
as reflecting the agent's understanding or interpretation of what exists. In many situa¬
tions, ontologies are considered to be shared knowledge; that is, it is the manifestation
of a shared understanding of a domain that is agreed between a number of agents;
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agents that diverge from this ontology can be said to be mistaken and in some sense
objectively wrong. However, in peer-to-peer systems, there is no definitive version
of reality; rather, if the differences cause problems, the agents must negotiate as to
which, if any, of their divergent ontologies to accept, or how these ontologies can be
merged. In this context, the meaning of ontology is thus closer to the philosophical
term epistemology than it is to the philosophical term ontology.
There are, in fact, many different definitions for ontology that are in use today. This
comes about partly due to the fact that people with diverse backgrounds and interests
are engaged in developing and using ontologies, and naturally create ontologies that
suit their own particular needs. Gruber defined an ontology as "an explicit specifica¬
tion ofa conceptualisation" [Gruber, 1993], which was expanded by Borst et al [Borst
et al., 1997] to prescribe that the specification should be formal and the conceptualisa¬
tion should be shared (note that this does not fit with how ontologies are regarded in
peer-to-peer systems: although, in such systems, there may be a large amount of shared
knowledge present, it is not assumed that the entire ontology must be shared or agreed
on). An ontology can be considered to be "a specification of the objects, concepts and
relationships in an area of interest" [Huhns and Stephens, 1999], and thus provides po¬
tential terms for describing knowledge about the domain [Chandrasekaran et al., 1999].
Kalfoglou examined many of these similar but slightly different definitions [Kalfoglou,
2002] and produced a summary of an ontology as an explicit representation ofa shared
understanding of the important concepts in some domain of interest.". He considered
it to be central to the role of an ontology that it supports knowledge sharing within and
among groups of agents.
At its most general level, an ontology can be considered to be the vocabulary, or sig¬
nature, that is used to describe the world. Whether, for example, money is considered
to be a concept that requires only one argument: (Money ?Amount); or two arguments:
(Money ?Amount ?Owner)\ or three arguments: (Money ?Amount ?Owner ?Currency),
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is determined by the ontology. An ontology also contains a class hierarchy, which is a
taxonomy describing how classes of objects are related to one another. The signature
is used to create a theory, which consists of facts about the world that are written using
the vocabulary: for example, (Money 10 Agent1 Sterling). The term ontology is used
either to refer to both the signature and the theory, or just to the signature, with the
theory being considered to be something outwith the ontology. In this project, we use
the former definition, as described in Section 1.3.
Kalfoglou and Schorlemmer [Kalfoglou and Schorlemmer, 2003b] define an ontology
as O — (S,A), where S is a signature and A is a set of axioms (or theory). This corre¬
sponds with the definition of ontology we use.
When an agent commits to an ontology, this means that its observable actions are con¬
sistent with the definitions in the ontology [Gruber, 1995], An ontological commitment
is an agreement to use a vocabulary in a way that is consistent with respect to the theory
that specifies the ontology.
An important role of ontologies is facilitating the reuse and sharing of knowledge [Gru¬
ber, 1991]. Building large knowledge bases is a difficult and costly process; it is there¬
fore essential that the effort put into this can be used more than once in more than
one particular situation. Traditional knowledge bases lacked the ability to facilitate
this: reusing can only be done by adopting the entire representation and programming
environment of the existing KB. Since ontologies build up a vocabulary of terms to
describe a domain, they are thus more amenable to reuse and sharing. Many theo¬
ries can be developed for a single signature, so that a domain description can cover
many instantiations of that domain. Additionally, ontologies facilitate the adaptation
of domain knowledge by users who wish to alter or add new concepts or relationships.
Online systems have been created for aiding the reuse and sharing of ontologies, a
well-known example of which is Ontolingua [Farquhar et al., 1996, Gruber, 1992, Gru¬
ber, 1993]. Ontolingua is a system for analysing and translating ontologies. It aims
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to describe ontologies in a form that is compatible with multiple representation lan¬
guages, and has a translation mechanism so that Ontolingua ontologies can be shared
by users requiring CLIPS, CLM, EpiKit, Interface Description Language, LOOM or
Prolog Syntax. The ontologies used in this project were written using Ontolingua.
2.2.1 Ontological Representation
One of the most crucial decisions that must be made in ontology construction is what
representation will be used. There are two conflicting issues at stake: how to allow
expressive representation, and how to enable tractable reasoning. The first issue is
best served by using an extremely expressive representation, such as full first-order
logic, and this is the basis of many popular ontological representations, such as KIF.
However, full first-order logic is not decidable and consequently can be difficult to
reason with. Much work has therefore been invested into finding a better compromise
between the two issues: to find a subset of first-order logic that retains a high level of
expressiveness, but at the same time is not undecidable or difficult to reason with.
Description Logics
Description Logics (DLs) represent some of the more successful attempts to balance
the need for tractability against the need for expressivity. DLs are subsets of first-
order logic; for example, the DL ALC corresponds to the fragments of first-order
logic obtained by restricting the syntax to formulae containing two variables [Nardi
and Brachman, 2003]. ALC is the smallest propositional closed DL, and can in some
ways be considered to be the basic DL. It is lacking in expressive power; for example,
it does not have appropriate operators to deal with inequality and equivalence. Many
other DLs are extensions to ALC, and these have greater expressivity. However, they
suffer from increased computational complexity, making them less tractable.
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DLs grew out of earlier work on representing knowledge through semantic networks
[Quillian, 1967] and frames [Minsky, 1985]. The essential components of a DL knowl¬
edge base are individuals, concepts and roles that relate them. Concepts can be equated
to classes, describing the common properties of a collection of individuals, and are thus
unary relationships. Roles are binary relations between objects. New concepts and
roles can be defined using language constructs that are defined by each DL, such as
intersection, union and role quantification. The main reasoning tasks are classification,
satisfiability, subsumption and instance checking. A DL ontology is split into two sec¬
tions: the T-box and the A-box. The basic form of declaration in a T-Box is a concept
definition, where new concepts are defined in terms of previously defined concepts.
They contain the terminological and background knowledge and can be considered to
be equivalent to our definition of signature. The A-Box contains assertions about in¬
dividuals, called membership assertions, and can be considered to be equivalent to our
definition of theory.
DLs are widely used. They are the basis for most of the web ontology representations
discussed in Section 2.3, and have been used in a variety of applications, including
conceptual modelling, information integration, query mechanisms, view maintenance,
software management systems, configurations systems and natural language under¬
standing [DL, 2004],
KIF
Knowledge Interchange Format (KIF) is perhaps the most popular full first-order on-
tological representation format. KIF was designed for use in the interchange of knowl¬
edge among disparate computer systems, which have been created by different pro¬
grammers at different times and in different languages [Genesereth and Fikes, 1992].
There are three essential features to KIF:
• It has declarative semantics;
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• It is logically comprehensive and provides for the expression of arbitrary first-
order logical sentences;
• It provides for the representation of knowledge about knowledge.
Ontologies written on the Ontolingua server are written in a specialised representation
language which is based on KIF, together with the Ontolingua frame-ontology.
Semantic Web Representations
Ontologies are central to the Semantic Web. The growth of the Semantic Web has
lead to an increase in the importance of developing ontology research, and the diver¬
gent, distributed and large-scale nature of the Semantic Web has meant that the so¬
phistication and functionality demanded from ontological representations has greatly
increased. The resulting representations are discussed in Section 2.3.1.
2.2.2 Ontologies and Contexts
A different approach to the problem of describing information semantics is through the
use of contexts. The difference between ontologies and context can be summarised as
follows [Bouquet et ah, 2004]:
• Ontologies are intended to be shared and to represent a view that is common to
different parties;
• Contexts are not intended to be shared, but rather are local, and represent a
personal view that is particular to an individual.
A context is a subset of a knowledge base that is relevant in a particular instance
[Giunchiglia, 1993]. It is a theory of the world that encodes an individual's subjec¬
tive perspective to the world.
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It is clear that ontologies are more useful than contexts in many situations because they
enable the sharing of knowledge, which facilitates communication and information
exchange. However, ontologies depend on there being a consensus of opinion about the
knowledge being represented, and on each agent that accesses that ontology requiring
only knowledge that is shared, and not keeping any personal information to itself.
Additionally, they can be very difficult to create and maintain. The use of contexts can
alleviate some of these problems; agents can have private information, and contexts
are easy to build and maintain because it is not necessary to obtain a consensus on how
information should be represented. However, inter-context communication requires
there to be mappings from the context of one agent to the context of another.
[Bouquet et al., 2004] proposes the integration of contexts and ontologies to produce
contextual ontologies, which are considered to be ontologies that are kept local, and
thus not shared with other ontologies, but whose content is put in relation with the
content of other ontologies via explicit mappings. Bouquet et al have developed Con¬
text OWL (C-OWL) to allow for the representation of contextual ontologies. C-OWL
is an extension of OWL (see Section 2.3.1), with the addition of bridge rules, which
allow concepts, roles and individuals in one ontology to be related to those in another.
Thus a contextual ontology is an OWL ontology embedded in a space of other OWL
ontologies and related to them via context mappings. Besana et al [Besana et al., 2005]
present a framework for allowing agents to discover semantic mappings between con¬
texts as these become necessary for communication. Potential bridges are hypothesised
and confidence intervals assigned to them through a filtering process.
2.2.3 Relevance to the Project
• What the project requires from ontologies:
It is necessary to base our concept of ontology on accepted definitions of on¬
tology within the field, so as to ensure that our work is compatible with other
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work being done with ontologies. Naturally, we cannot claim to have made a
contribution to ontology refinement and matching if our concept of ontology is
completely different to that which is generally used, and thus closely studying
this field was essential to our work. The project particularly makes use of the
KIF representation, and we have used the Ontolingua server to produce our on¬
tologies.
• What the project contributes to ontologies:
We do not consider that the project contributes directly to the theory of ontolo¬
gies. The contribution of this project is concerned with the subfield of ontology
refinement and matching; this subject is covered in detail in Chapter 3.
2.3 The Semantic Web
The development of the World Wide Web has caused an enormous change in global
communication and the impact of computers on people's lives. However, the role of
computers within the Web is to act as tools, giving access to the information but not
processing or evaluating it. The WWW was designed for human comprehension and
relies heavily on natural language and visual aids such as pictures, fonts and colours,
which can be difficult for machines to analyse. But as the importance of web-based
services has increased [Mcllraith et al., 2001], it has become increasingly apparent
that there would be enormous benefit in enabling machines to use the web and perform
web-based tasks currently performed by humans [Narayanan and Mcllraith, 2002].
The two main motivators of the Semantic Web are data integration and providing more
intelligent support for end users [van Harmelen, 2004], Thus much current research
is focused on how to make the web structure and web-based services accessible to
automated systems.
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The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), which is the organisation that is chiefly
behind the development of the Semantic Web, define the Semantic Web as providing
"a common framework that allows data to be shared and reused across application,
enterprise, and community boundaries" [W3C, 2005].
In order to facilitate this, markup languages, which have well-defined semantics to
enable unambiguous computer interpretation, are essential to the Semantic Web.
Just as the World Wide Web can viewed as a network for providing access to online
services, the purpose of the Semantic Web is often viewed as facilitating services, that
are provided, accessed and used by automated systems. The Semantic Web Services
Initiative (SWSI) is an ad hoc initiative of academic and industrial researchers which
aims to create infrastructure to support "maximal automation and dynamism in all
aspects of Web service provision and use" [SWSI, 2005],
A key concept of the semantic web is the automated processing of ontological knowl¬
edge by agents and services. [Berners-Lee et al., 2001] outlines how these are central
to the role of the semantic web, and how they require ontological matching to perform
appropriately. However, the nature of the semantic web means that strict controls on
these ontologies are impractical: it must allow for, amongst other things, partial infor¬
mation, erroneous information and the evolution of ontologies [Koivunen and Miller,
2001]. All of these requirements cause difficulties for agent communication, and create
the need for online ontology mapping and refinement.
2.3.1 Ontologies on the Semantic Web
Since the central purpose of the Semantic Web is to allow semantic interpretation of
remote information and services by automated systems and agents, the problem of how
to represent this information to facilitate this is crucial. The meaning of everything on
the Semantic Web has to be explicit, has to be available to systems or agents attempting
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to access it, and has to be formally represented so that it is unambiguous. Thus on¬
tologies are widely regarded as one of the foundational technologies for the Semantic
Web [Antoniou et al., 2005].
Over the past few years, several markup languages have been developed which can
make the contents of Web pages apparent to agents. The first of these is XML (Exten¬
sible Markup Language). Although this considerably improved the situation, it lacks
semantics [Mcllraith et al., 2001], hence ambiguity is possible and agents cannot be
guaranteed to determine the intended interpretation of XML flags [SemanticWeb.org,
2002],
W3C developed RDF (Resource Description Framework) [Lassila and Swick, 1999]
and RDFS (RDF Schema), which is an object-oriented type system which can be
thought of as a minimal ontology language [Mcllraith et al., 2001], RDF Schema
allows the following features to be expressed [Antoniou et al., 2005]:
• Classes and their instances;
• Binary properties between objects;
• Organisation of classes and properties in hierarchies;
• Types for properties: domain and range restrictions.
These are an improvement on XML but are still not expressive enough and have poorly
defined semantics. RDF and RDFS are based on an unusual thesis of representation
that is different from that built into most representation languages, and this makes its
use as the foundation of representation in the Semantic Web difficult [Horrocks and
Patel-Schneider, 2003].
In order to attempt to rectify the problems associated with RDF and RDFS, the DAML
(DARPA Agent Markup Language) family was developed, and these are becoming the
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web standard. OIL (Ontology Inference Layer) is an advanced ontology language that
was designed to meet three requirements [Fensel et al., 2001]:
• to be highly intuitive to the human user;
• to have well-defined formal semantics with established reasoning properties;
• to have a proper link with existing Web languages such as XML and RDF to
ensure interoperability.
The combination of DAML with OIL to create DAML+OIL [DAML+OIL, 2002],
which is built on top of RDF(S) and extends its expressive power, was an important
development. It was built from the original DAML ontology language DAML-ONT
in an effort to combine many of the language components of OIL. The language has
a clean and well defined semantics and a clearly specified syntax. DAML+OIL was
carefully designed so that reasoning was decidable [Horrocks and Patel-Schneider,
2003]. DAML+OIL was used by W3C to create the OWL Web Ontology Language.
DAML+OIL and OWL extend RDFS.
An important idea for representation on the Semantic Web is the idea of layering lan¬
guages. This allows for a simple core that can accommodate simple taxonomies and
relationships, while additional layers of expressivity, functionality, and complexity can
be added for groups requiring more expressive power [Clark and Uschold, 2002], In
order to meet the different requirements that different users have for the Web, OWL is
layered. The lowest layer is RDFS, on which all the OWL layers are based. The OWL
layers on top of RDFS, in order of increasing complexity, are: OWL-Lite, OWL-DL
and OWL Full. This approach enables users to use the maximal expressivity they re¬
quire without dealing with the complications of expressivity they do not need.
However, like all DAML languages, OWL is largely based on Description Logic, and
its semantics are thus very different from those of RDFS, making layering DAML+OIL
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or OWL on top of RDFS problematic. A solution to this layering problem has been
suggested through the development of languages such as SKIF [Flayes and Menzel,
2001] and Cbase [Guha and Hayes, 2003], which have semantics that are more similar
to those of RDFS. The core of SKIF and Lbase is standard first order logic syntax,
extended with the ability to use predicates and variables interchangeably [Horrocks
and Patel-Schneider, 2003]. Horrocks and Patel-Schneider argue that it would in many
ways be better not to use RDF and RDFS as the basis for Semantic Web ontologies,
but instead to base them in first-order logic [Horrocks and Patel-Schneider, 2003].
However, using any language that is not based on RDF and RDFS could be considered
to be a disadvantage, because it could not take advantage of the XML- and RDF-based
technology that has allowed DAML+OIL to develop so quickly [van Harmelen, 2002],
Ontology Service Languages
The concept of services is centrally important to the Semantic Web: many common
interactions on the Semantic Web are assumed to consist of agents performing services
for one another. It is thus important that ontology languages that are used by agents on
the Semantic Web are able to describe interfaces to services. This essentially involves
being able to describe the conditions under which a service is performable and how
things are changed after the service has been performed. The process can be thought
of as analogous to an action description. However, it is difficult in most ontology
languages to describe services. A simple definition for a service might include a list of
conditions under which it was performable and a list of conditions that apply after it has
been performed: in effect, preconditions and effects. However, a general description of
preconditions and effects requires the use of variables, and ontology languages based
on Description Logics do not include variables. Thus it is rather more complicated to
describe services in such ontologies.
An attempt to provide this ability for DAML languages created DAML-S, a DAML-
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based Web Service Ontology [DAML-S, 2002], This was later updated to OWL-S [Ser¬
vices, 2005], which is compatible with OWL. It supplies web service providers with a
core set of markup language constructs for describing the properties and capabilities of
their web services in unambiguous, computer-interpretable form. OWL-S markup is
designed to make web service tasks easier to automate. An OWL-S ontology is made
up of three parts, as illustrated in Figure 2.1:
• The Service Profile: this is for advertising and discovering services, and de¬
scribes what the service requires of the user and what it provides for them;
• The Service Model: this gives a detailed description of a service's operation, and
describes how it works and what happens when the service is carried out;
• The Service Grounding: this provides details of how to interoperate with a ser¬
vice, via a message, and explains how the service is used: the necessary com¬
munication protocol, message formats and other service-specific details.
The service profile provides the information needed for an agent to discover a service
and, taken together, the service model and service grounding provide enough informa¬
tion for an agent to make use of a service.
Figure 2.1: OWL-S Service
Similar to OWL-S is WSMO (Web Service Modelling Ontology) [WSMO, 2005], an
initiative to describe web services using F-Logic [Kifer and Lausen, 1989].
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2.3.2 Relevance to the Project
• What the project requires from the Semantic Web:
The project does not directly build on the work done in this field. However,
it is nevertheless important to the development of the project, because the Se¬
mantic Web, and other large-scale, multi-user, distributed systems provide the
motivation for this work and the area in which it will be useful. The fact that the
Semantic Web is an area of increasing import in Artificial Intelligence demon¬
strates that the scenario in which our work can operate is one that is of much
importance.
• What the project can contribute to the Semantic Web:
The main focus of the project could be considered to be aimed at systems like
the Semantic Web, in which large numbers of disparate processes, or agents, are
attempting to interact successfully. Systems such as this cannot always assume
that these agents are identical, and yet differences between the agents present
huge problems in their interactions, which are often difficult or impossible due to
these differences. This project addresses one aspect of this problem: ontological
mismatch. Since it is not possible to ensure mismatches do not exist, nor is it
easy for agents to interact when mismatches exist, patching these mismatches
as and when it is necessary is an important part of making systems such as the
Semantic Web successful, and this project presents one approach to this problem.
2.4 e-Science and the Grid
According to the National e-Science Centre [NESC, 2005], e-Science is "the large
scale sciences that will increasingly be carried out through distributed global collab¬
orations enabled by the Internet." They state that this will require access to very large
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data collections, very large scale computing resources and high performance visuali¬
sation for individual user scientists.
The infrastructure required for this is much more complex than is required for, for
example, the World Wide Web, because scientists need access not just to pages of
information but to remote facilities and resources and to dedicated databases. The
focus is on allowing scientists to access instruments remotely and to share and combine
their facilities and their results. In order to facilitate this, the architecture of the Grid is
being developed.
According to Ian Foster and Carl Kesselman, the Grid is "an infrastructure that en¬
ables flexible, secure, coordinated resource sharing among dynamic collections of in¬
dividuals, institutions and resources." [RCUK, 2004], Foster and Kesselman are the
inventors of the Globus approach to the Grid. Their Globus Toolkit is an open source
software toolkit which is used for building most Grid systems and applications.
Like the Semantic Web, the Grid has to deal with the problem of multiple users who
wish to be able to interact automatically. e-Science is designed as a tool for scientists,
and it is imperative that it should not be difficult to use or place too many demands on
users, such as insisting on them altering their representations to a common represen¬
tation; if it does, scientists will prefer to rely on older techniques of communication
and interaction and will not use the Grid. Thus the ability to deal with many kinds of
mismatches is crucial to the success of the Grid and of e-Science.
2.4.1 Relevance to the Project
Since the Grid is also a large-scale, multi-user, distributed system, albeit a less tightly




Peer-to-Peer computing is an area that has grown to prominence in recent years, and
is the basis of many of the Internet's most important and innovative applications. It
seems clear that the development of the Semantic Web will lead to an even greater
dependence on peer-to-peer systems and a need to develop their functionality even
further.
There is no definitive formalisation of what a peer-to-peer system is, but their essential
characteristic is that they are distributed systems, with no central control or hierarchical
organisation [Haase et al., 2004]. Each peer in the network is autonomous and has
equal status with every other peer. Characteristics generally associated with peer-to-
peer networks are [Oriol, 2003]:
• Decentralisation: there is no central control or management;
• Potentially large size: it is possible for a large number of peers to join;
• Dynamism: there are no constraints on peers' behaviour and abilities, and thus
it is impossible to know when a specific peer may leave or join the network;
• Heterogeneity: the peers in the network may be very different;
• Service provision: peers may use the services of other peers and themselves
provide services that are available to other peers.
The main advantages of peer-to-peer networks is that they remove the bottlenecks
associated with centralisation, and therefore they allow efficient use of network re¬
sources. Such systems are more scalable and more robust than centralised systems.
The potential search problems in peer-to-peer systems can be dealt with by a variety of
techniques, such as distributed hash-tables (DHTs), or by semantic overlay networks
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(SONs), or by some combination of the two. DHTs allow for storing and allocating
content in a completely distributed way, by hashing each shared item to a unique key,
which is efficiently routed to the unique peer responsible for that key. SONs enable
peers to keep pointers to other peers which have similar content to them; thus queries
in peer-to-peer networks can be more directed, and do not need to be distributed to
every peer in the network [Haase et al., 2004]. pNear [Siebes, 2005] combines these
two approaches and thereby circumvents some important disadvantages that hold for
the individual approaches.
Some of the important applications that are based on peer-to-peer networks are [Mau-
the and Hutchison, 2003]:
• Napster: which is an online music sharing system, the first such system based
on peer-to-peer technology. It is, in fact, only partially peer-to-peer: the actual
exchange of content is between peers, but the discovery of peers is centralised;
• Gnutella: which is another online file sharing network used primarily to ex¬
change music, films and software. It is fully peer-to-peer; however, it suffers
from problems of scalability and from free riders (peers who take content from
other peers but do not provide any themselves);
• MojoNation: which is an online file store which is fully peer-to-peer and in¬
cludes disincentives for free riders through a credit system;
• Freenet: which is a file/content sharing system where the primary goal is to
make its use censorship-resistant by ensuring completely anonymity and pre¬
venting file deletion;
• Bibster: which is an application of the use of semantics in peer-to-peer systems,
and enables exchanging bibliographic metadata amongst researchers.
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Peer-to-peer techniques are not only useful on the Internet; they can also be used ef¬
fectively in domains such as the Semantic Web, Grid computing, database systems
and multiagent systems. In fact, the arguments for peer-to-peer technology in such
environments is often more persuasive than on the Internet. For example, on the Se¬
mantic Web, there is not only a potential problem with physical bottlenecks, as on the
Internet, but also with semantic bottlenecks, where semantics are enforced by a central
server [Stuckenschmidt et al., 2005]. Making use of peer-to-peer technology will avoid
both of these problems.
However, useful as peer-to-peer systems are, they are still not realising the full po¬
tential of peer-to-peer technology. One problem is that the knowledge structure of
peers in peer-to-peer networks is generally quite limited. Peer-to-peer systems mostly
rely on keyword search and are not appropriate for the requirements of more sophis¬
ticated knowledge structures, such as knowledge management systems [Ehrig et al.,
2003]. The SWAP (Semantic Web and Peer-to-Peer) project integrates these two ap¬
proaches, allowing participants to maintain individual knowledge structures whilst
sharing knowledge in ways such that administration efforts are low but knowledge
sharing and finding is easy. Another approach is to take an agent-based view of peer-
to-peer [Singh, 2002], with agents acting as peers and modelling, communicating and
learning about each other. Peer-to-peer systems can also be used for effective com¬
position of web services [Walton, 2005] if the peers in a peer-to-peer architecture are
represented and controlled through a web service interface.
2.5.1 Relevance to the Project
• What the project requires from peer-to-peer:
The philosophy behind peer-to-peer technology informs the philosophy behind
ORS, and we ultimately envisage the technology behind ORS being used in
a peer-to-peer environment where one cannot make assumptions about other
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agents and one must attempt to interact successfully with other agents despite
heterogeneity and despite the lack of any central resources for overcoming these
difficulties. However, since ORS is currently a proof-of-concept system, its in¬
herent limitations mean that it is not currently peer-to-peer, nor have we taken
many practical ideas from the field in the developing of ORS.
• What the project can contribute to peer-to-peer:
One of the difficulties of peer-to-peer agent systems is that the agents must be
able to understand one another, and yet the nature of peer-to-peer systems means
that it is not desirable or possible to place too many conditions on peers. Investi¬
gating how peers might communicate without being entirely compatible is thus
important, and ORS tackles one aspect of this: namely how agents with simi¬
lar but misaligned ontologies can successfully communicate. The ideas of ORS
could thus be useful in a peer-to-peer context, particular in a situation where the
peers are agents.
2.6 Planning
The ability to form plans to achieve a goal and then to execute these plans in a given
environment is generally considered to be one of the most fundamental and important
aspects of intelligence. The field of planning has been significant since the earliest
days of AI, and has progressed impressively over the years. However, there are still
many problems that remain unsolved, and many ways in which automated planning
is vastly inferior to human planning. In this section, we explain the development of
planning throughout its history, the most significant fields today, and the relevance of
planning to this project.
The field of automated planning grew out of AI problem solving in the early 1970s.
Among the first significant planning system were QA3, developed by Cordell Green in
38 Chapter 2. Background
1969 and STRIPS (Stanford Research Institute Problem Solver), [Fikes and Nilsson,
1971], developed in 1971 by Fikes and Nilsson. At this time, as the name STRIPS
suggests, planning and problem solving were considered analogous, though they have
since diverged. QA3 represents sentences and questions in a first-order language and
carries out deduction by resolution. STRIPS was used to drive the SHAKEY robot and
addressed the problem of efficiently representing and implementing the operations of a
problem. STRIPS has had a strong influence on the development of the planning field
and even today a great many planners use a STRIPS-style representation.
STRIPS-style systems use operators which consist of three lists: preconditions, add-
list and delete-list. The first list states what preconditions must be true before the
operator can be applied, the second list states what will become true as a result of the
application of the operator and the third list states things that were previously true and
have now been made false. The representation assumes that all actions are instanta¬
neous and that there is no interval between actions, which is not always a reasonable
assumption. STRIPS makes use of triangle tables, which is a data structure for or¬
ganising sequences of actions within a plan [Luger and Stubblefield, 1997]. The main
advantage of triangle tables is that they offer some assistance if the plan breaks down
due to an unexpected event. When something goes wrong, the planner can look into
the rows and columns of the triangle table to find what is still true, and use this to work
out what the next step should be to get the larger solution restarted.
Modern planning seems to fall naturally into two distinct threads: heuristic planning
and planning graph based planning.
• Heuristic Planning: As the name implies, heuristic planning uses heuristics to
guide the search process. One of the biggest challenges in planning is develop¬
ing systems that can produce plans quickly. The reason why planning can be a
very slow process is that the search spaces tend to be enormous. Using heuris¬
tics to reduce the search space can allow the production of planners that are
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extremely time efficient. One of the most influential representatives of this di¬
rection if Hoffmann's FF planner [Hoffmann, 2003, Hoffmann, 2002, Hoffmann
and Nebel, 2001], The success of FF lies in the fact that it uses a relaxed problem
to compute the heuristic for the search. More recently, another big advancement
in heuristic search planning was achieved by LPG [Gerevini et al., 2003].
• Planning Graph based planning: Another popular planning paradigm was in¬
troduced with the Graphplan planner [Blum and Furst, 1995]. Graphplan is a
partial order, least commitment planner, which is optimal with respect to the
number of execution steps. The ideas behind graph plan are pivotal to the suc¬
cess of many of today's fastest planners, such as BlackBox [Kautz and Selman,
1999] and SATPLAN04 [Kautz and Selman, 1992],
Hierarchical planning is used in many planners, though not in STRIPS, so that plans
can be described at both a high level, providing a good overall view of the plan, and
a low level, providing precise instructions of what to do [Russell and Norvig, 1995].
There are two main types of hierarchical planning:
• Hierarchical decomposition: an abstract, non-primitive operator can be de¬
composed into a complex network of steps.
• Abstraction hierarchies: a single operator can be planned at different levels of
abstraction. At the primitive level, the operator has a full set of preconditions
and effects; at higher levels, the planner ignores some of these details.
Planners that have to deal with large and complex domains will inevitably be working
with incomplete and incorrect information. Even in a simple domain such as the blocks
world, unexpected events can occur, such as a block falling off the block it was placed
on, which would lead to an incorrect theory. Thus it is important to develop planning
systems that can be flexible in their approach and continue to move towards a goal even
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if the intended route is not possible. An early approach to this problem is the STRIPS
triangle tables, as discussed above. Other approaches are:
• Conditional planning: all the possible outcomes are considered in advance and
the plan is developed to give a range of different options depending on the out¬
come of an action. This is not very practical in any but the smallest of domains
as the plan becomes extremely large and a lot of effort is necessary to consider
every possible outcome. In fact, in most domains it is not possible to predict
with certainty every possible outcome.
• Execution monitoring: the outcomes of actions are monitored to check whether
they are as expected, and, if not, replanning is performed. Thus the job of consid¬
ering what to do in the case of failure is deferred until it is necessary to consider
it. This an advantage over conditional planning because it means there is no un¬
necessary work on parts of the plan that do perform as expected. However, there
are also inherent problems in that it can produce fragile plans without the ability
to fix themselves. In practise, a combination of the two is often used.
The above methods are ways to patch plans that fail to work due to unexpected events.
Another problem is how to form plans with knowledge that is known to be inadequate.
Two approaches to this are coercion, where one forces the world into a possibly in¬
accurate model and assumes that this will be sufficient; and abstraction, where one
ignores detail as much as possible. These approaches allow plans to be formed from
incomplete knowledge but run the risk of forming incorrect plans. It is not reason¬
able to assume that either approach is valid; however, if the knowledge is incorrect or
incomplete then it is impossible to form reliable plans and it may be decided that a
potentially incorrect plan, formed using one of the above approaches, is more useful




Proof planning is a meta-level reasoning technique developed at Edinburgh University
for guiding the search of a proof [Bundy, 1991,Bundy, 1998]. Proof planning can
be considered as plan formation in the traditional AI sense, although there are some
differences, mostly to do with the fact that proof planning takes place in the determin¬
istic domain of mathematics, whereas traditional planning deals with incomplete and
uncertain information.
Proof planning splits the problem of finding a proof into two:
1. an approximate plan is assembled by the plan engine;
2. the plan is executed by the theorem prover.
A proof plan captures general knowledge about the commonality between the members
of a proof family and is used to guide the search for more proofs in that family. Proof
planning with critics involves the combination of a proof planner and an exception
handler. The exception handler is invoked if the goal is blocked. A proof critic contains
a high-level specification of a failure pattern as well as providing the corrective action.
Proof planning is cheaper than searching for a proof in the underlying theory because
each plan step covers many proof steps and also because plans contain many heuristics.
2.6.2 Relevance to the Project
• What the project requires from planning:
Making use of automated planning techniques is essential to this project. The
overall aim of what we are doing certainly has uses and importance outside the
realm of planning; however, this is the domain in which have chosen to explore
the problem. The planner is an essential component of the system, without which
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the system could not operate, but the theoretical requirements of the planner
are fairly simple, and we do not require much of the sophistication of modem
planning techniques.
• What the project can contribute to planning:
Although the central aims of the project are tangential to the planning commu¬
nity, the process of developing a planning system that deals with ontologies has
allowed us to make some contributions to the crossover areas between planning
and ontology which, with the development of the Semantic Web and similar
multi-user distributed systems, is becoming increasingly important. These in¬
clude the notion of a plan deconstructor and a translation process between KIF
and PDDL. These are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 and in Sections 6.3
and 9.1.2. Additionally, critics that repair a signature have not previously been
considered in proof planning, but could provide useful additional functionality.
However, we have not investigated this possibility in any detail.
2.7 Summary
This chapter introduces the theory on which ORS depends, describes in brief the rele¬
vant fields, and explains how our work both takes from and adds to these fields.
Chapter 3
Mismatch and Refinement
The focus of this project centres on facilitating the interaction of agents that have mis¬
matched ontologies by finding ways to refine them appropriately. There has been much
work in AI on the problems of refinement and revision in various different contexts, and
on the problem of how to maintain consistency between or within knowledge bases.
The most important approaches are discussed in this chapter. We briefly examine each
approach, and then discuss the subject in the context of our work. A further discussion
of the approaches in this chapter that most closely relate to our work, together with a
detailed analysis of how they compare, can be found in Section 7.5.
3.1 Ontology Mismatch
3.1.1 Introduction
The notion of ontology, as discussed in Section 2.2, was originally concerned with
defining the existence of things in the world. From this point of view, an ontology
can be considered to be objective and absolute: disagreement over the contents of an
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ontology is not permissible. However, such a view is clearly unworkable in an envi¬
ronment where ontologies are interpreted, updated and changed. The emergence of the
Semantic Web, with its distributed and deregulated nature, has exacerbated this prob¬
lem [Kalfoglou and Schorlemmer, 2004], but the problem of integrity of knowledge
bases is far older than this. Even in the field of databases, which are much more con¬
trollable than the Semantic Web because they can be regulated and are not distributed,
this issue has to be faced [Banerjee et al., 1987]. Additionally, the field of belief re¬
vision ( [Belief Revision, 2005]; see Section 3.2) is concerned with how a system of
beliefs can be maintained under conflicting information. In fact, [Finkelstein et al.,
1993] makes it clear that semantic heterogeneity is something that is an inevitability in
distributed systems.
The central role of the Semantic Web can be viewed as facilitating agents from dif¬
ferent backgrounds and perspectives to interact successfully. Differences between
ontologies that interacting agents may have access to threaten their ability to inter-
operate. ISO/IEC 2382 defines interoperability as "the capability to communicate,
execute programs, or transfer data among various functional units in a manner that
requires the user to have little or no knowledge of the unique characteristics of those
units" [Kalfoglou and Schorlemmer, 2004], In a multi-agent context, Uschold argues
that "two agents are semantically integrated ifthey can successfully communicate with
each other" and that "successful exchange of information means that the agents un¬
derstand each other and there is guaranteed accuracy" [Uschold, 2002], The idea that
guaranteed accuracy is essential is not universally accepted; it is becoming increasingly
common to define a notion of "good enough" [Kalfoglou and Schorlemmer, 2004], and
ensuring that agent communication complies with this standard, rather than guaranteed
accuracy. This notion has developed pragmatically, because insisting on perfection in
a system such as the Semantic Web is unworkable. This mirrors the situation in hu¬
man communication where, due to the complexity of interaction, misunderstandings
are always possible.
3.1. Ontology Mismatch
3.1.2 How and Why Ontologies Differ
45
As discussed in Section 2.2, the term ontology does not always mean the same thing to
all people. Determining what we mean by ontology mismatch and how this can occur
is obviously dependent on what we mean by ontology. In this project, we follow the
definition of ontology expounded by Kalfoglou and Schorlemmer, which can be found
in Section 2.2, where an ontology consists of both a signature and a theory, though
some people define ontology to be only the signature. Kalfoglou and Schorlemmer
explain that a basic approach to the problem of mismatched ontologies is to consider
only morphism of the ontological signature, whereas a more ambitious and practically
necessary approach is to consider how ontological axioms are mapped as well as the
signature [Kalfoglou and Schorlemmer, 2003b], We, like most involved in resolving
ontology mismatch, are centrally concerned with dealing with signature mismatch, but,
like Kalfoglou and Schorlemmer, agree that dealing with the axioms (or theory) is a
practical necessity in order to maintain internal consistency within an ontology.
A very common approach to ontologies is to view them as a taxonomy of concepts,
or a class hierarchy [Giunchiglia and Shvaiko, 2003, Giunchiglia et al., 2005a, Doan
et ah, 2003,Campbell and Shapiro, 1998,Kalfoglou and Schorlemmer, 2003a,Wiesman
et ah, 2002]. Thus ontology mismatch is concerned with differences in the taxonomy
of ontologies, and finding links between the concepts.
Hameed et al [Hameed et ah, 2003] list three reasons why there are differences between
ontologies:
1. There are different models to choose from and, even if some become standard,
there will still be legacy differences;
2. Ontologies are often aligned with particular perspectives on the world;
3. Ontologies are evolving.
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It is clear that these are all not only inevitable but desirable features of ontologies, and
that the use of ontologies must develop to be able to deal with them.
3.1.3 Resolving Ontological Differences
The literature discusses four main approaches to the problem of mismatched ontolo¬
gies: mapping, merging, aligning and translation [Kalfoglou and Schorlemmer,
2003b]. These differ in the degree to which they attempt to resolve the differences
between the ontologies and in whether they produce a single ontology or an intelligent
way to interpret each ontology in terms of the other.
3.1.3.1 Ontology Mapping
The process of ontological mapping attempts to build maps between the concepts found
in the two ontologies. According to Kalfoglou and Schorlemmer, ontology mapping is
"the task of relating the vocabulary of two ontologies that share the same domain of
discourse in such a way that the mathematical structure ofontological signatures and
their intended interpretations, as specified by the ontological axioms, are respected"
[Kalfoglou and Schorlemmer, 2003b], According to Stuckenschmidt [Stuckenschmidt,
2002], ontology mapping preserves the autonomy of ontological models on a general
level because agents are able to keep their own ontologies and not conform to a single
merged version. He also claims that the mapping approach to dealing with mismatched
ontologies is the most often mentioned in the literature.
Ontology mapping is difficult. This is, for example, because [Kalfoglou and Schor¬
lemmer, 2003a]:
• There are many implicit assumptions in ontologies;
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• Systems that perform ontology mapping are embedded in an integrated environ¬
ment for ontology editing or are attached to a specific formalism;
• Mapping and merging are usually based on heuristics that mostly use syntactic
clues to determine correspondence or equivalence between ontology concepts,
but rarely use semantics;
• Most, if not all, approaches do not treat ontological axioms or rules often found
in formal ontologies;
• Ontology mapping is a term used in different ways by different people.
Giunchiglia et al [Giunchiglia et al., 2005a,Giunchiglia and Shvaiko, 2003,Giunchiglia
et al., 2005b] reiterate the problem of determining mappings purely through syntactic
means, rather than also using semantics. They attempt to resolve this problem through
their use of semantic matching, which is implemented in their system S-Match, which
is discussed in more detail in Section 3.1.4.
Wache et al [Wache et al., 2001] list four common ways of facilitating ontology map¬
ping:
1. Through defined mappings, which can be predefined or determined during inter¬
action through mediation agents (see Section 3.1.5);
2. Through lexical relations, which provide intuitive semantics for mapping be¬
tween concepts in different ontologies;
3. Through top-level grounding, where a single top-level ontology can be used to
define mappings;
4. Through semantic correspondences, where well-founded semantic correspon¬
dence between concepts from different ontologies can be identified.
48 Chapter 3. Mismatch and Refinement
Hameed et al [Hameed et al., 2003] describe different levels at which this mapping can
take place:
• Pairwise mappings between different individual ontologies - this may have to be
done many times, once for each pair of ontologies;
• Mapping to a single common ontology, which is more scalable but removes flex¬
ibility;
• Mapping between multiple ontology clusters, with inter-cluster mappings, which,
they claim, is the best approach as it combines the advantages of the other two
approaches.
Stuckenschmidt believes that ultimately, pre-existing mappings will rarely exist be¬
tween the networks of ontologies that exist on the Semantic Web because it would be
too expensive to construct them. Rather, these mappings will mostly be established by
individual agents that are using these different ontologies, in order to process a given
task [Stuckenschmidt, 2002],
3.1.3.2 Ontology Merging
Ontology merging is a rather different approach to resolving conflict between ontolo¬
gies. Unlike ontology mapping, which maintains distinct ontologies but determines
ways to relate them, ontology merging results in a single ontology: two different on¬
tologies are scrapped and instead a new one is used that to some extent covers both of
them.
Hameed et al define merging as "the act ofbuilding a new ontology by unifying several
ontologies into a single one" [Hameed et al., 2003], and Noy and Musen view merging
as "a single coherent ontology that includes the informationfrom all sources".
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Ontology merging is less common than ontology mapping, and can be problematic
because the autonomy of agents is partially lost by the use of a global ontology [Stuck-
enschmidt, 2002], It is also more difficult than mapping because of the construction
of this single ontology. Ontology mapping can be thought of as only a fragment of the
more ambitious tasks of merging and aligning ontologies [Kalfoglou and Schorlem-
mer, 2003b].
Mitra and Wiederhold claim that a merging approach of creating a unified source is
not scalable; one monolithic information source is not feasible due to unresolvable
inconsistencies between them that are irrelevant to the application [Mitra et al., 2000].
3.1.3.3 Ontology Alignment
Ontology alignment is a more complete form of mapping, and involves mapping con¬
cepts and relations to indicate equivalence [Kalfoglou and Schorlemmer, 2004],
Noy and Musen consider alignment to be a process in which "the sources must be
made consistent and coherent with one another but kept separately" [Noy and Musen,
2000],
3.1.3.4 Ontology Translation
Translation can be considered to be an implementation of the mapping process. Whilst
ontology mapping defines a collection of functions that specify which concepts and
relations correspond to which other concepts and relations, ontology translation is the
application of these mapping functions to the sentences based on one ontology into the
other [Kalfoglou and Schorlemmer, 2003b],
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3.1.3.5 Mediators and Brokers
Campbell and Shapiro have developed the Ontological Mediator for resolving commu¬
nication difficulties resulting from different ontologies [Campbell and Shapiro, 1998].
An ontological mediator is an agent capable of reasoning about the ontologies of two
communication agents, A\ and A2. If agent A\ uses word W, the mediator must look
for an ontological translation W' that means the same thing to A2. It is assumed that
common words mean the same to both agents. Mediators are not concerned with the
process of detecting misunderstandings, but rather with ways of resolving communi¬
cation problems. In Campbell and Shapiro's definition, ontologies consist of concepts
which are represented by words; one or more words per concept. Words can be shared
between agents but concepts cannot.
This is closely related to the idea of brokers, where broker agents facilitate other agents
communicating with each other. For example, the AKT project [AKT, 2002] has pro¬
duced a brokering system through which agents are able to advertise their capabilities
or to look for other agents to perform tasks for them [Schorlemmer et al., 2002, Slee-
man et al., 2002]. If the ontologies of the agents are not compatible then bridges
are defined to translate terms in one ontology to be described according to the other
ontology. These bridges are usually constructed manually, hence this is not a feasible
solution for ontologies that are widely different. Additionally, they can only be defined
if the ontology of a knowledge system is made explicit. However, they are a powerful
concept for extending the range of the knowledge and capabilities of any system.
3.1.3.6 Ignoring Mismatches
Instead of attempting to diagnose and repair inconsistency, another approach is to sim¬
ply avoid the inconsistency. Reasoning with inconsistent knowledge bases is prob¬
lematic due to the ex contradictione quodlibet premise, which states that from contra-
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diction, anything can be deduced. However, if the classical logic approach is ignored
in favour of a non-standard approach such as paraconsistent logic, then meaningful
reasoning becomes possible. Huang et al [Huang et al., 2005] discuss how selection
functions can be used to select some consistent sub-theory from an inconsistent ontol¬
ogy, so that standard reasoning techniques can then be used to find sensible answers.
They introduce their system PION that implements this approach. However, this deals
with the problem of internal inconsistency, rather than inconsistency between agents.
3.1.4 Systems for Resolving Ontological Differences
In this section, we describe some of the systems that perform these tasks. This is
not intended as a comprehensive survey, but rather to give an overview of the kind of
functionality that is available.
Noy and Musen developed PROMPT [Noy and Musen, 2000], and later PROMPTD-
IFF [Noy and Musen, 2002], which use linguistic similarity matches between concepts
and the underlying ontological structures of the environment of the open-source on¬
tology editor Protege-2000, for which they are available as plug-ins. PROMPT offers
semi-automatic, interactive ontology-merging, which guides users through the merg¬
ing process, determining conflicts and making suggestions and proposing resolution
strategies through syntactic analysis. It is highly interactive and relies on the candi¬
date ontologies already having close similarity. Anchor-PROMPT [Noy and Musen,
2001] implements a number of extensions, including consideration of similarity be¬
tween class hierarchies [Hameed et al., 2003].
The use of information flow methods for mapping ontologies has been implemented in
IFF by Kent [Kent, 2000] and in IF-MAP by Kalfoglou and Schorlemmer [Kalfoglou
and Schorlemmer, 2003a]. IFF represents ontologies as logics, and ontology sharing as
a specifiable ontology extension hierarchy. IF-MAP is based on the Barwise-Seligman
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theory of information flow, which provides a systematic and mechanised way for de¬
ploying channel theory, a mathematical theory of information flow, on a distributed
environment to perform ontology mapping among a variety of different ontologies.
GLUE [Doan et ah, 2003] is an interactive system that uses machine learning to find
semantic mappings between ontologies. It uses multiple learning strategies, each of
which exploits well a different type of information either in the data instances or in the
taxonomic structure of the ontologies. GLUE regards concepts as labels and recasts
the problem as finding the best label assignment to concepts, taking into account both
given knowledge about the domain and the two taxonomies and domain independent
considerations such as neighbourhood. CGLUE extends GLUE by finding complex
mappings between two given taxonomies. The authors claim this is an advantage over
most matching systems, which deal only with simple mappings.
ONION (ONtology CompositlON) [Mitra et al., 2000] proposes a scalable and main¬
tainable approach based on interoperation of ontologies to handle distributed queries
crossing the boundaries of the underlying information systems. This requires the inter¬
operation between the ontologies for the individual information systems to be precisely
defined. ONION matches two sets of concepts using dictionaries and information re¬
trieval techniques.
Chimera [McGuinness et al., 2000] facilitates the merging and testing of ontologies.
McGuinness et al consider the task of merging two ontologies into one or combining
two or more ontologies that may use different vocabularies and may have overlapping
content. Users can request analysis or guidance during the merging process. Help
offered during the merging process includes: generation of a name resolution list that
helps the user in the merging task by suggesting terms, each of which is from a different
ontology, that are candidates to be merged; and generation of a taxonomy resolution list
where the tools suggest taxonomy areas that are candidates for reorganisation [Hameed
et al., 2003].
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OntoView [Klein, 2002] compares ontologies at a structural level, showing which defi¬
nitions of ontological concepts or properties have changed. It identifies changes among
different ontology versions.
S-Match [Giunchiglia et al., 2005a, Giunchiglia and Shvaiko, 2003,Giunchiglia et al.,
2005b] is a system based on semantic matching, a notion devised by Giunchiglia et
al in which the key intuition is to exploit the model-theoretic information which is
codified in the nodes and the structure of the graph. Whereas most approaches deal
only with syntactic similarity measures and search for semantic correspondences only
on the basis of syntactic features, semantic matching searches for semantic correspon¬
dence by considering not only the labels of nodes, but also their positions in the graph
structure of the ontology. This approach, like many of the others, views ontologies
as a concept taxonomy represented in a graph, and thus the position in the graph of a
node (or concept) is crucial to its meaning. S-Match takes two trees and, for any pair
of nodes from the two trees, computes the strongest semantic relation holding between
the concepts of the two nodes. The kinds of semantic relations that are considered are:
equivalence, more general, less general, mismatch and overlapping.
Stuckenschmidt [Stuckenschmidt, 2002] describes an approach in which agents share
parts of their ontology. An agent will use one or more ontologies to perform a task.
These ontologies will normally supplement each other but have sufficient overlap that
an agent can find mappings between them, and each agent will establish mappings
between ontologies which it is using. It is argued that on-demand translations are
more appropriate in this situation than mapping and merging. The advantages of these
two approaches are combined by defining the concepts from different sources using
terms in a shared ontology and relating these concepts only if such a relation is needed
during terminological reasoning. Connections to every other source in the system do
not have to be established, only with the shared model. If a query cannot be fully
understood, a rewriting is found that approximates it the most closely.
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Ehrig and Sure [Ehrig and Sure, 2004] describe an approach that has been derived
from the SWAP project, where the aim is to enable individuals to keep their own work
views and at the same time share knowledge across a peer-to-peer network. Similar¬
ity is determined through rules which have been encoded by ontology experts, which
are then combined for one overall result. Only one-to-one mappings between single
entities are considered. Implementation is based on manually encoded mapping rules,
which identify possible mappings.
SHOE (Simple HTML Ontology Extensions) [Heflin and Hendler, 2000] is a web-
based knowledge representation language that supports multiple versions of ontolo¬
gies. Ontology revision is defined as a change in the components of an ontology, so
that it can involve the addition or removal of categories, relations and/or axioms. Revi¬
sions are only thought of as additions and removals; the modification of a component
is thought of as a removal followed by an addition. SHOE performs versioning by
maintaining different web pages for each version of an ontology. Each page must state
which version it commits to and which ontologies it is compatible with.
C-OWL [Bouquet et ah, 2004], mentioned in Section 2.2.2, also presents a solution to
the problem of mismatched ontologies. Contextualised ontologies, which are local and
not shared, are likely to contain many mismatches. C-OWL integrates these ontologies
by facilitating the building of semantic bridges between the different ontologies in
order that their concepts, roles and individuals can be related.
3.1.5 Determining Potential Mismatches
Another approach to this problem, particularly relevant to our work, is the idea of
determining in advance what the potential mismatches are. For many of the methods
described above, such an approach would be pointless, because they view ontological
mismatch as a misalignment between concepts. However, if a richer view is taken of
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ontologies, then the kinds of mismatches that are possible become more varied.
Visser et al [Visser et al., 1997] defined potential mismatches in the following way.
In defining ontology mismatches, they confine themselves to mismatches between
definitions of classes (CD), definitions of relations (RD) and definitions of instances
(ID), and do not address definitions of functions or axioms. Definitions are Def =
< T, D,C >, in which T is the term that is being defined, D is what it is defined in
terms of, and C is the ontology-concept description to be defined, in natural language.
They then provide a classification for potential mismatches, which, they emphasise, is
not complete or disjoint but rather a useful instrument to determine which mismatches
are hard to resolve, and to define guidelines for the design of interoperable systems.
The classification is as follows:
• Conceptualisation mismatches - mismatches between two (or more) conceptu¬
alisations of a domain:
- Class mismatches - mismatch concerning classes and their subclasses:
* Categorisation mismatch - when two conceptualisations distinguish
the same class but divide this class into different subclasses;
* Aggregation-level mismatch - when two conceptualisations recog¬
nise the existence of a class, but define classes at different levels of
abstraction.
- Relation mismatches - mismatch relating to the relations distinguished in
the conceptualisation:
* Structure mismatch - when two conceptualisations distinguish the
same set of classes but differ in the way these classes are structured by
means of relations;
* Attribute-assignment mismatch - when two conceptualisations dif¬
fer in the way they assign an attribute (class) to other classes;
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* Attribute-type mismatch - when two conceptualisations distinguish
the same attribute (class) but differ in their assumed instantiations.
• Explication mismatches - mismatches that are not defined on the conceptuali¬
sation of the domain but on the way the conceptualisation is specified. Since a
definition has three components, there are eight different relations between two
definitions. However, two of these situations do not require investigation: if all
the terms are the same, there is no mismatch, and if all the terms are different,
there is also no mismatch, because there is no similarity. The remaining six
mismatches are:
- Concept mismatch (C) - the concepts (natural language definitions) do not
match;
- Definiens mismatch (D) - the terms that are formally describing the defi¬
nition do not match;
- Term mismatch (T) - the terms that are being described do not match;
- Concept and Definiens mismatch (CD) - neither the concepts nor the
definiens match;
- Concept and Term mismatch (CT) - neither the concept nor the term
match;
- Term and Definiens mismatch (TD) - neither the term nor the definiens
match.
They discuss how mappings could be defined for these mismatches, and for which
mismatches this would prove difficult.
Wiederhold [Wiederhold, 1997] classify potential mismatches thus:
• Key difference - different naming for the same concept (e.g., synonyms);
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• Scope difference - distinct domains, or distinct coverage of domain members;
• Abstraction grain - varied granularity of detail among definitions;
• Temporal basis - mismatches concerning time;
• Domain semantics - distinct domains, and the way they are modelled;
• Value semantics - differences in the encoding of values.
Shaw and Gaines [Shaw and Gaines, 1989] deal with the problem of how to create a
database of expert knowledge that has been obtained from many different experts, and
thus may not be compatible. They describe four ways in which experts' ontologies
might overlap:
• Conflict - experts use same term for different concepts;
• Correspondence - experts use different terms for same concept;
• Contrast - the experts use different terms and have different concepts;
• Consensus - experts use the same term for the same concept.
They discuss a methodology for facilitating experts coming to agreement. Automated
tools are used to analyse the mismatches, but the mismatches are then resolved by the
experts.
Hameed et al [Hameed et al., 2002] discuss how expert's ontologies can be used to
create a single coherent ontology. Naturally, the experts will have different internal
representations of their subject, and the ontologies they build will be mismatched in
some ways. They compare the mismatches they discovered between expert's ontolo¬
gies when these processes were carried out to mismatches defined by Visser [Visser
et al., 1997], Wiederhold [Wiederhold, 1997] and Shaw and Gaines [Shaw and Gaines,
1989],
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Stuckenschmidt and Klein [Stuckenschmidt and Klein. 2003] also take this approach.
They are centrally concerned with ontology as a concept hierarchy, but consider the
concepts as complex objects. Their ontologies are written in OWL-Lite, and they list
all the possible change operations to an ontology according to the OWL-Lite knowl¬
edge model. This list includes both atomic change operations and complex change
operations. 120 such changes are defined thus far, and the number is growing.
The approach of Stuckenschmidt and Klein was influenced by the work of Baner-
jee et al on schema evolution [Banerjee et al., 1987], They developed ORION, a
framework for supporting schema evolution. They established a taxonomy of over
20 schema changes, including creation and deletion of a class, alteration of the IS-
A relationship between classes, and addition and deletion of instance variables and
methods. Franconi et al [Franconi et al., 2000] add to the classical schema change
primitives described in [Banerjee et al., 1987] by enabling the definition of complex
and articulated schema changes. The potential changes that they developed include:
add-attribute, drop-attribute, change-attribute-name, change-attribute-type, add-class,
drop-class, change-class-name, change-class-type, add-is-a and drop-is-a.
3.1.6 Drawbacks and Limitations of Current Methods
This section demonstrates that there is a considerable amount of effort being spent
on resolving the problems surrounding ontological mismatch. However, the difficult
nature of the task means that there is as yet no complete solution to the problem, nor
are any such solutions currently on the horizon.
Most of these approaches are interactive; it is far rarer to find a system that can perform
such a task in a fully automated manner. It is preferable that any matching that is
to be done on the Semantic Web during runtime of the interactions of agents should
not be interactive; the agents should be able to resolve such problems themselves. If
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the process of mapping/merging/aligning the ontologies is not done during runtime,
then this problem is less pronounced. However, Kalfoglou and Schorlemmer claim
that "the advent of the semantic web, the proliferation of ontologies nowadays, and
agent technology advances, pose hard requirements on the timescales for performing
ontology mapping ".
For most ontology mapping, it is necessary to translate to a common representation. A
few systems do not use this method, but their processes are manual, laborious and pre¬
supposes that the knowledge engineer is familiar with the input formalisms, and does
thorough inspection of the model semantics and domain to write meaningful mapping
rules.
In summary, all such systems require large amounts of human effort to be put in the task
in order to be able to map, merge or align ontologies sufficiently. This is problematic
for the Semantic Web, where it is not possible for a user to predict which agents it
will be necessary to interact with, how their ontology will clash with the user's agent's
ontology, how many times ontologies will have to be altered/merged, and so on.
3.2 Belief Revision
Another field that is concerned with the integrity of knowledge bases is belief revision.
Belief revision is centrally concerned with the problem of how to maintain the integrity
of a set of beliefs about the world, given that these beliefs are constantly challenged
by the environment. For an agent to act effectively within a domain, it is essential that
it has beliefs about that domain. However, it may become apparent that a particular
belief that it holds is, in fact, incorrect, perhaps because the domain has changed since
it came to accept the belief, or perhaps it was wrong to originally accept the belief. The
main focus of belief revision is on how the agent should restructure its belief system
in the face of this contradiction of one of its beliefs [Gardenfors, 1992]. It is thus
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concerned with problems analogous to those of theory revision, and not with signature
revision.
In some situations, the offending belief may exist in isolation in the belief system, so
that it can be removed without concern for the integrity of the rest of the belief system.
However, in most situations, the relationship of a belief with the other beliefs in the
system is more complex. For example, beliefs are very often entailed by other beliefs,
and if an entailed belief is discovered to be false, it is clear that at least one of the
beliefs that entailed it must also be false.
In a closed belief system, any belief entailed by existing beliefs in the belief system
must also be members of the belief system. Thus if a belief system contains the fol¬
lowing two beliefs:
1. All men are mortal
2. Socrates is a man
then it is clear, by deduction, that the belief Socrates is mortal must also be in the
belief system. If further interaction with the domain reveals that, in fact, Socrates is
immortal, then not only must the belief Socrates is mortal be retracted, but so also
must at least one of the premises of the deductive argument. Additionally, the impact
on any beliefs that are entailed by the removed belief must be calculated. Often, this
will mean that those entailed beliefs must also be removed; sometimes, they may be
separately entailed by other beliefs in the belief system, and thus can remain.
Belief revision is concerned with how this should be done. Usually, it is desirable that
this should be done with minimal impact on the belief system; that is, do not remove
two beliefs if it is possible to maintain the integrity of the belief system by removing
only one. However, in some situations, one belief may be considered more important to
the belief set than two other beliefs, and thus these two would be removed in preference
to that single one.
3.2. BeliefRevision
3.2.1 Representations of Belief States
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Belief sets are often used as a way of representing a belief state. A belief set is defined
as a set K of sentences in L which is closed under logical consequence. This is an
appealing way of representing belief states because it means that if we have a belief A
and we see that -A is not in the belief set, we can conclude that adding A to the belief
set will not cause inconsistency. However there are obviously computational problems
with belief sets since they are usually infinite.
A more practical method of representing belief sets are belief bases, which are finite
subsets of belief sets. If Cn{A) is defined as the set of all the logical consequences of
A, then we say H is a belief base of a belief set K if Cn{H) = K. Belief bases have
another practical advantage over belief sets in that they allow the distinction between
innate beliefs {i.e., ones that we hold but can't justify) and justified beliefs {i.e., ones
that are justified by other beliefs in the database). However, checking for falsity (-A)
is harder than in belief sets.
3.2.2 The AGM Postulates and Integrity Constraints
The AGM postulates were laid out by Alchourron, Gardenfors and Makinson [Gardenfors
and Rott, 1995] as a framework for modelling and implementing belief revision sys¬
tems. They are applicable to closed belief systems, and require that minimal change
take place during belief revision.
The AGM postulates are based around expansion, revision and contraction. They de¬
pend on the assumption that, for any belief set K and sentence S in a language L, there
is a unique belief set K + S representing the revision of K with respect to S. This is a
strong assumption.
In order to address the problem of choosing which beliefs to retract when logic alone
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cannot help, these systems can make use of the notion of epistemic entrenchment.
This is based on the idea that we may not consider all beliefs to be of equal value. For
example, if a belief is fundamental to many other parts of our belief set and if it is
in common use then we would give this a high degree of epistemic entrenchment and
only retract it if forced to. A belief that is not of much use would receive a low degree
of epistemic entrenchment. Hence each belief is annotated with a value that reflects
its importance and the willingness of the system to renounce it. It may be considered
better to retract several beliefs with low epistemic entrenchment than a single belief
with a high epistemic entrenchment.
The AGM postulates require the fulfilment of the integrity constraints which are as
follows:
1. Databases should be consistent, that is if A is in the database, -A cannot also be
in the database;
2. Elements logically entailed by the database should be in the database (closure);
3. Minimal Information loss: during a revision or contraction, the smallest possi¬
ble amount of information should be lost that will allow the database to remain
consistent;
4. Epistemic entrenchment is required.
Other methods of belief revision adhere to these constraints to varying degrees. They
are certainly very useful computationally because they force a high degree of simplic¬
ity. However, this simplicity can be very limiting to the attempt to realistically model
beliefs, and for this reason many areas of belief revision chose to disregard some or all
of these constraints.
3.2. BeliefRevision
3.2.3 Foundation Theory v Coherence Theory
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There are two main ways in which revision of the database can take place.
1. Foundations Theory - this states that the justifications of a belief should be
tracked and nothing should be accepted in the database if it cannot be justified;
2. Coherence Theory - as long as a belief to be added is coherent with other beliefs
in the database and doesn't entail any contradictions, then it can be accepted in
the database without justification.
These are comparable with the principle of positive undermining and the principle of
negative undermining, the first of which states that we should keep believing something
until we are forced not to (inertia of belief), and the second of which states that we
should stop believing something when we are not forced to.
3.2.4 Truth Maintenance Systems
A large group of belief revision systems are referred to as truth maintenance systems
(TMSs). These systems focus on the justifications for the beliefs and manage beliefs
on the basis of dependency information. They are connected to a problem solver which
communicates new information to the TMS in the form of justifications.
One way in which TMSs differ from other forms of belief revision is that they never
delete any beliefs. All beliefs are marked either in or out and, during updating, old in
beliefs that are now rejected are marked as out, rather than being deleted. So updating
becomes a process of relabelling nodes. TMSs are based on a severely restricted lan¬
guage; nodes are unstructured objects and justifications are one-way rules. They are
capable of distinguishing between premises, which need no justification, and justified
beliefs.
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One of the main purposes of TMSs is to provide justifications or explanations for
propositions. These are in the form of a list of the other propositions in the knowledge
base that deductively entail the proposition. These can be in the form of assumptions,
so that a justification would be of the form: ifproposition P is true andproposition Q is
true then proposition R can be inferred. The simplest form of TMS is the justification-
based truth maintenance system, or JTMS. In a JTMS, each sentence is marked with
one or more justifications that indicate why it is believed to be true. If, during retraction
of beliefs, all of these justifications come to contain retracted beliefs, the sentence does
not then have a valid justification, and is marked as out. The information about the
justifications is retained, and if any of the retracted beliefs is reinstated, thus producing
a valid justification, the sentence is then marked as in. More popular are ATMSs
(Assumption-based Truth Maintenance Systems). These differ from JTMSs because
they allow the representation of all states that have ever been considered, whereas
JTMSs only allow one world state to be represented at a time.
Another advantage of TMSs is that they help in dealing with inconsistencies by help¬
ing to point out where the contradiction that an inconsistency entails lies. However,
although TMSs can be extremely useful, reasoning with them is NP-hard.
3.3 Theory Change
Much work has been done in the more general field of theory change. By theory
change, we mean exploring the problems surrounding mismatch and counter-examples
that we have discussed throughout this section, but without the specific focus on on¬
tologies or knowledge bases that are directly comparable to ontologies. In this section,
we cover the some of the more interesting and relevant areas of this field.
3.3. Theory Change 65
Method Description
Induction Generalising from particulars
Surrender Abandoning a conjecture in the light of counter-examples
Monster barring Modifying a definition to exclude counter-examples




Considering the properties which unite all counter-examples
and rewriting the theory definition to exclude them
Exception barring:
strategic withdrawal
Withdrawing the theory (rewriting the definition)
from examples for which it does not hold
Lemma Incorporation Adding a precondition to the theory definition to exclude
results for which it does not hold (making hidden
assumptions explicit)
Table 3.1: Lakatos's Methods
3.3.1 Developing Mathematical Theories
Lakatos investigated the ways in which mathematical theories could account for counter¬
examples, and ways in which they could be altered so that counter-examples no longer
provide a refutation of the theory [Lakatos, 1976]. The methods Lakatos describes are
outlined in Table 3.3.1.
Pease et al [Pease et al., 2004] have implemented a multi-agent system on top of
HR [Colton, 2002], which is a system for automated theory formation. The resulting
system makes use of Lakatos's methods to fix faulty theories that may be generated
within this multi-agent context.
Hayes-Roth [Hayes-Roth, 1983] presents five heuristic methods for repairing flawed
beliefs which extend and make practical Lakatos's ideas of proofs and refutations.
These are described in Table 3.3.1.
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Method Description
Retraction Restricting the theory's predictions to be consistent with
observations
Exclusion Barring the theory from applying to the current situation
cf Lakatos's monster-barring
Avoidance Ruling out situations that predictably deny the theory's
predictions
Assurance Method Ruling in situations that predictably assure the theory's
entailments
Inclusion Method Restricting the theory by ruling in confirming cases
Table 3.2: Hayes-Roth's Methods
3.3.2 Representational Issues
In [Amarel, 1968], Amarel discusses how the representation of a problem can make an
enormous difference to the difficulty of solving a goal in a theory, hence theory refine¬
ment can be achieved through changing representation. Amarel develops nine different
changes of representation, each making the solution of the problem easier. These in¬
clude steps such as translating the problem into more concise vocabulary, removing
redundancies and searching for global patterns and symmetry. It is made clear that
the representation of the problem has an enormous effect on its solvability, although
it must be remembered that all of the changes come with a cost and it may be hard
to predict in advance if these costs will be repaid. The changes are all equivalence
preserving.
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3.3.3 Symbolic Machine Learning and Inductive Programming
One approach to the problem of theory refinement is the use of machine learning.
FORTE [Richards and Mooney, 1995] is a system which uses machine learning for
revising function-free first-order Horn-clause knowledge bases. It is part of a grow¬
ing body of work on inductive logic programming (ILP) [Muggleton, 1999], In gen¬
eral, ILP systems that modify incorrect knowledge require interaction with the user
[Shapiro, 1982], although FORTE is fully automated and finds a minimal revision of a
theory to make it consistent with a set of training examples by performing hill search.
EITHER [Ourston and Mooney, 1990] is a propositional theory refinement system
which uses deduction, abduction and induction to refine a propositional Horn-clause
theory. GOLEM [Muggleton and Feng, 1990] is based on Plotkin's idea of relative
least general generalisations (RLGG), which Muggleton shows to be closely related to
inverse resolution [Muggleton, 1999].
PAC (Probably Approximately Correct) learnability theories have been used by Mooney
to approach the problem of theory revision [Mooney, 1995], He uses the notion of syn¬
tactic distances, which describe the number of elementary operations needed to trans¬
form the given concept to the desired representation. He considers the PAC-learnability
of the class of concepts having a bounded syntactic distance from a given concept rep¬
resentation, which allows for the concept of prior knowledge. Sloan and Turan expand
on these ideas, formulating the problem in the model of learning with membership and
equivalence queries [Sloan and Turan, 1999], They present revision algorithms using
these queries and show that they are efficient for certain types of formulae but are not
efficient for other, more complex formulae. Koppel et al [Koppel et al., 1994] describe
an approach, called PTR, which uses probabilities associated with domain theory el¬
ements to numerically track the 'flow' of proof through the theory. PTR is proved to
converge to a theory which correctly classifies all examples.
Another approach to machine learning is explanation-based learning (EBL). In this ap-
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proach, machines create justified generalisations from single training instances. Their
ability to generalise from a single example follows from their ability to explain why
the training example is a member of the concept being learnt [Mitchell et ah, 1986]. In
order to do this, they rely heavily on background information, as opposed to the empir¬
ical approach where minimal background knowledge is assumed [Ellman, 1989]. EBL
can be seen as a method that performs four different learning tasks: generalisation,
chunking, operationalisation, and analogy.
3.3.4 Correcting Faulty Formulae
Another relevant approach is work on correcting faulty formulae. A formula is con¬
sidered to be faulty if it is a contingent formula that was expected or intended to be a
theorem [Monroy and Bundy, 2001]. In his thesis, Moore introduced a methods that
attempts to avoid over generalisation [Moore, 1974], Formulae sometimes need to be
generalised in order to be proved by induction. However, generalisations may not al¬
ways be sound: the generalisation of a valid formula may not itself be valid, because
the common subterms that have been generalised may be important. For example,
(Sort (Sort A)) = (Sort A) is a valid formula which is generalised to (Sort Genrll) =
Genrll, where Genrll is a skolem constant which replaces the subterm (Sort A). This
generalised formula is only true in certain circumstances: specifically, if Genrll is an
ordered list. Moore's system attempts to create conditions under which these formula,
not true in the general case, can be made true. In this case, this would be (Ordered
Genrll) —> ((Sort Genrll) = Genrll). However, this approach requires both the orig¬
inal formula and the over generalised one, so as to determine what the restriction on
the generalised case should be, and thus does not deal with the problem of correct¬
ing faulty formulae in general. This approach was further developed by Franova and
Kadratoff [Franova and Kodratoff, 1992], They developed a method, PreS, that builds
a corrective condition using the constructive principle of proofs-as-programs. How-
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ever, this can only handle certain types of conjectures. Protzen applied PreS to find
conditional, recursive corrective formulae [Protzen, 1996],
Monroy stated the problem of correcting faulty formulae G as the problem of finding a
corrective condition P such that P —> G is a theorem [Monroy, 1999]. The mechanism
used to find this condition P is based on abduction. Building a corrective condition
amounts to providing an algorithm for computing the condition. The mechanism ren¬
ders an algorithm as a collection of equational cases, each of which might be condi¬
tional. Abduction is used to explore the associated partial proof trees. These trees can
be extremely large and sometimes infinite, and care must be taken to avoid combinato¬
rial explosion. Proof planning is used to address this problem (see Section 2.6.1). The
abductive mechanism is given as a set of heuristics. Each one captures the restricted
way in which the search for a proof of a faulty formula can fail and provides knowledge
to recover from such a failure.
3.3.5 Program Debugging
There has also been some work done on the problem of automated program debugging
and repair. In his work on Cynthia [Whittle et al., 1997], Whittle approached the prob¬
lem of debugging programs by considering the analogous problem of theory revision.
Hence when changes were made to the top-level program, the effects of that change on
the underlying theory were assessed and the theory repaired accordingly. Examples of
these changes include renaming items, changing the type of items, for example from
list to tree and changing patterns inherent in the type: for example, the base case for a
list is nil, whereas for a tree it is one. This allows users to move from one program
to another in a way that is verifiably valid. Users are only permitted to make a limited
number of predefined changes, hence the way in which things will need to be changed
is predictable. An earlier implementation of similar ideas can be found in the recursion
editor [Bundy et al., 1991], which is designed to edit Prolog programs.
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Shapiro also did much work in program debugging [Shapiro, 1982] and provided al¬
gorithms for use, although he did not consider how it might be analogous to theory
revision. He divides the problem of program debugging into two different aspects:
• How do we identify a bug in a program that behaves incorrectly?
• How do we fix a bug once it is identified?
Shapiro's MIS system uses diagnosis algorithms to address the first issue and bug-
correction algorithms to address the second. Unlike many of the theory revision sys¬
tems, the MIS system [Shapiro, 1982] is capable of specialising theories as well as
generalising. MIS requires user interaction, as the user is queried for information
about the intended behaviour of the program.
Shapiro developed three different kinds of diagnosis algorithms, one for termination
with incorrect output, one for termination with no output and one for non-termination.
We reproduce here his diagnostic algorithm for termination with incorrect output, as
this is the most relevant for our work. The idea of the algorithm is to step through the
procedural calls of the computation to discover which is the first to return an incorrect
output, thus identifying it as incorrect. The algorithm uses a ground oracle for an
interpretation M, such that, on input < p,x,y >, it outputs yes if < p,x,y > is in M,
and no otherwise, where p is a procedure and x and y are vectors over some domain D:
Algorithm:
Input: A procedure p in P and an input x such that p on x returns an output y _L
incorrect in M.
Output: A triple < q, u, v > not in M such that q covers < q, u, v >.
Algorithm: Simulate the execution of p on x that returns y; whenever a procedure call
< q, u > returns an output v, check, using a ground oracle, whether < q, m, v > is in M.
If it is not, return < q, u, v > and terminate.
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3.4 Fault-Catalogue and Model-Based Diagnosis
Another field which addresses the problem of mismatches and how to deal with them
is the field of diagnosis. It is concerned with the problem of inconsistent information
in databases, terminologies or ontologies, and with how these inconsistencies can be
identified and resolved. Like our approach, this is concerned with diagnosing what the
problem is by considering what the potential problems could be and, in some cases,
considering what could be done to rectify the problem. There are two main approaches
within this field: fault-catalogue based diagnosis and model-based diagnosis. The first
relies on a list of potential faults to aid in diagnosing the problem, whereas the second
relies on a model of the system and attempts to compare actual behaviour with the
model to determine how it may explain inconsistencies.
A seminal paper in the field is [Reiter, 1987], which presents a general algorithm for
computing all diagnosis for a given faulty system. This is developed for a first-order
representation language, but the theory is reasonably general and is compatible with
many other logics. The representational logic specifies how the system would normally
behave if all its components are working properly. The system failure can then be
explained in terms of some component working abnormally, by calculating what kind
of abnormal component behaviour would lead to the observed behaviour of the system.
The algorithm computes all possible diagnoses for a given faulty system, and it is
then left to the user to determine which diagnosis was actually responsible for the
fault out of the candidate combinations; this is usually done experimentally. A system
is considered to be a pair: system = (Sd,Cmp), where Sd is a system description
and Cmp is the set of system components, [de Kleer and Williams, 1987] presents
a general, domain-independent diagnostic engine for dealing with multiple faults by
using a model to describe the physical structure of a device in terms of its constituents;
thus the diagnosis problem becomes that of determining how the device differs from its
model. The diagnostic process requires a notion of the physical structure of the device,
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models for each constituent, a set of possible model-artifact differences and a set of
measurements to determine how each constituent is performing, and it produces a set
of candidates to explain the discrepancy between the behaviour predicted by the model
and the experienced behaviour of the device. The method of computing diagnoses is
based on notions of conflict sets. A conflict set describes all the possible combinations
of components that could have lead to the fault. These may be single fault diagnoses
(failure of a single component would explain the fault) or multiple fault diagnoses
(failure of more than one component in combination is necessary to explain the fault).
Single fault diagnoses are often preferred, as they provide a simpler explanation - i.e., it
is more likely that a single component has failed to cause the fault than that the specific
combinations of multiple components have simultaneously failed. Conflict recognition
is performed to identify all the minimal conflict sets, and a set of minimal candidates
is generated from these minimal conflict sets through experimentation.
The philosophy of model-based diagnosis [Console and Dressier, 1999] is that diag¬
nosis should be based on an objective model of the device (system) to be diagnosed.
Different types of models can be considered: for example, structural (concerning phys¬
ical or logical structure); functional (describing function); behavioural (describing how
functions are achieved); and teleological (describing the purposes of the use of the de¬
vice); or a combination of approaches can be used. Clearly, the actual diagnostic
process depends on the models, which are usually component-oriented. Devices are
described in terms of minimal replaceable or repairable components. Component mod¬
els include a list of variables and a definition of its mode of behaviour. The behaviour
of components is described via a set of relations or constraints. Both the correct be¬
haviour and a set of known faulty behaviours can be described. Different notions of
explanation can be adopted, from weak ones based on consistency to stronger ones
based on abduction.
More recently, these ideas have been developed by Scholbach and others. [Scholbach
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and Cornet, 2003] describes diagnosis for conflicting ALC T-Boxes. The work is moti¬
vated by the example of DICE terminology (Diagnosis for Intensive Care Evaluation);
DICE defines more than 2400 concepts and uses 45 relations, so the potential for error
is large. Debugging conflicts requires both an explanation of the logical incorrectness
and its correction. This paper focuses on the former, by attempting to find a single
axiom in the TBox that is causing the contradiction. Minimal subsets of axioms of an
incoherent terminology that preserve unsatisfiability of a particular concept are found
by removing axioms that are irrelevant to the incoherence (that is, the TBox remains in¬
consistent after they are removed). This allows the exact position of the contradictions
within the remaining axioms to be found. [Scholbach, 2005] describes a framework
for debugging logically contradicting terms which is based on model-based diagno¬
sis. Three different types of diagnosis, based on Reiter's hitting set algorithm [Reiter,
1987], which discover different types of conflict sets. The first is a DL-based reasoner
(RACER), which is used to return entire terminologies as maximal conflict sets. How¬
ever, this fails even on small incoherent terminologies. The second idea uses internal
information from unsatisfiability proofs to return small (but not minimal) conflict sets.
The third approach implements the specialised algorithms described in [Scholbach,
2005] to calculate minimal conflict sets. Evaluation indicates that the complexity of
the general problem is so high that implicit information on proofs is necessary to make
the problem tractable. The two more specialised algorithms for finding small and min¬
imal sets work in practice, implying that implicit information on proofs is required.
Related work on debugging inconsistent ontologies and detangling taxonomies through
diagnosing inconsistencies has been done as part of the MINDSWAP project
[Cuenca Grau et al., 2004, Parsia et al., 2005]. A distinction is drawn between glass
box approaches, where information from internals is extracted and presented to the
user, and black box approaches, where the user acts as an oracle. When clashing
information is discovered, attempts are made to find a set of axioms which support
this clashing information, and hence which must contain an inconsistency. This is then
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presented to the user. Attempts to fix the problem are focused on making it easier
to for the modeller to understand what the problem is; thus, this is done interactively
rather than automatically. [Rector et al., 2001, Rector, 2002] describe work on tangled
taxonomies that focuses on maintaining taxonomies so that they do not become tangled
in the first place.
3.5 Relevance to the Project
• What the project requires from the field
A thorough grounding in the state-of-the-art technology in this field is a prereq¬
uisite for the project, as this is the context within which our work is based. It
is necessary for understanding which problems remain unsolved, and for under¬
standing how our work is related to the work of others. However, although we
have taken inspiration from many of the approaches described above, we do not
consider our work to be based on or a direct extension of any of them, but rather
it is a new approach to the problem.
• What the project contributes to the field
We believe that our work constitutes a novel approach to the problem which pro¬
vides solutions and potential solutions for aspects of mismatch and refinement
that have not otherwise been solved, and which complements the contributions
of much of the work discussed in this chapter. A more detailed discussion of
how our approach provides this, and how it relates to the approaches discussed
in this chapter, is not possible before a more thorough explanation of our work
has been provided. Such a discussion can be found in Section 7.5.
Chapter 4
Overview of the Ontology Refinement
System
4.1 Overview
In this chapter we give an overview of the project and of the Ontology Refinement
System (ORS): what we are attempting, how we intend to achieve this and why these
approaches were chosen. We describe the aims and limitations of the project and
briefly discuss how the limitations of the system can be minimised; this is discussed
in further detail in Chapter 8. We introduce the subsystems of the overall system,
discussing their role and how they interact with each other. Worked examples are
given throughout to illustrate how the system works.
4.1.1 Research Goals
The overall aim of the project is to create an agent communication system in which, if
interaction breaks down due to communication failure, agents are capable of detecting
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the ontological mismatches that caused this problem and refining their ontologies to re¬
move these mismatches in an appropriate manner. Communication failure occurs when
agent interaction does not progress as the agents expect it to, and when this failure is
due to ontological differences between the agents and not due to network, software or
hardware failure. Once the problem has been identified and fixed, communication is
then resumed using the updated ontologies. From this point on, this particular commu¬
nication problem should not be encountered, although perhaps further communication
problems will occur at a different point. This is envisaged as a dynamic, incremen¬
tal system, where each communication problem leads to immediate diagnosis and re¬
finement. The ramifications of this particular problem with respect to the rest of the
ontology are considered: altering one part of the ontology will often entail changes in
other parts of the ontology. Diagnosis and refinement of ontological mismatches is al¬
ways prompted by failure: we do not compare the ontologies of the interacting agents
except where parts of them are revealed through communication, nor do we examine
unexpected locutions except where these are implicated in communication failure.
The end result is a system in which agents are continually altering their ontologies so
that they can successfully interact with other agents, even if these agents do not have
identical ontologies to them. If refinement succeeds, the output of the system is an
indication that the desired objective of the communication has been fulfilled, together
with an ontology that may be slightly different from the initial ontology, according to
the refinement requirements of any problems encountered during the communication
process, and a history of which refinements have been performed. Sometimes it is not
possible to perform the appropriate refinement. In such a case, the output is a diag¬
nosis of the problem, a description of why it was impossible to refine the problem, an
ontology that may differ from the original ontology if previous, successful refinements
were performed, and a history of which refinements have already been performed on
the system before further refinement became impossible.
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4.1.2 Scope of the Project
The scope of the project includes many different research areas, each with complex
and difficult issues of their own. For example, the complexities surrounding automated
communication between agents are immense. The problems of ontological mappings,
mergings and alignment are currently amongst the most difficult issues faced in the
agent community, and the push to develop the Semantic Web has led to these becom¬
ing important areas of research. Thus the project needs to find a balance between an
attempt to understand these issues and deal with them as far as possible on the one
hand, and a central focus on the themes of diagnosis and refinement, without too much
diversion into sub-issues, on the other.
A key part of this project is therefore to find parameters within which to investigate
this problem such that it is possible to produce interesting and informative output. It
is important in such a large domain to carefully control the direction of the research to
ensure that it remains focused, and to this end we have identified a particular approach
to the problem, and a particular subset of issues that we wish to address. We have made
several important assumptions about agent behaviour which are discussed in Section
6.2. Some of these are bold assumptions and are the subject of major research effort
within the agent community. However, by making these assumptions we are able to
develop a platform from which to explore the issues that this thesis is really concerned
with: the problem of ontological mismatch. Without making such assumptions, we
would be unendingly caught up in tangential issues.
Among the key assumptions we have made is that the ontologies of agents will be
largely similar, that agents behave in simple and understandable ways, that the agent
that is attempting to refine its ontology will trust the ontologies of other agents, and
that the agents are only involved with interactions with each other; that is, there are
no agent interactions of which we are unaware. These assumptions create a tractable
problem. Discussions about how this work can be expanded to remove some of these
80 Chapter 4. Overview of the Ontology Refinement System
assumptions is discussed in Chapter 8.
We therefore do not suggest that this research is a full solution to the problems that we
are addressing, but rather that it is a solution to an interesting subset of these problems.
We claim that it introduces techniques that can be shown to facilitate agent communi¬
cation that would otherwise be impossible, and that these techniques have the potential
to be developed further to create a more complete solution to the problem.
4.1.3 Project Domain
The context in which we explore the problem of ontological refinement is a planning
environment. The agent communication system contains planning agents (PAs), which
form plans and attempt to execute them through communication with service-providing
agents. Thus a plan step is executed by persuading an appropriate agent to perform
that step. Any agent in the system has the ability to be a planning agent or a service-
providing agent, but we assume that only one plan is being executed at any one time,
and thus only one agent is acting as a PA at any one time. Considering ontology
refinement within a planning domain allows us to generate a situation in which the
ontology mismatches are highlighted (through plan failure) and in which the positive
effects of the refinement process can be verified (by showing that planning with the
refined ontology can eventually result in the goal being achieved).
We are exploring the situation in which a PA is attempting to achieve goals by forming
and executing plans in a given domain. The inputs and outputs of this agent are shown
in Figure 4.1. The PA will form plans to achieve the goals which it is given, based
on its understanding of the world. Each plan step will be executed through interaction
with other agents. The PA initially makes the assumption that these other agents have
the same ontology as it, and thus the conditions under which the PA believes an ac¬
tion is executable will match the conditions under which other agents will perform it.
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Additionally, this assumption entails the assumption that the effects of a given action
being performed will match the PA's expectations of the effects. It is very useful to
make such assumptions, as this allows one to form plans based on one's understanding
of the world. However, it is often the case that other agents may have ontologies that
are similar but slightly out of sync. This happens, for example, because ontologies are
dynamic and are regularly updated, leading to agents having different versions of the
same ontology, and also because off-the-shelf ontologies are adapted by users to their
particular needs. This can lead to plan execution failure, since the other agents may
not always behave in the way predicted by the PA's expectations.
The system is fully automated. The PA will prompt initially for a goal, which is pro¬
vided by the user, but after that there is no user interaction. If plan execution failure
is experienced, the PA will diagnose and refine the problem and then replan. In some
cases it is not possible to fully diagnose the causes of failure and thus to appropri¬
ately refine the ontology. In such situations, the attempt to reach the goal must be
abandoned. Further discussion of this issue can be found in Section 5.4.
The decision to explore the problem of ontology refinement within such a context
limits the applicability of the system to a planning environment. The system cannot
function without this because the methods of identifying that mismatch has occurred,
and diagnosing what the mismatch may be, depend on the planning context. However,
the theory describing the kinds of ontological mismatches is not dependent on a plan¬
ning context, and this theory could be reimplemented in a system that operated in a
different context.
4.1.4 The Ontology and the Meta-Ontology
Each agent operating in a domain has both an ontology and a meta-ontology describing
that domain. The ontology contains the ground-level information about the domain,
and the meta-ontology contains information about those ground-level terms. In order
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Figure 4.1: Inputs and Outputs of the PA
to be able to diagnose and perform the kinds of refinements we discuss in later sec¬
tions in this chapter, we require information about the ontological objects within the
ontology. For example, we require a class hierarchy not only of individuals, but also
of predicates themselves: the predicate (Dollars ?Amount) may be a subclass of the
predicate (Money ?Amount). We require information about the predicates concerning
how they ought to be interpreted in plan execution: for example, facts that need to be
checked with other agents, facts for which the PA depends on its own information, and
so on. We also require information about the rules: for example, which agent is able
to perform each action. This is included in the meta-ontology.
The ontology and the meta-ontology have both signature and theory objects, with some
of the signature objects in the ontology being represented as theory objects in the meta-
ontology.
Naturally, we cannot expect every agent that is encountered to have a meta-ontology, as
this is not standard. Many ontology languages allow such meta information to be con¬
tained in the ground-level ontology. This does not mean that the system will not work
with such agents, only that they will not be able to diagnose certain types of refine-
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ments, because they will not have the necessary information about how the predicates
are related. In many ontology languages, this kind of relationship can be described in
an object level ontology: for example, by using the subPropertyOf relation in OWL.
Thus a meta-level ontology would not be necessary for describing the predicate hier¬
archy.
4.2 Worked Example
We introduce an example which is intended to illustrate as many as possible of the
diagnostic and refinement techniques described in this chapter1. It is also intended to
be typical of the kind of scenario that one might expect to encounter on the Semantic
Web. It is based on the Semantic Web Conference ontology, parts of which can be
found in full in Appendix A, and which can be found in full on the project website2.
This ontology concerns a virtual agent whose role is to form plans to achieve given
goals, and execute these plans in a Semantic Web like environment, where other agents
are available to perform tasks or services. In particular, this PA is able to organise trips
to conferences.
In this section, we introduce the general background of the example, and then give
precise examples of refinements in the appropriate sections.
Consider the situation in which a researcher wishes to present a paper at a conference.
Since he has a lot of demands on his time, he does not wish to spend time organising
his visit to this conference, and instead passes an electronic copy of his paper to an
autonomous agent, together with information about which conference he wishes to at¬
tend, and allows this agent to perform the necessary administration for him. Once the
agent has the goal, it will attempt to form a plan to achieve this goal. In this situation,
1 Output from the ORS can be found in Chapter 7
2http://dream.inf.ed.ac.uk/proj ects/dor/
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this plan will involve, at a simple level, converting an accepted paper so that it is in the
format required for final submission, submitting the paper to the conference, register¬
ing for the conference, booking accommodation, booking flights from the researcher's
home city to the city where the conference is located, and perhaps submitting a request
for reimbursement from lab funds once the costs have been paid. A more detailed plan
may involve arranging transport from the researcher's home to the airport, arranging
transport the other end, registering for workshops, and so on. For the purposes of
clarity, we have kept the example concise.
In this example, the agent receives a goal:
(PresentedAtConference Researcher Ai-Conf My-Paper) and a paper, My-Paper.ps.
The goal predicate takes three arguments: a conference attendee name, Researcher,
a conference name, Ai-Conf; and a paper name, My-Paper. The predicate definition
contained in the ontology specifies that the class of the third argument must be Paper.
However, it does not specify the subclass of the class Paper, e.g., PsPaper, PdfPaper:
this is determined by the submission process and may vary from conference to confer¬
ence. The goal is simply to submit that paper in the required form; the conversion into
the required form is handled by the agent as part of the plan.
The following plan is produced:





(Reimburse Researcher Ai-ConfRegistration-Cost Accomodation-Cost Flight-Cost)].
Once the plan has been generated, it is executed step-by-step within the agent commu¬
nication system. The PA will first locate the appropriate agent with which to converse,
for example a Paper-Conversion agent may be required for the action (ConvertPaper
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Researcher My-Paper.ps My-Paper.pdf). The PA will request that the appropriate agent
performs the action, and then wait for a response. This response will either be an in¬
dication of whether the task has succeeded or failed, or it will be a request for further
information. An agent will carry out a task that it can perform if it is able to under the
circumstances; that is, if the preconditions for that task are fulfilled. The agent will
be able to verify some of the preconditions for itself, will have to check with other
agents to verify some of them, and the validity of other preconditions will only be
determinable though questioning of the PA.
For example, when attempting to register with the Registration agent, the conversation
may proceed as follows (note that PA represents the planning agent, and RA, the regis¬
tration agent; arguments beginning with a question mark are variables, and otherwise
are constants):
PA: request (Register Researcher Ai-Conf)
RA checks those of its own preconditions that it can, plus any that must be verified with the other agent,
and then verifies the others with PA
RA: query (Accepted-Paper Researcher Ai-Conf ?RefNo)
PA: reply (Accepted-Paper Researcher Ai-Conf 125)
RA verifies that this is an acceptable reference number
RA: performed (Register Researcher Ai-Conf)
Registration information is now generated for the researcher; PA needs to know this information to
continue.
PA: query (Registered Ai-ConfResearcher ?RegistrationNo)
RA: solution (Registered Ai-ConfResearcher 539)
There are two stages to the above communication. The request itself does not contain
any reference to the registration number that is given to the PA at the end of the in¬
teraction. No reference to this is necessary in the action because it is not required in
order to perform the action, it is merely an effect of the action. In order to determine
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whether the action can be performed for this agent, the RA must verify that the PA is
requesting this information on behalf of someone who already has a paper accepted.
The PA must then check its effects are fully instantiated before updating its ontology.
In order to instantiate its effects for this action, the PA then directly asks the RA to
return the relevant registration reference number. Since the action has been performed
successfully, this information is available; otherwise it would not be.
Unless unexpected problems arise, this process will continue until each step of the plan
has been successfully executed through communication with appropriate agents. The
successful execution of the final step of the plan entails the goal being fulfilled.
However, the belief that the generated plan is a viable list of steps to achieve the goal
is based on the assumption that the ontology from which the plan was formed is an ac¬
curate representation of the domain in which the plan will be executed. If the ontology
of the planning agent is in fact incomplete or incorrect with respect to the ontologies
of the other agents with which it is interacting, unexpected problems may occur during
the execution of the plan. For example, in the above conversation, consider the case in
which the Accepted-Paper predicate had been altered to contain information not only
about the attendee and the conference, but also about the paper which they were pre¬
senting:
(Accepted-Paper ?Attendee ?Conference ?Paper ?RegNo).
However, the PA is using an out of date version of the ontology, and thus considers
Accepted-Paper to be a ternary predicate. In response to the question from the above
dialogue:
AA: query ((Accepted-Paper Researcher Ai-Conf ?Paper ?RegNo))
the PA will reply No, since it does not have any facts that match, and the plan step will
fail to be executed.
Throughout the rest of the chapter, we describe how our system will deal with such a
failure; how the ontological mismatch that caused this will be identified, and how the
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PA's ontology will be refined so that this mismatch no longer exists. Examples of the
types of refinements we might expect to encounter, together with descriptions of how
they might be refined, are given in the appropriate sections below.
This example contains many assumptions about agent behaviour; these are discussed
in more detail in Section 6.2.
4.3 Sub-systems of the Ontology Refinement System
The ontology refinement system (ORS) consists of various different sub-systems: the
refinement system, the diagnostic system, the agent communication system, the plan¬
ning system and the translation system. The PA exists as part of the agent communi¬
cation system and is able to call the other parts of the system as necessary. Figure 4.2
shows the interaction between the subsystems.
The PA will firstly wait for a goal, and as soon as one is received, it will commence
attempting to achieve it. The ontology is translated into a suitable format so that it can
be interpreted by the planner and directly interpreted by the PA and the plan decon-
structor. The planning version of the ontology is then sent to the planner, and a plan is
returned. Sometimes the planner will fail to return a plan. It might be that it is not pos¬
sible to achieve the goal using the PA's original ontology, or it might be, if refinements
have already been made to the ontology, that these refinements have made it impossi¬
ble to form a plan. If the planner does not return a plan, the process ends in failure: it
is not possible to achieve the goal. If a plan is produced, this plan is deconstructed to
produce a justified plan, which links the plan to the underlying ontology (this process
is discussed in Section 6.3), and the PA then attempts to execute the plan. If this is
successful, the PA will then ensure that the ontology is updated with respect to the re¬
sults of the plan, and the process will terminate successfully. If failure is encountered,
the agent attempts to diagnose the underlying ontological mismatch that caused the
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failure. In some cases, it is not possible to fully diagnose the mismatch; in such cases,
all the PA can do is to mark the relevant part of the ontology (for example, the relevant
action rule) as unusable. If diagnosis is successful, the ontology is refined accordingly.
The updated ontology is then retranslated for the planner, and the process is repeated.
These last two processes, diagnosis and refinement, are the central concern of the
project. The rest of the ORS provides the structure within which diagnosis and re¬
finement can occur.
In summary, there are five different modules in the system:
1. The diagnostic system
2. The refinement system
3. The agent communication system
4. The planning system, which consists of:
(a) The planner
(b) The plan deconstructor
(c) The plan finder, which extracts and translates a usable plan from the planner
output
5. The translation system, which consists of:
(a) The translator from KIF to PDDL
(b) The translator from KIF to Prolog
(c) Various smaller translation processes
Of these components, the planner and the agent platform are taken off the shelf (this is
discussed further in the relevant sections); all the other components have been written
for the project. All of these bespoke components are written in Sicstus Prolog [Sicstus,
2005],
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4.4 Flow of System
The system is controlled by the PA. The flow of control is illustrated in Figure 4.3. The
PA will first of all prompt for a goal, and then translate the ontology and the goal into
the PDDL representation and the Prolog representation (discussed in Section 4.5). The
goal is required during translation so that it can be placed into the PDDL representa¬
tion and used during planning; it is not used again unless plan execution fails and, after
diagnosis and refinement, a new plan has to be formed.
Once the translation process has created the PDDL and the Prolog versions of the
ontology, the PA then calls the planner using the PDDL representation. If the planner
fails to return a plan, this is reported to the PA, and the process fails. This will occur if
it is not possible to reach the goal from the initial state described in the ontology, using
the actions described in the ontology. This may happen the first time that the agent
attempts to form a plan, or it may be that it was initially possible to form a plan, but
this plan failed to be successfully executed, and refinements made to the ontology, as
a result of that failure, resulted in a situation where it was no longer possible to reach
the goal. This process is illustrated in Figure 4.4.
If the planner succeeds in returning a plan, this plan is first interpreted and translated so
that it can be read by the PA. The PA then attempts to execute the plan step by step. At
each step, it locates the appropriate service-providing agent to perform the task, sends
a request to that agent to perform the task and waits for one of the following responses:
1. Information about the final outcome:
• An indication that the action has been successfully performed,;
• An indication that the action has failed to be performed;





























part of the ontology
as unusable
Figure 4.3: Flow of Control of the ORS
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Figure 4.4: Flow of System
• A fully instantiated predicate, for which the PA must give the truth value
according to its ontology; an agent will either reply that this is true if it has
information to indicate this, or that it cannot confirm the truth if it does not
have such information;
• A fully or partially uninstantiated predicate, which the PA must instantiate
according to its ontology. If there is no fact in its ontology that corresponds
with this, it replies that this is false.
If the response received from the service-providing agent is of type 2, the PA, after
responding appropriately to it, waits again for one of the above responses. This loop
continues until a response of type 1 is received. If the action succeeds, the PA then
attempts the next step of the plan, until the goal is reached. At that point, the PA
returns output to indicate that the plan has succeeded, and terminates. If all the actions
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succeed, the system is just performing planning within a multi-agent system. It is
when failure occurs that the core abilities of the ORS are called into use: diagnosis and
refinement. If any action fails, the PA calls the diagnostic system to receive a diagnosis
of the problem. If a precise diagnosis is possible, the refinement system is then called
to implement the diagnosis (discussed in Section 5.5). In cases where no refinement
can be performed, the process terminates, with the PA providing feedback that the goal
could not be achieved and detailing why a precise diagnosis could not be performed.
If an appropriate refinement can be performed, which may be either the alteration of
an ontological object or an indication that this object should not be used in planning,
the process is then repeated. The updated ontology is retranslated, and a new plan is
formed, if possible: the refining of the ontology could mean that it is impossible to
form a plan to achieve the goal. If a plan is produced, this is then executed step by step
in the manner described above. The process is repeated until the goal is achieved, or
until diagnosis, refinement or replanning proves impossible.
4.5 Representation
The way in which the ontology is represented is one of the key features of the system.
There are three main things that are required of the representation:
1. To be a recognised format for agent ontologies, so as to make the application as
broad as possible,
2. To be usable by an efficient planner so that the PA can use its ontology to find
solutions to achieving goals,
3. To be available for constant reference and updating within an agent communica¬
tion system.
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It is not possible to satisfy all three of these requirements using the same representation.
There is no common agent ontology language that is also the representation required
by a state-of-the-art planner. Additionally, we wish to keep the agent communication
system simple, and to that end, it is written in Prolog and based on the Linda server
(see Section 6.2). Therefore, these three aims are achieved by using three different
representations:
1. The original ontology is written in KIF, developed on the Ontolingua server;
2. The planning representation is written in PDDL;
3. The ontologies with which the agents work within the agent communication
system are written in Prolog. This is also used by the plan deconstructor.
It should be noted that we use a restricted form of KIF in order to constrain the problem.
The KIF ontologies ORS can deal with are restricted in the following ways:
• Classes: As KIF is an expressive ontological language, it allows for complex
class definitions. However, our restricted KIF ontologies are permitted only
simple class definitions that name the class and place it in the class hierarchy.
Specifically, full KIF allows the following aspects of class definitions that are
not allowed by our restricted KIF:
- Cardinality restrictions;
- Statements about disjointedness of classes;
- Declaration of special characteristics of classes such as inverse, uniqueness,
etc.;
Note that some of these properties may be declared in the meta-ontology, where
it is possible to talk about classes as objects. However, this information cannot
be contained within the class definition, as is possible in full KIF.
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• Quantification: In our restricted KIF, all variables are implicitly universally
quantified over finite domains.
These restrictions certainly limit the applicability of the system, since they limit the
expressiveness of the ontologies. It has already been established through the need to
build OWL on top of RDF-S that such expressivity is necessary in useful agents [An-
toniou and van Harmelen, 2004], In fact, some of the ways in which the expressivity
of OWL improves the expressivity of RDF-S are similar to the class expressivity dif¬
ferences between full KIF and our restricted KIF. Thus removing these assumptions is
an important part of further work (see Section 8.1.1). However, we believe that using
these restrictions for ORS was justified, because it was necessary for us to constrain
the problem so that a working solution could be developed, and this seemed an obvious
restriction to use due to the planning context. Most planning problems and represen¬
tations, and most modern planners use a similar simple approach to class definitions,
where they are merely used to define a class hierarchy and restrict the kind of object
that can be used in certain plan steps. Thus our approach allows a fairly full investiga¬
tion of our chosen domain, but we have not included the extra expressivity that would
be necessary for other forms of agent interaction.
It could be argued that, since the expressivity constraints on our restricted KIF and
on RDF Schema are in some ways similar, we would have been better to use ontolo¬
gies written in RDF Schema. The obvious advantage of this is that this is a much
more common representation language for the Semantic Web, and if we improve the
expressivity of the representation, as we envisage doing to convert our restricted KIF
into full KIF, this would result in OWL ontologies, which are generally considered
to be the standard representation for Semantic Web agents [DAML, 2002]. The main
reason we choose not to do this is that KIF, even in our restricted version, does have
some expressive advantages over RDF Schema and OWL. In particular, it allows pred¬
icates of unlimited arity, rather than the triples (binary predicates) that RDF Schema
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and OWL are restricted to, and the use of variables allows for the definition of general
axioms, which can be used to describe actions (see below for a discussion of how this
is done). Both of these aspects are important in the planning domain. Additionally,
the semantics of RDFS are complex and based on graph theory rather than Description
Logics. If ORS were to be used in a more general Semantic Web like setting, without
the restriction to the planning domain, then utilising the accepted ontology representa¬
tion language (currently OWL) would become more important than taking advantage
of the increased expressivity of (even restricted) KIF. A discussion of what would be
involved in changing ORS to work with OWL ontologies can be found in Section 8.1.2.
Ontolingua is an ontology server designed to facilitate reuse and sharing of ontolo¬
gies [Farquhar et al., 1996, Gruber, 1992], It consists of a set of tools and services
to support the process of achieving consensus on shared ontologies by geographically
distributed groups. The ontology editor uses the World Wide Web to enable wide ac¬
cess and provide users with the ability to publish, browse, create and edit ontologies.
We chose to do this because this ensures that the ontologies are developed and ex¬
pressed in a specific manner, thus easing the issues of translation and refinement. It
also facilitates the process of creating a KIF ontology, and ensures that any ontology
produced is consistent. The Ontolingua server builds KIF ontologies on top of the
frame ontology [Frame Ontology, 1999]. The frame ontology defines the terms that
capture conventions used in object-centred knowledge representation systems. Since
these terms are built on the semantics of KIF, one can think of KIF plus the frame-
ontology as a specialised representation language.
The KIF ontology is viewed as the original ontology, and translations to the other rep¬
resentations are performed as necessary. In the system, this need is initially prompted
by the existence of a goal. When a goal is passed to the system, the system reacts to
this by translating the KIF ontology into both PDDL and Prolog. The PDDL ontology
is used to produce a plan and is then discarded; the Prolog ontology is used by the
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agent during plan deconstruction and plan execution, and can then also be discarded.
If refinements are necessary, these are performed directly on the KIF ontology. The
PDDL and Prolog ontologies are not altered, since these have been discarded, and if a
further goal is received, or the original goal is not yet reached, these will be regener¬
ated from the new KIF ontology. Some maintenance of the ontology is also necessary
during ordinary plan execution (i.e., even excluding refinement situations). This con¬
cerns facts that are made true or made false as plan steps are executed. For example,
after a Buy action, (Money PA 100), which was previously true, will become false, and
(Has PA Item) and (Money PA NewAmount), where the value of NewAmount will be
determined by the cost of the item, will become true. During plan execution, these
updates are made only on the Prolog ontology (which is the working ontology at this
stage), and a record of all these changes kept. There is no communication with the
KIF ontology during plan execution. When plan execution terminates, either because
the goal has been achieved or because plan execution failure has been encountered, the
KIF ontology is updated accordingly.
As discussed in Section 2.3.1, many ontology languages are not very suitable for de¬
scribing services. However, in KIF it is possible to define axioms, which are essentially
inference rules describing a conjunction of conditions that entail another conjunction
of conditions. For example:
(Parent ?X ?Y) A (Female ?X) —> (Mother ?X ?Y).
We have used these axioms to describe action rules. However, there is a potential
problem with doing this, because an action rule implies a time ordering: first, the
conjunction on the left of the rule is true, then the action occurs, then the conjunction
on the right of the rule is true. In an inference rule there is no time element, and the
conjunction on the left and right of the rule, if true, are both true simultaneously.
In order to use inference rules as action rules without introducing logical inconsistency,
we have therefore used Situation Calculus [McCarthy and Hayes, 1969]. This intro-
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duces a situational argument to fluents (predicates whose value changes depending on
the situation). Using Situation Calculus, a Buy rule might be stated as follows
(Money ?Agent ?Amount ?Situation 1) A (Cost ?Item ?Price) —>
(Has ?Agent ?Item [Buy, ?Situationl]) A (= ?NewAmount (- ?Amount ?Price))
A (Money ?Agent ?NewAmount [Buy, ?Situation 1 ])
Thus (Money ?Agent ?Amount ?Situationl) and (Money ?Agent ?NewAmount [Buy,
?Situationl]) are distinguished by the situational argument, and even if ?Amount and
[NewAmount have different values, the rule is not inconsistent, as would be the case if
the situational arguments were not present.
A situation is a stack of the actions that have been performed when the fact is true.
Thus if no previous actions had been performed, Situationl would be [Start] and the
next situation, [Buy, ?Situationl], would be [Buy,Start].
4.5.1 The Meta-Level Ontology
We have introduced various meta-level predicates that contain information about the
predicates in the ontology. We consider the ontology to consist of two parts: an object-
level ontology, which contains all the information pertinent to the particular situation,
and a meta-level ontology, which contains information about the objects that may ap¬
pear in the object-level ontology. The meta-level ontology contains the same kinds of
objects that are found in the object-level ontology: relations, functions, classes, a class
hierarchy, individuals and actions. The way an object is classified differs from the
object-level to the meta-level ontology. Relations, functions and actions in the object-
level ontology are considered to be individuals in the meta-level ontology. This means
that we can make statements about them that are not otherwise possible; for example,
we can give them classes. This enables us to define a predicate hierarchy, and to give
relations specific classes like the ones mentioned below. It also means that relations,
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functions or actions can be mentioned within facts. For example, we can create the
fact (Agent-Needed Ticket-Selling-Agent Buy-Ticket) to indicate that the agent needed
to perform the action Buy-Ticket is Ticket-Selling-Agent. We can only state this in the
meta-level ontology, where actions are considered to be individuals of class action. In
the object-level ontology this cannot be stated, because facts can only take individuals
as arguments, not actions (or relations or functions).
Meta-level predicates are:
• Agent-Needed: this predicate links an agent that can perform a task to an action,
e.g., (Agent-Needed Ticket-Selling-Agent Buy-Ticket)
• My-Facts: this predicates applies to object-level predicates whose instantiations
an agent should not check with other agents, but should instead rely on its own
information. The location of that agent and the items it possesses would fall into
this category, e.g., (My-Facts Location).
• Inform: this applies to predicates about which the agent must ask for information
from another agent, and always applies to effects of actions. For example, if an
action has a effect:
(Has-Ticket Me Edinburgh London ?Confirmation-Number), the PA must ask
the ticket selling agent to instantiate the confirmation number once the action
has been performed.
In addition, the meta-level ontology contains information about the predicate hierar¬
chy. This allows us to declare, for example, that the predicate US-Dollars is a subclass
of the predicate Dollars, which is a subclass of the predicate Money. A predicate hier¬
archy allows to represent information about how predicates are related to one another.
These two different levels can either be represented as two different ontologies, or
the meta-level can be flattened so that all the information is contained within a single
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ontology. Since meta information is not allowed in Ontolingua ontologies, we create a
different ontology to contain it.
The predicates above are those which are needed by a PA. A service-providing agent
would also require the following information:
• Ask-Planning-Agenf. this predicate applies to an individual of class predicate if
the agent is a service-providing agent, and indicates which facts it needs to check
with the agent that is requesting an action to be performed.
• Ask-Other-Agent: this applies to predicates that need to be checked with another
agent, other than the PA or the service-providing agent, and must contain infor¬
mation about which agent it should be checked with.
It is reasonable to assume that any agent that is capable of executing plans through
interacting with other agents will have some kind of meta-information about how to
find an agent to perform the task. This may be, as we have assumed here, through
simply knowing where to find the right agent, or it may be through the ability to get in
contact with some kind of brokering service. Additionally, it is reasonable to assume
that such an agent will have some way of knowing how to interpret the effects of such
an action; when it needs to request further information, and so on.
Although we could not expect agents not designed by us always to represent this in¬
formation in precisely the manner we have envisaged, we can be confident that this
information is represented somehow, and thus these assumptions do not limit the ap¬
plicability of the system. It may be, however, that if an agent that used a different repre¬





PDDL (Planning Domain Definition Language) was chosen as the planning represen¬
tation because it is the most commonly used planning formalism, and the majority
of efficient modem planners take input in PDDL. It is the language developed by the
AIPS-98 Competition Committee for use in defining problem domains, and is a com¬
munity standard for the representation and exchange of planning domain models [Fox
and Long, 2003]. The PDDL we use is naturally constrained, because the full func¬
tionality of PDDL is not required to express our KIF ontologies. Some of the more
advanced features of PDDL, such as the ability to deal with durative actions, are not
required in our system.
4.5.2.1 Expressive Differences Between PDDL and KIF
There are important expressive differences between KIF and PDDL. KIF is full first-
order, whereas PDDL is used by propositional planners, and hence cannot be full first-
order. In fact, the very reason that PDDL is so suitable for planning is that it is not full
first-order, and thus does not face the huge search problems associated with first-order
logic. However, because it is much more intuitive and convenient to represent ontolo¬
gies in first-order logic, PDDL is designed as a pseudo first-order language. PDDL
appears to be first-order: predicates can be expressed in general terms, with class re¬
strictions on the arguments, rather than simply by a list of all current instantiations of
this predicate. However, this is, in fact, merely syntactic sugar. PDDL is designed to
look like a first-order language, but to be immediately translatable by planners into a
propositional language, and this places restraints on what can be expressed in a PDDL
ontology. Thus the expressiveness of PDDL is not equal to the expressiveness of KIF,
and there are statements that can represented in KIF that cannot be represented in
PDDL.
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One problem is that quantification over infinite domains can be represented in KIF but
not in PDDL. It would be possible to partially translate KIF ontologies that contain
quantification over infinite domains into PDDL so that plans could be formed from
them, but the PDDL representation would have to use a particular instantiation of the
quantification, and thus the full meaning of the KIF representation would be lost. How¬
ever, this is an inherent problem when attempting to form plans from such a representa¬
tion; it is, in most cases, not tractable to plan with infinite domains, and thus whatever
representation was chosen for planning, this issue would need to be addressed. In the
approach that we take, it is not an insurmountable problem if the KIF and PDDL rep¬
resentations are not equivalent, as long as what is represented in PDDL is also true in
the KIF representation. Thus there may be additional information contained in the KIF
representation that is not expressed in the PDDL representation, and we would still
consider this translation acceptable for our purposes, because the PDDL would only
produce plans that were executable both according to the PDDL representation and the
KIF representation. The disadvantage is that, because the KIF representation may not
be fully expressed in the PDDL representation, there may be valid plans that can be
formed from the KIF representation that cannot be formed from the PDDL representa¬
tion. The loss of expressivity is in one direction only: the PDDL version may not fully
express everything that is contained in the KIF version, but the KIF version is certain
to fully express everything that is contained in the PDDL version. Thus we can be sure
that the plans produced from the PDDL version of the ontology are always executable
with respect to the KIF ontology.
The problem of the potential loss of expressivity in the translation to PDDL is diffi¬
cult to avoid. The very reason that we wish to plan with PDDL rather than directly
from KIF or some other first-order representation is because the limited expressivity





Since we required a first-order representation for the ontology, and since the agent
communication was written in Sicstus Prolog, an ontology written in Prolog is both
sufficiently expressive and easy to read.
4.5.3.1 Expressiveness in Horn Clause Representation
The Prolog programming language is built on Horn clauses, with a built-in unification
algorithm. A clause (a disjunction of literals) is a Horn clause if it contains at most one
positive literal, which means there must be at most one literal on the right-hand side of
the implication . A Horn clause with a positive literal is called a definite clause, and
one without is called a goal. Only a subset of first-order logic can be expressed as Horn
clauses, and thus it is theoretically possible to develop an ontology in a full first-order
representation such as KIF that cannot be fully expressed in a Prolog representation.
In particular, it is not possible to express a disjunction of literals on the right hand side
of the equation.
However, in ORS we are not representing the KIF action rules as Prolog rules, but
rather we are using Prolog as a meta-language in which to encode the KIF rules. If
Prolog is used in this way then it becomes possible to use it to express full first-order
logic. In the Prolog representation of the ontology, a rule, named This Rule, would be
expressed as follows:
[This Rule, [A\, A2], [#i, B2,53]]
Thus, if there were a disjunction in the right-hand side, this could be expressed:
[This Rule,[A\,A2\, [B\,or{B2,Bfi)}\.
Another problem is that quantifiers are not explicitly allowed in Prolog. Thus an ex¬
pression containing quantifiers must be skolemised. However, we are not dealing with
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ontologies that contain quantifiers, and thus we do not need to concern ourselves with
such issues.
Thus there is no loss of expressivity in translating between our KIF ontologies and the
Prolog representation of this.
Another difference between Prolog and KEF is that in Prolog, there is no difference
between a correct, negative answer and a failure of the program to respond correctly
to the query: both receive a no response. However, in our KIF ontologies, we are not
using the closed world assumption, and thus there is a difference between a negative
response and an inability to answer the query. In practice, this is not a problem for the
system, because, although the agents are written in Prolog, the responses they give to
queries are not directly the results of executing Prolog programs, but an interpretation
of the failure or success of the Prolog. For example, an attempt to find the answer to
a query may result in a no response from the Prolog, and, depending on from where
and under what circumstances this no was returned, this might lead to, for example,
a response from the agent of I cannot correctly answer that query, or it might lead to
a response of I do not understand the question . Since it is possible to program the
agents to be able to distinguish between the different kinds of responses, it is possible
to get them to give appropriate responses to all queries.
4.6 Rewinding the Past
We discuss in Chapter 5 how there are some situations in which we cannot be cer¬
tain that we are performing the correct refinement. Also, refinements are performed
to bring the PA's ontology in line with the ontology of the service-providing agent to
which it is currently communicating. Later communication with other agents may in¬
dicate that it was unwise to attempt to align with this agent: perhaps it is an anomalous
agent (see Section 8.4.3 for further details of this). It is therefore important to keep
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a record of the refinements that have been performed thus far. A more sophisticated
approach to this issue is to keep several versions of ontologies, rather than one central
ontology to which all the refinements are made: this approach is discussed further in
Section 8.3. In the current system, we simplify this issue by simply returning a list of
all the refinements that have been performed. It is usually not difficult to undo refine¬
ments, because, in most cases, the refinements have inverses: for example, adding an
argument to a predicate is undone by removing it; switching the order of arguments
in a predicate is undone by switching them back again. However, in situations where
performing a refinement involves removing information, then, although performing the
inverse refinement is possible, it will lead to a situation where there is less informa¬
tion in the ontology than previously. For example, if a predicate is altered from (Money
?Agent ?Amount ?Currency) to (Money ?Agent ?Amount), then the fact (Money Agentl
100 Dollars) will be altered to (Money Agentl 100). If this is then undone, then the
definition of the predicate can be altered appropriately, but the fact (Money Agentl 100)
can only be altered to (Money Agentl 100 ?Currency), because the specific information
has been lost.
As well as altering due to refinement, the ontology is also altering as a result of the
actions being performed during plan execution. These effects are only concerned with
the facts of the ontology: facts are added and removed because they are part of the
effects of an action. Such changes will never influence the representational language
of the ontology. It is never possible to rewind the past with respect to the effects of
plan execution as it would be with respect to refinement. This is because the actions
taken during plan execution have actually happened: they have affected a world larger
than the PA. If the PA has executed a destroy-file action by requesting a file destroying
agent to perform this task for him, it then becomes impossible for the file concerned not
to have been deleted, and therefore pointless to consider what would have happened
had that not been the case. If the PA wishes to rewind the past with respect to plan
execution, the only option is to form a new plan from the position in which the PA is
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now in to take it back to its original position. In many cases, such as in the example
given above, this may prove to be impossible. If the system were designed so as to
have multiple ontologies, as discussed in Section 8.3 and above, then they would all
need to be altered according to the effects of plan execution. Whether a refinement
should have been performed or not is sometimes uncertain and may differ with respect
to different agents, and thus we wish to retain the ability to undo them. Whether a plan
execution step should have been performed or not is irrelevant: it has been performed,
and it is not afterwards possible to undo it.
4.7 Summary
This chapter introduces ORS, which is discussed in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6.
The implementation of our ideas has forced us to decide on an exact context for the
theory to be used. For reasons discussed in 4.1.3, this was chosen to be a planning
context. In addition, the production of such a system has forced us to make many
decisions as to how to contain the system sufficiently so that a fully working version
can be produced within the time scale. This has led to the production of a system that
is not as comprehensive as we would like; this is inevitable when tackling such a vast
problem from a novel direction.
The system that we have produced is capable of:
1. Starting with a KIF ontology and a goal written in Prolog;




3. Sending the PDDL ontology to a planner, receiving and interpreting a plan and
translating it into Prolog;
4. Deconstructing the plan using the Prolog ontology, to produce a justified plan;
5. Executing the plan through communication with other agents;
6. In case of plan execution failure, diagnosing what ontological mismatch between
the PA and the action-performing agent caused the failure;
7. Refining the KIF ontology appropriately so that this mismatch will no longer
cause problems;
8. Replanning using the updated ontology and repeating the process until the goal
is reached or until replanning, diagnosis or refinement is impossible.
We claim that points 2, 4, 6 and 7 represent original research, whilst the rest of the
functionality of the system is necessary to provide a platform from which to implement
this original research. Of these, points 6 and 7 represent the central focus of the project,
and points 2 and 4 are part of the platform from which this occurs.
Chapter 5 discusses the central concerns of this project: the diagnostic and refinement
aspects of this system. Chapter 6 discusses the other subsystems of ORS.
Chapter 7 describes the results of running different ontologies, with different onto¬
logical mismatches, on the system, and the steps that we took to evaluate both the
functionality and the usefulness of the system through comparison with ontological
mismatches discovered in real-world ontologies.
A discussion of how we would like to improve the system, and our ideas as to how this
could be achieved, can be found in Chapter 8. Nevertheless, the produced system fulfils






The diagnostic and refinement processes are implemented as separate systems, but the
theories behind them are deeply intertwined. The heart of the project is the theory on
which these two systems are based.
ORS must first identify where the ontological mismatch lies: diagnosis; secondly, it
must apply methods to fix this problem: refinement. The ability of the system to per¬
form either of these tasks depends on the pre-identification of the kinds of mismatches
that could occur. Before the systems were implemented, substantial ground work was
necessary to formalise the ontological mismatches that are possible for the given on¬
tological representation. The efficacy of the system depends to a large extent on our
ability to define refinement techniques and to use them to identify problem areas and
hence choose an appropriate refinement technique to apply.
The choice of ontological representation predetermines the kinds of ontological mis¬
matches that are possible. In this project, we are interested in first-order representa¬
tions. The method of identifying what mismatches could occur and forming diagnostic
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algorithms to determine which of these is to blame for communication failure is gen¬
eral to any ontological representation; however, the types of mismatches that could
occur and the algorithms needed to chose between them will vary between different
representations. This issue is discussed in more detail in Section 8.1.2.
5.2 Types of Refinements
In order to apply reasoning techniques to the problem of ontology mismatch, we need
to define methodical descriptions of how we might expect ontologies to differ. It is not
enough merely to say this ontological object is different to that one, we also need to
say how they are different. Therefore, we have developed formal descriptions of how
first-order ontologies may differ from one another. These descriptions of how things
may differ can be transformed into techniques which describe how refinements that
patch these mismatches can be implemented.
The system is limited in that we can only diagnose and refine ontological mismatches
that correspond to these descriptions. For ontological objects that differ in a more
chaotic manner, or in a manner not considered by the diagnostic system, no appropri¬
ate diagnosis will be discovered, and thus no refinement technique will be applicable.
This is an inherent limitation of the system: no matter how thorough we are in the
investigation of ontological mismatches, it is always conceivable that ontological mis¬
matches exist that have not been described. This makes it difficult to deal with onto¬
logical differences that are chaotic in nature: for example, names that are arbitrarily
changed, arguments that are arbitrarily altered, and so on, we cannot always expect
to find appropriate refinements using descriptions of methodical differences. Dealing
with such problems is outside the scope of this project. In order to limit the number
of problems of the latter kind; that is, problems that differ in a methodical way but for
which we have not predefined diagnostic methods, we need to ensure that we are as
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thorough as possible when defining these methods.
Many of the possible refinements fall into the category of those that generalise an
ontology, or those that specialise an ontology: often, ontologies are altered because
the level of information they contain is inappropriate for their needs. Much work has
been done in the field of generalising theories through the techniques of abstraction,
and it is to these that we turn as a basis for developing our own techniques. Although
much less work has been done in the field of specialising theories, we can apply these
abstractions in reverse to create what we call anti-abstractions, which are thus formal
descriptions of how to add detail to a theory.
5.2.1 Abstraction
The problem of refinement that results in generalising and removing detail from a
theory is the problem of abstraction. This is frequently used in automated systems
to detect patterns and remove detail in order to create a more general, simpler plan
[Giunchiglia and Walsh, 1992]. Thus we examine abstraction techniques to draw in¬
spiration for our own refinement techniques.
In [Giunchiglia and Walsh, 1990], Walsh and Giunchiglia attempt to formalise the
hitherto vague notion of abstraction by creating a theory of abstraction. They claim
that the most common use of abstraction in theorem proving, problem solving and
planning has been to abstract the goal, to prove its abstracted version and then to use
the structure of the resulting proof to help construct the proof of the original goal.
This work includes some work on how to build abstractions. Since abstractions should
change the theory and not the logic (except in the case of reducing a unary predicate to
a nullary predicate, which could be seen as reducing first-order logic to propositional
logic), the problem of building abstractions can be reduced to the problem of deciding
on a suitable mapping of atomic formulae. It is also desirable that these abstractions
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be truthful, where a truthful abstraction is one such that all the theorems in the ground
space are also theorems in the abstract space. They further claim that most abstractions
of this sort fall into four categories:
1. Predicate abstractions
mapping predicate names in some uniform way:
e.g., (Bottle ?X), (Cup ?X) map onto (Container ?X).
2. Domain abstractions
mapping constants and function symbols in some uniform way:
e.g., (Prime 3), (Prime 5) map onto (Prime Oddnumber).
3. Propositional abstractions
dropping some or all of the arguments to predicates:
e.g., (Abelian GroupA), (Abelian GroupB) map onto (Abelian).
4. Precondition abstractions
mapping some of the atomic formulas onto true or false:
e.g., (Has Ticket Me) —>■ (Can-Travel Me) maps onto (Can-Travel Me)
5.2.2 Anti-abstraction
When we find that our ontology contains too much information, that we have a rep¬
resentation of the domain that is too specific, we will want to abstract detail from
our ontology. When we face the opposite situation; that our ontology is not detailed
enough, we need to perform the opposite task: adding detail to the ontology. This sit¬
uation seems to be fairly likely to occur. An ontology is likely to become increasingly
sophisticated over time, with further detail added as further work is done in the domain,
and thus an agent with a slightly outdated version of this ontology will need to be able
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to add this information to its ontology. Additionally, an agent working in an area out-
with its usual field of expertise may have somewhat vague ideas about this area. It may
not have been considered worthwhile to provide a rich and detailed description of all
the information in this field when the agent was not expected to interact significantly
with it. This is particularly relevant in large and complex domains where developing a
complete ontology is an onerous task; developing as much of an ontology as is initially
thought to be relevant and then allowing the agent to insert more detail as and when it
proves necessary is perhaps a more time-efficient option. This has interesting parallels
to human reasoning, where our ideas about domains in which we are not knowledge¬
able are hazy and generalised. As we interact further with this domain we enrich our
understanding of it so that it becomes more complete in a fairly similar manner to how
an agent might enrich its ontology using the anti-abstraction techniques.
The refinements below illustrate how the abstractions above can be inverted to produce
methods that can be used to insert detail into an ontology. Note that we use infix
notation, with the first element of a predicate referring to the predicate name, and the
remaining elements, to the predicate arguments.
1. Predicate anti-abstraction
A single predicate is split into one or more subclass predicates, e.g.,:
(Money ?Amount) maps onto (Dollars ?Amount), (Euros ?Amount), (Sterling ?Amount),
etc
2. Domain anti-abstraction
The class of an argument is divided into one or more subclasses, e.g.,:
(Money ?Amount European) maps onto (Money ?Amount Euros), (Money ?Amount Ster¬
ling), (Money ?Amount Krona), etc.
3. Propositional anti-abstraction
The arity of a predicate is increased, e.g.,:
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(Money ?Amount) maps onto (Money ?Amount Dollars), (Money ?Amount Sterling),
etc..
4. Precondition anti-abstraction
A precondition is added to a rule, e.g.,:
(Has Money ?Agent) —> (Has Item ?Agent) maps onto
(Has Money ?Agent) A (InStock Item Shop) —> (Has Item ?Agent)
5.2.3 Other Types of Refinement
There are only a finite number of ways in which the kind of ontology we are consider¬
ing can be altered. Such ontologies contain the following objects:
• Predicates, which have a name, an arity and a given class for each argument;
• Action rules, which have one or more preconditions and one or more effects;
• Classes, which have a name and a superclass (the set of classes and their super¬
classes in the ontology defines the class hierarchy);
• Individuals, which have names and classes;
• Facts, which are applications of predicates to individuals.
Therefore, the only possible way to change such an ontology is to change one of these
attributes. Of these, the predicates and the classes are signature objects, which make
up the representational language, and the action rules, individuals and facts are theory
objects, which are expressed using the representation language.
The abstractions and anti-abstractions above describe specific ways of changing predi¬
cates and actions rules. However, they do not cover all possible ways of changing these
objects, nor do they describe how the other ontological objects could be changed. In
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this section, we examine each kind of ontological object and discuss all the possi¬
ble ways it could be changed. Note that we have throughout made the assumption
that changes are made one at a time and that we are not dealing with compound mis¬
matches. A discussion about how we might do this can be found in Section 8.4.4.
• Predicates:
- Changing a predicate name: We have already explored two ways in
which this might be done: by making the name more specific (predicate
anti-abstraction) and by making the name more general (predicate abstrac¬
tion). In both these cases it is possible to deduce this change of name
because we can relate the existing name to the correct name, since we have
information that it is a sub- or super-predicate. If this name is changed
arbitrarily, then it is not possible to diagnose the problem, as the new, ar¬
bitrary, name cannot be connected with the existing name. There may be
no way to know what predicate this new one is linked to if we cannot find
a connection, although it is possible that there may be some information
regarding synonyms in the ontology.
- Changing the arity: Any possible way of doing this is accounted for by
propositional abstraction or anti-abstraction. Although these techniques
deal with removing or adding a single argument, they can be repeated as
necessary to deal with removing or adding any number of arguments.
- Changing the classes of arguments: If the classes of the arguments are
changed to a subclass or superclass, this is accounted for by domain ab¬
straction or anti-abstraction. If this is done in a less methodical manner,
it is still not difficult to diagnose the appropriate refinement. Since the
predicate still has the same name, it is simple to link the new occurrence
of the predicate to the existing one, thereby determining which predicate
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should be altered. The class of the new argument must then be found, ei¬
ther through examination of the ontology or, if this fails, questioning of the
other agent.
- Switching the classes of arguments: Another possibility is that the argu¬
ments are transposed; this is also simple to diagnose.
Action Rules:
- Changing preconditions: Some ways of doing this is described by precon¬
dition abstraction and anti-abstraction. It is also possible that an existing
precondition is altered, although this can be seen as being equivalent to
performing first an abstraction and then an anti-abstraction (or vice-versa).
An interesting way in which preconditions can be added or altered is tight¬
ening class restrictions. Normally, the class is restricted through the pred¬
icates used: for example (HasPaper ?Agent ?Paper) restricts the second
argument to being of class Paper. For some rules, however, this may not
be sufficient. Perhaps a submitPaper action requires a paper to be of a cer¬
tain format. If (HasPaper ?Agent ?Paper) is the only precondition, then an
extra class restriction must be added to the rule to enforce this restriction:
e.g., (Class Paper PdfPaper). Altering these preconditions is another kind
of refinement.
- Changing effects: Changing the effects of an action occurs in precisely
the same manner as changing the preconditions.
Classes:
- Changing the name: This is extremely difficult to deal with, because it is
usually impossible to know what existing class this new class is replacing.
This new class can be added into the class hierarchy if information is known
about the superclass, but it is usually impossible to replace the existing
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class with the new class.
- Changing the superclass: If the name of the new superclass can be iden¬
tified, changing the class hierarchy in this manner is not difficult.
• Individuals:
- Changing individuals merely consists of changing their names. This is not
an interesting change. It is also difficult to deal with, for the same reasons
as changing the name of a class or a predicate is.
• Facts:
- If a fact is changed, it is sometimes possible, and sometimes not, to de¬
termine what the new version of the fact should be. Determining whether
a fact should be changed, and how this will affect the knowledge base, is
usually a matter of belief revision.
In addition to changing ontological objects that are already present in the ontology,
whole ontological objects can be added or removed. It is difficult to deal with objects
that are added unless we can extract sufficient information about how they are related
to objects that already exist. A class, for example, can be added fairly easily, as the
only required information is the name and the superclass. For a predicate to be added,
we firstly need to know how the predicate is related to other predicates. It is also nec¬
essary to know the arity and the classes of each argument (which may involve adding
new classes). This is possible in some communication situations, and not in others.
An action rule cannot be added without full information about its preconditions and
effects. Removing objects from an ontology is not difficult to perform, although it is
important to ascertain that the object should be entirely removed from the ontology,
rather than removing specific instances of it (for example, removing a particular predi¬
cate as a precondition of an action rule, but retaining the predicate definition and other
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occurrences of the predicate). However, this is difficult to diagnose, because unnec¬
essary additional objects in the ontology would not normally lead to plan execution
failure.
Those alterations that occur in a methodical manner, or for which it is possible to con¬
nect the object that has been changed with the object from which it has been changed,
can usually be accurately diagnosed. Those alterations that are chaotic and hard to
link to the original ontological object can usually not be accurately diagnosed. In Sec¬
tion 5.3, we describe the diagnostic process, making it clear exactly which changes in
which circumstances we can diagnose, and what can be done if precise diagnosis is not
possible.
5.3 The Diagnostic Algorithm
Having outlined the ways in which ontological mismatch may occur, we now describe
how we can use this knowledge to diagnose the specific mismatches we encounter.
5.3.1 Diagnostic Assumptions
As discussed in Section 4.1.2, making the problem of ontology refinement tractable in
the first instance requires some assumptions to be made. Here, we outline what these
assumptions are.
• It is an assumption in the current system that external agents are only interacting
with the PA, and not interacting with others in ways that cause changes to their
ontologies. Supposing we have, at some stage of the plan execution, interacted
with a particular agent, say AgentX. After that interaction, AgentX will have
certain beliefs about the state of the world that may have been affected by the
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interaction: for example, if it has performed an action for the PA, it will believe
that the effects for that action are fulfilled. We are making the assumption that
if, at some later point in the plan execution, we wish to return to AgentX and
question it about, for example, its beliefs about the effects of this action, then its
beliefs will be the same as just after that action was performed. If AgentX had
been interacting independently with other agents then this might not be the case;
any questions we ask it about the effects may not reflect the state of the effects
immediately after the action was performed, and thus cannot tell us anything
certain about the action. This assumption is certainly not valid in all cases, and
an obvious way to make the system more sophisticated is to eradicate such an
assumption. However, this enables us to develop a system that can explore these
issues in a context that is simple enough for a working system to be produced.
• We make certain assumptions about the way in which a service-providing agent
will check its preconditions. There are four categories of preconditions, which
are checked in the following order:
1. Those that the service-providing agent can check independently; for exam¬
ple, for a shopkeeper agent, (InStock Item Shop) would be a precondition
that it could verify itself.
2. Those that must be checked with an agent other than a PA agent. For ex¬
ample, a ticket-booking agent might check with a airline agent to check if
a requested ticket was actually available.
3. Those that must be checked with the PA; for example, (Money AgentAmount)
would be a precondition it would need to check with the PA.
4. Those that can verified independently, but only after information has been
received; for example, Price < Amount would be something the shop¬
keeper agent could verify independently once it has received information
about Amount from the PA.
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This ordering simplifies the process of diagnosis. If the service-providing agent
begins to query the PA, and failure then occurred, it can be assumed that the
cause of failure is the reply to one of these questions. Without this assumption,
we cannot be sure whether failure is due to the reply to a question, or another
precondition that was being checked in the meantime without being put to the
PA. If we wished to remove this assumption, the diagnostic process would have
to be complicated to some extent to cover this possibility. However, this would
only affect a small number of situations. This is discussed further in Section
5.3.3.
The PA always interacts with the first service-providing agent it can find that it
believes is able to perform the task. In cases where the PA is aware of more
than one agent that it believes can perform the task, there is no deliberation over
which agent would be more appropriate to approach; the choice depends only
on the order in which they appear in the meta-ontology. However, it would be
preferable to make this choice in a more sophisticated manner. For example,
previous interactions with the agents could lead to one being considered more
reliable than the other; discussed in Section 8.4.3. Additionally, one of the agents
may be more flexible and willing to accommodate the PA, making it a more
desirable agent to interact with; this is discussed in Section 8.4.2.
The system is designed to deal with errors on a case by case basis. We do not
need to make the assumption that failure is caused by exactly one error; we can
identify one error, fix it, replan, encounter failure again and then diagnose a
second error. This is not the most efficient way to deal with such a situation,
but is reasonable if we believe that in most cases, a particular failure will be
caused by a particular error. However, the nature of this approach to multiple
errors means that we are forced to assume that these errors are independent, and
that dealing with them one by one will lead towards a more correct ontology,
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rather than refining the ontology in an incorrect manner. This is certainly not
always going to be a valid assumption in a real world situation, and the system
will fail if it encounters compound mismatches that cannot be diagnosed as a
series of individual mismatches. Exploration of how we might investigate these
combinations of errors would add a layer of sophistication to the system and
enable it to be more robust in complex domains. This is discussed further in
Section 8.4.4.
• We assume, for reasons discussed in Section 6.2, that the only information we
can get from other agents is that which is revealed by the questions they put to
the PA, and by their answers to direct questions put by the PA to them.
5.3.2 Determining Authority
When an ontological mismatch is detected, there is the potential for some complex
negotiations between the agents as to which of them ought to refine their ontologies,
or, indeed, whether both should. Factors that might be relevant here are whether one
of the agents is recognised, perhaps by the community, perhaps by the other agent, to
be an authority on the matter; whether one is controlling the situation by, for example,
being able to provide something that is required by the other agent; whether either
of the agents consider this part of their ontology to be particularly important and are
unwilling to compromise it, and so on.
We simplify all these issues by assuming that the PA is willing to take on trust any
information that is given to it by another agent. The main reason we make this assump¬
tion is that it makes the situation tractable and allows us to avoid getting sidetracked
onto important but tangential issues. However, we also believe that this assumption
is plausible, because, in this scenario, the PA is interacting with other agents because
it wishes them to provide services for it; hence the other agents are in control of the
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situation. We discuss how this could be made more sophisticated in Section 8.4.2.
5.3.3 Linking Plan Failure to Ontological Mismatches
The means of detecting that an ontological mismatch has occurred, and determining
what that ontological mismatch may be, is through agent communication. The only
information available about mismatches is that which can be gleaned from observation
of past agent communication, from forming appropriate questions and putting them to
the appropriate agent, and from analysis of the ontology.
The questions put to the PA by the service-providing agents provide the richest source
of information. In many cases, the source of the ontological mismatch can be directly
identified from these questions, through the information these questions reveal about
the ontology of the service-providing agent.
We have developed the notion of surprising questions, which can provide information
about where ontologies between two agents may differ. The PA will have a set of
preconditions for the action to be performed which it believes are all fulfilled at the
time that the action is to be performed. Some of these it will expect to be asked about
and some not; however, it will not expect to be asked about anything not directly
contained in these preconditions. When a question is put to it by the service providing
agent, it answers it as best as it can and then compares this question against its list
of preconditions to see if it exactly matches one of these. If it does not, it is flagged
as a surprising question. No further action is taken at this stage, but if plan failure
occurs then the surprising questions are referred to. Of particular interest are surprising
questions that are asked immediately before plan failure occurs.
Very often, the information contained in a surprising question is enough on its own
to find the source of the problem. For example, if the question contains an instance
of a recognised predicate, but with an unexpected arity, or with an argument with an
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unexpected class, then it is clear that the expectations of this predicate are to blame.
However, sometimes it is discovered, possibly through information revealed in a sur¬
prising question, that there is a problem with a fact, believed by the PA to be true, but
believed by the service-providing agent to be false. If there is no problem with this
fact with respect to the representational language, linking the plan execution failure to
a flaw in the underlying ontology is more difficult. It must be established how the fact
came to be believed. The fact may be present in the original ontology, or it may have
been added to the ontology because it was believed to have been the effect of a previ¬
ously performed action. In the former case, our policy is to remove the fact from the
ontology, preferring the service-providing agent's belief that it is incorrect to our own
belief that it is correct. In the latter case, we must examine the faulty action to discover
what went wrong. We refer to the algorithm that diagnoses these incorrect facts as the
Shapiro algorithm, because it is loosely inspired by Shapiro's work on algorithmic pro¬
gram debugging [Shapiro, 1982] (see Section 3.3.5). We have not attempted to follow
Shapiro's algorithms closely but have merely used his ideas as an inspiration.
The algorithms used in the diagnostic processes are illustrated below as flow charts.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the top-level decision procedure, and Figures 5.2 - 5.7 illustrate
sub-algorithms that are called once the higher-level decisions have been made.
Figure 5.1 separates the diagnosis into three separate cases: those where no questions
were asked; those where questions were asked but none of them were surprising; those
where there were questions asked and at least one of them was surprising.
1. Failure immediately after a request to perform an action has been made
This situation is illustrated in Figure 5.2.
In this situation, it can be difficult or even impossible to diagnose what the cause
of failure is because the amount of information we have access to is quite limited.
The fact that failure has occurred without any questioning is certainly helpful
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Figure 5.1: Top Level Decision Making
information, but it reveals less about the ontology of the other agent than the
other two situations.
We identify three situations in which this may occur:
• The agent that has been asked to perform a task it is not able to;
• One of the preconditions for the action, that we believed to be true, is not
true;
• We are missing a precondition, and that precondition is not currently ful¬
filled.
We can eliminate the first option by querying the agent as to whether it is capable
of performing the action. If not, we must remove the information that this agent
can perform the action from our ontology and replan. Note that this means a
change to the meta-ontology, rather than to the ordinary ontology, as this is where
information about which agent can perform which task is kept.
We can investigate the second option by querying the other agent as to its beliefs
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Figure 5.2: Diagnosis when no Questions have been Asked
of the truth values of our preconditions. If we discover a precondition that it
does not believe to be true, then this is a likely cause of the failure. We then need
to consider why we came, incorrectly, to believe this precondition to be true by
using the Shapiro algorithm, illustrated in Figure 5.3.
If all of the PA's preconditions are fulfilled then the problem is much harder to
diagnose. It is clear that not all of the other agent's preconditions were fulfilled,
since it has refused to perform a task that it is capable of performing. Since it
believes that the PA's preconditions for the action are fulfilled, it is clear that
there must be some discrepancy between the two sets of preconditions: there is
an essential precondition for this action that the planning agent does not have
in its set of preconditions. Unfortunately, we have no information at all about
what this precondition may be. We cannot glean any information from previous
queries, since there are none that relate to this action. Nor can we query the
agent about what this precondition is, since we have no basis to guess what it
might be, and we cannot assume that the other agent will reveal its complete
set of preconditions for this action. Thus our only recourse during refinement
is to flag this rule as incomplete and not use it during planning. Hopefully, a
new plan can be formed that does not require the use of this incomplete rule.
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However, if this rule is essential to forming a plan that can achieve the goal then
we find ourselves in a situation where it is impossible to form a sound plan.
This is naturally undesirable; however, it is still preferable to our former state of
ignorance, where we believed that we could form an executable plan and only
discovered during execution that this was not the case.
Thus there are four possible diagnoses in the situation where failure occurs with¬
out any questions being asked:
(a) Incorrect agent consulted;
(b) An effect for a previous rule should be altered;
(c) A precondition should be altered;
(d) Missing or incorrect precondition. In this situation, precise diagnosis is not
possible. See Section 5.4.
Figure 5.3: Shapiro Algorithm Diagnosis
2. Failure after a surprising question 1
1 Note that RSQ refers to the Relevant Surprising Question
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This situation is illustrated in Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4: Diagnosis with Surprising Questions
If the agent with whom the PA is conversing attempts to perform the action,
and fails without any questioning of the agent, then the information available
for diagnosis is somewhat limited. However, if any queries are made, we are
immediately provided with much information about what the problem may be,
particularly in the case where the question is surprising. A surprising question
is one that does not exactly match a precondition; it may be very similar to an
expected precondition.
We can categorise surprising questions in the following ways:
(a) The name of the predicate in the surprising question matches the name of
a precondition:
i. The number of arguments of these two - 'matching' predicates is the
same: domain refinement or switch arguments;
ii. The number of arguments is different: propositional refinement;
(b) The names do not match:
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i. There is a class relation between the name of the predicate in the sur¬
prising question and the name of one of the preconditions: predicate
refinement;
ii. There is no relation: precondition refinement.
• Case a)i):
- Most of these situations conform to the following 2:
ifxy) matches (fxz), y ^ z,
where / indicates a predicate, x indicates one or more arguments, and
y and z are arguments.
There are four possibilities:
* classiy) = class(z)
In this case, the two predicates match with respect to the represen¬
tational language, but conflict with respect to their specific instan¬
tiation. The source of this incorrect fact must be tracked down by
the Shapiro algorithm.
* classiy) A class(z).
This is domain abstraction.
* classiy) >- class(z).
This is domain anti-abstraction.
* class{y) is not related to classiz).
This does not fall so neatly into our classifications, but it is nev¬
ertheless easy to diagnose and refine, because we have sufficient
information about the problem.
2Notation:
i)In all cases, the statement "A matches B" indicates that A is the surprising question put by the service-
providing agent, and B is the question the PA expected, which corresponds with the PA's ontology. Thus
diagnosis and refinement is aiming to change B so that it matches A;
ii) -< indicates subclass relation;
iii) (fxy) does not imply anything about the ordering of the arguments: it does not imply that y must be
the last of the arguments.
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class(z) must already be in the ontology of PA, since z is a constant
that PA is using in its planning. class(y) may already be known by PA;
if not, the service-providing agent is queried to ascertain this value.
Since the service-providing agent is using y in its communication, it
must know what its class is.




class(y) = class(b) and class(z) = class(a).
That is, the arguments have been transposed, either with the same in¬
stantiation or not.
• Case a)ii):
- (fxy) matches (fx).
This is propositional anti-abstraction. This signature refinement is
easy to diagnose and refine; all that is required is that class(y) is as¬
certained, either through examination of the PA's ontology or through
questioning the service-providing agent. However, this signature re¬
finement entails theory refinements that are more difficult to imple¬
ment; this is discussed in Section 5.5.
- (fx) matches (fxy).
This is propositional abstraction. This is easy to diagnose and refine,
both for the initial signature refinement, and for the theory refinements
that entails. It may be necessary to know what the class of the addi¬
tional argument is, so that it is possible to tell which argument should
be removed; this can be discovered either from the ontology or by
asking the service-providing agent.
• Case b)i):
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- (fx) matches (gx)
There are three possibilities:
* class(f) -< class(g).
This is predicate abstraction.
* class(g) -< class(f).
This is predicate anti-abstraction.
* class(f) is not related to class(g).
This is usually impossible to diagnose, because there is insuffi¬
cient information to determine that (fx) should match precondi¬
tion (gx). This is much harder to diagnose than the equivalent
situation in case a)i), where there was no relation between the
classes of the arguments, because in that situation, the matching
of the names of the predicates was sufficient information to deter¬
mine that this precondition probably ought to match the surprising
question. In this situation, we do not have this information. Situa¬
tions of this type are usually incorrectly classified as occurrences
of case b)ii): a missing precondition. We cannot connect this sur¬
prising question to any of the preconditions, and so we assume
that it is an additional precondition.
Case b)ii):
- (fx) fails to match any of the preconditions.
In this situation, we diagnose precondition anti-abstraction, although,
as discussed in case b)i), this will sometimes be incorrect. If it is in¬
correct, the effect will be to over-constrain the rule. We consider this
to be an acceptable approach, because if this does occur, we are still
left with a rule that will not be used other than in situations where it
is correct to use it. The disadvantage is that there may be some situa¬
tions in which it is correct to use it in which it appears to be unusable.
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However, since we consider that random name changing will not oc¬
cur especially often, these situations will be rare, and a diagnosis of
precondition anti-abstraction is usually correct.
In summary, there are ten possible diagnoses in the situation where failure occurs
when surprising questions have been asked:
(a) Domain abstraction should be applied (see Figure 5.5);
(b) Domain anti-abstraction should be applied (see Figure 5.5);
(c) The arguments should be inverted (see Figure 5.5);
(d) The domain of one of the arguments should be changed in a more chaotic
manner (see Figure 5.5);
Figure 5.5: Diagnosis of Domain Refinement
(e) A fact in the original ontology should be removed (diagnosed by the Shapiro
algorithm, see Figure 5.3);
(f) An effect of a previous rule should be altered (diagnosed by the Shapiro
algorithm, see Figure 5.3);
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Figure 5.6: Diagnosis of Predicate Refinement
(g) Predicate anti-abstraction should be applied (see Figure 5.6);
(h) Predicate abstraction should be applied (see Figure 5.6);
Figure 5.7: Diagnosis of Propositional Refinement
(i) Propositional anti-abstraction should be applied (see Figure 5.7);
(j) Propositional abstraction should be applied (see Figure 5.7);
(k) Precondition anti-abstraction should be applied.
Failure after some questioning, with no surprising questions
If failure occurs in this situation, we can conclude:
• Since questioning has begun, the only possible cause of failure is the PA's
response to these questions.
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• The PA was expecting to be asked this question, and therefore ensured that
it was correctly fulfilled, as far as it understood this was to be done.
There are two ways in which this might happen:
(a) The service-providing agent put a question to the PA that contained an
uninstantiated variable, so that the PA could instantiate this appropriately.
For example, the service-providing agent might ask:
(Money PA ?Amount),
to which the PA would reply, for example,
(Money PA 1000).
As part of the preconditions of the action, the PA would have some expec¬
tations about what the value of ?Amount should be; for example, PA might
have a precondition:
?Amount > 800,
and would ensure that this precondition was fulfilled before the action was
attempted.
Failure after PA's reply to the question (Money PA ?Amount) indicates the
incorrectness of the precondition which moderated the value of this vari¬
able: perhaps the correct precondition was
(?.Amount > 1200), or
(?Amount < 800).
It is not difficult to diagnose this problem, but it is usually impossible to
refine it. Heuristics could be built in to guess what the correct value should
be: i.e., guess that we actually need 100 more than the amount stated in the
previous precondition, or guess that the inequality should be inverted, and
see if such guesses lead to successful execution. However, this is a displeas-
ingly imprecise solution, and in cases where the uninstantiated variable is
not numeric, it becomes even harder to guess what the correct value might
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be. A neater solution would be to mark the rule as unusable; however, this
may severely limit the abilities of the PA.
(b) If the service-providing agent puts a fully instantiated question to the PA,
then it is clear that both the service-providing agent and the PA believe
that the truth or falsity of this fact is essential to the execution of the rule.
The PA must have ensured that the fact was true or false, depending on
its expectations of the required truth value, before the rule was executed.
Therefore, we can only conclude that PA's expectations of the required truth
value were wrong: if PA believe this fact should be true for the action to be
performed, it should, in fact, be false, and vice versa. This is both easy to
diagnose and to refine.
5.3.4 Dealing with Incorrect Facts: Using the Shapiro Algorithm
In many cases, as has been discussed above, finding a problem fact will enable us to
immediately diagnose what the problem is. For example, if we encounter a fact that
contains an extra argument than we expect, it is clear that the problem is connected
to this argument mismatch. However, in some cases there is no signature error with a
problem fact; sometimes the fact is correct from a signature point of view but simply
wrong, i.e., incorrect from a theory point of view. This problem is thus not amenable
to signature refinement. Instead, we must discover how it was that this incorrect fact
came to be believed. The algorithm we use to determine this is the Shapiro algorithm.
In such cases, we need more sophisticated information about how the plan steps are
linked to the underlying ontology: which action rules were used to perform each step,
why the preconditions of those rules were believed to be correct in each situation, and
so on. This information is provided by the plan justification; details of this can be
found in Section 6.3.2. If the fact came to be believed because it was believed to be an
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effect of a previous action, then we need to establish how the definition of that action
is at fault. The most obvious possibility is that one of the supposed effects of the action
was erroneously believed to be an effect:
O—»©A (fx)
should in fact be stated:
where <t> is a set of preconditions, 0 is a set of effects, / is a predicate, x one or more
variables, and (fx) represents an extra effect.
This can be checked by questioning the agent that performed this action as to its beliefs
about the validity of the effect. Due to assumptions we make about agent behaviour,
we can question the agent as to its current beliefs about the truth of the fact and this
will represent its beliefs about the truth of this fact immediately after the action was
performed. If we find that the agent does not believe this to be an effect for the action,
then this effect must be removed from the rule. This may leave the rule incomplete;
it may be that this was not an extra effect but rather an incorrectly stated effect. In
some cases, we can solve this problem by asking the agent to instantiate the fact for us;
that is, we query it using the problem fact with the relevant variable (or all variables if
we are uncertain) uninstantiated. In this way, we may be able to discover the correct
instantiation for this effect and refine the rule accordingly. Through this method, we
can also ascertain what the agent which was performing the action at which the plan
failed was expecting as a precondition. Since we have made the assumption that other
agents agree with each other, these two instantiated facts ought to agree with each
other. If they do not, it is clear that the problem action was not the correct one to
employ. This information about the correct effect and the expected precondition will be
added to the appropriate rules during refinement, so that a better plan can be developed.
Another possible cause of error is that there was some kind of problem with the pre¬
conditions, rather than that the effects are incorrectly stated in the ontology. It is clear
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that this problem with the preconditions must have had some affect on the effects, since
otherwise it cannot have been the cause of plan failure, but the problem occurs because
an incorrect instantiation of the preconditions leads to an incorrect instantiation of the
effects, rather than that there is anything inherently wrong with the effects. There are,
however, only a limited number of situations in which this can occur, because this
problem in the preconditions was not sufficient to cause immediate plan failure. From
the fact that this action was included in the plan and was performed successfully, we
can deduce that both the PA and the action performing agent believed that the precon¬
ditions were fulfilled. So the value of the arguments in the problem fact were sufficient
to fulfil the preconditions for the action, but affected the value of the effects. Consider
the example given above in failure case 3a) (failure after some questioning, with no
surprising questions). In that situation, a reply:
(Money PA 1000) causes failure, perhaps because the precondition:
(?.Amount > 800)
ought instead to have been
(?Amount > 1200).
But consider what would happen if the correct precondition was
(?.Amount > 900).
In such a case, this misinformation about the precondition would not cause plan fail¬
ure, because
(Money PA 1000),
would still be an acceptable reply. However, after this action was performed, the PA
would use its precondition to deduce that
(Money PA 200)
was now true, whereas, in fact, the truth is
(Money PA 100).
Such situations lead to incorrect facts being believed, which may well affect plan exe¬
cution later on.
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In order to distinguish the two cases, the expected value of the effects is determined by
asking the agent that performed the action to instantiate the problem fact. If this error
could be accounted for by an error in the preconditions, then this must be investigated
further. The Shapiro algorithm is used again to investigate the source of this failure.
This is another area where it may be difficult to tell exactly what the problem is, as
there could potentially be a very complex relation between the preconditions and the
effects such that an error in the preconditions would result in the effects being altered
in an unexpected way. This method allows us to identify incorrect effects and, in some
cases, to identify preconditions that may have caused incorrect values in the effects
and investigate this further. However, identifying these effects can only be done in
certain situations where there is a predefined pattern in the preconditions that explains
how they affect the effects. Currently, this is only true for numeric arguments, where
a calculation is done as part of the effects. In other cases, it will not be possible to
identify these problem preconditions. If we cannot find a problem precondition then
we must assume that the fault lies with the relevant effect. This is thus removed during
refinement. However, since we are aware that there may be another undiagnosable
cause of this failure, we do not wish to remove the original rule, that could possibly
have the correct effects, from the ontology entirely. This is thus kept in the ontology
but is not used during planning. If we encounter a problem with this rule in future, we
will be able to refer to the original rule to see if it would have performed better in this
case. If so, it can be reinstated. We will then be aware that this rule will not perform
correctly under all circumstances; however, if the preconditions are correct, the effects
should be instantiated properly. This will also lead us to the conclusion that there is
an undiagnosed problem in the database that was the genuine cause of the problem.
However, we will be, at this stage, unable to diagnose what the problem is. We can
only hope that it will not cause problems during planning, or that if it does, we will
then be able to diagnose why.
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The Shapiro algorithm is summarised in Figure 5.3. It traces back through the justi¬
fication to determine where the value of the problem precondition was last changed.
If this was a fact in the original ontology, it removes this fact. If this fact was an
effect of a previous action, it checks with the agent that performed that action as to
what it believes the value of the fact should be. If this agrees with the value queried
by the service-providing agent at failure, then the effects of that precondition are al¬
tered. The Shapiro algorithm does not, at present, investigate what happens if these
two service-providing agents disagree with each other, as we have made the assump¬
tion that service-providing agents do agree with each other. If we were to remove this
assumption, the PA would need to make judgements about which of these agents was
likely to be the most reliable. The Shapiro algorithm also does not investigate failure
caused by complex interactions between the preconditions and the effects, such that an
error in the effects is caused by an error in the preconditions, as described above.
5.4 Diagnosis Failure
In some situations, regardless of how sophisticated the diagnostic process is, it will be
impossible to provide a precise diagnosis of the cause of failure. This is due sometimes
to the assumptions we have made about the behaviour and helpfulness of other agents,
and sometimes to problems inherent in finding extra information to add to an ontology
in a fully automated way.
The first issue arises because we assume that agents are not willing, or not able, to
reveal their entire ontology to another agent (see agent assumptions in Section 6.2).
Thus an agent must surmise what the problem is through the interaction that has taken
place, and through further specific questions that are put to the service-providing agent
by the PA.
The second issue arises because there is not always an automated source for informa-
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tion missing from an ontology, or because the source of this information is unlocatable.
Consider the situation in which a human user adapts an ontology, which is then used
by an agent. The user intends to deal only with dollars, and therefore does not consider
currency information relevant, thus representing money as (Money ?Amount ?Agent).
However, over time the purposes of the agent deviates to some extent, or perhaps, if
it is using an off-the-shelf ontology, the authors of that ontology decide that currency
information would be useful, and it encounters an agent which represents money as
(Money ?Amount ?Agent ?Currency). The original agent can easily diagnose and per¬
form propositional anti-abstraction on the predicate Money. However, how is it to
instantiate this extra argument in all the instances of Moneyl The knowledge that all
money within this agent's ontology is in dollars exists only in the mind of the original
developer, and is impossible for the agent to access. The simplest approach to this
problem is to have a default value indicated for each set of subclasses; for example,
the subclasses of currency might have a default value of dollars, as illustrated in Figure
5.8: the double line indicates the default value.
Currency
US dollars Yen
Figure 5.8: Subclasses of Currency
Thus if we have an uninstantiated value of class currency that needs to be instantiated,
and there is no specific information about how this should be done, we would choose
dollars. If no default value were given, the choice would be made arbitrarily. This
method is preferable to randomly choosing a value, but it nevertheless introduces some
amount of uncertainty, as choosing the default value is merely an educated guess, rather
than a certainty.
Another approach would be to have certain agents in the system that are deemed to
be knowledgeable on such matters. For example, it may be possible to put a question
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(Money Me 1000 ?Currency) to a bank agent and expect that agent to be able instantiate
?Currency appropriately.
5.4.1 Situations that Lead to Diagnosis Failure
There are two reasons why precise diagnosis is impossible:
1. The diagnosis system does not have sufficiently many or sufficiently sophisti¬
cated diagnostic algorithms.
This effect can be minimised by thorough analysis of what kind of communica¬
tion problems are likely to occur, but it is hard to eliminate this altogether.
2. We cannot extract sufficient information to fully refine the ontology, either be¬
cause our assumptions about agent behaviour mean that they will not provide
this information, or because this information does not exist in an extractable
form (see the dollars assumption described above).
We have briefly explained our assumptions about how much information we ex¬
pect other agents to provide in Section 5.3.1. These are explained in more detail,
together with the reason we feel these assumptions are important, in Section 6.2.
The latter problem, of the information not existing in an extractable form, is also
impossible to eliminate, since we do not wish to put restrictions on the develop¬
ers of agents, but rather deal with the ontologies that are naturally encountered.
It may be possible to build in some intelligent guesswork feature to the system:
for example, if the agent is associated with a US user, and the currency of the
US is known to be dollars, then, in the absence of any explicit information, that
agent can guess that dollars is the appropriate instantiation. We can also allow
the user to build in educated guesswork through the use of default values. How¬
ever, there will be many situations in which guessing is not possible or feasible.
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In these situations, there is nothing that can be done, unless there is some kind
of oracle agent, such as the bank agent discussed above, or perhaps an oracle
agent that is able to link, for example, location to currency, so that it might be
able to inform an agent associated with a US users that its currency is likely to
be dollars.
5.5 Implementing Refinements
Once the diagnostic process is complete, implementing signature refinements is not
theoretically difficult. Through the diagnosis process we know exactly what we need
to add to the ontology and what we need to remove. Implementing this is really just
a question of text manipulation. However, there remain two difficult issues behind
implementing refinements:
• Determining the scope of refinement
Consider, for example, the situation in which a precondition (Money PA 100) is
refined to a precondition (Dollars PA 100), where both (Money ?Agent ?Amount)
and (Dollars ?Agent ?Amount) are predicates defined in the ontology. In the par¬
ticular rule where this predicate is being used, it is clear that the wrong predicate
is being used. We must therefore remove the precondition (Money PA 100) from
this rule and replace it with the precondition (Dollars PA 100). However, it is not
clear whether any further steps should be taken. It may be the case that it is never
correct to refer to Money, and that every occurrence should be changed to some
specific currency. However, not only would this create enormous difficulty, for
how could we tell which currencies should be used, it is also unjustified. Why
should we conclude that, since this was the precondition required for this rule,
it must be required in all situations? The approach we take to this is to err on
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the side of caution. Perhaps the correct thing to do would be to refine every in¬
stance of this predicate; however, because we cannot be sure of that, we refine
only this specific instance, and refine others, if necessary, when they cause prob¬
lems. It would be possible to build heuristics into the diagnostic process that
would change all occurrences of a predicate if single instances had already been
changed many times. However many occurrences we had encountered, we could
never be certain that this was the correct thing to do, but it may be considered to
be the best guess, given that it is always possible to refine the altered predicates
back to the original if necessary.
Even more problematic is domain anti-abstraction. In predicate refinement, as
discussed above, we can at least be certain that the specific problem is incor¬
rect: we say with certainty that (Dollars ?Agent ?Amount) should have been
used in this particular rule in place of (Money ?Agent ?Amount). However,
with domain refinement, we are dealing with particular instantiations of argu¬
ments. If we have a precondition (Location ?Agent ?Place), (Class ?Place
Place), which is instantiated in this particular instance as (Location PA Edin¬
burgh) and this clashed with a surprising question from the other agent: (Lo¬
cation PA EdinburghJrlighStreet), this may indicate the need for domain anti-
abstraction, because the class of Edinburgh-HighStreet is Street, which is a sub¬
class of Place. However, the agent's question does not conflict with our ontol¬
ogy: Edinburgh-HighStreet is inevitably also of class Place, and so fits in with
the class restrictions of our ontology. Thus we cannot be sure, even in this par¬
ticular instance, that we need to refine this predicate. Since this is the case, we
also err on the side of caution to avoid creating rules that cannot be fulfilled; see
Section 7.3.2.
If the agent's question were (Location PA Edinburgh-Castle), then we would
be able to identify a mismatch: if I expect an individual of class Street and am
asked about an individual of class Building, there must be some mismatch in
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the class information. In this situation, one could either assume that the correct
class for the argument is Building, or one could assume that our ontology is over-
constrained, and that the correct class of the argument is Place. The dilemma in
such situations is whether to diagnose domain refinement, or to simply assume
that an incorrect class has been used. This would be easier to resolve if we
had historical information, as discussed in Section 8.4.1, as this would tell us
whether this particular problem had arisen previously. In the absence of that
information, there is nothing to lead us to suspect it is more likely that domain
anti-abstraction is applicable than that we have simply got an incorrect class.
We therefore prefer the latter assumption, as this leads us to an over-constrained
ontology, where we may have to do more work to achieve a goal than necessary,
rather than an under-constrained ontology, where actions that we believe to be
executable lead to failure.
This issue is not a problem for domain abstraction, because, since we are deal¬
ing with superclasses rather than subclasses, there will be a clash. That is, if
we have a class restriction (Class ?Place Street), and we encounter a predicate
instantiated (Location PA Edinburgh), this is clearly not compatible. A copy of
the original instantiation could be retained and flagged as unusable, because this
may contain important information concerning the uninstantiated argument. If,
for example, the old class was place and an instantiation was europe, this would
be incompatible if the class was altered to country. However, this would reveal
important information about the way in which the new argument should be in¬
stantiated: we cannot tell exactly what it should be, but it is sensible to assume
it must be a European country. The system is not currently able to perform any
reasoning with such information; this is a task for future work, see Section 8.
• Implementing theory refinements
The problems inherent in implementing theory refinements have already been
discussed above to some extent. Sometimes signature refinement will be a matter
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of refining a single signature object, as for domain and predicate anti-abstraction.
However, sometimes signature refinement entails theory refinement. Most no¬
ticeably, this happens with propositional anti-abstraction. As has previously
been discussed, this is both extremely hard (or sometimes impossible) to im¬
plement and also outside the main scope of the project. Therefore, we do not
wish to put too much effort into solving this problem. However, we do need to
decide what our approach is going to be, since the system cannot perform ap¬
propriately if this is not solved to some extent. Since the system is designed to
keep replanning and attempting to execute plans after refinement has occurred,
until the goal is eventually reached, it is essential to keep the ontology consistent
after refinement, otherwise this process will be impossible. This means that all
instantiations of signature objects (which are themselves theory objects) must be
consistent with the definition of that signature object. Thus if a unary predicate is
refined to a binary predicate, for example, then all instantiations of this predicate
must also be made binary.
We deal with the problem of theory refinement after propositional anti-abstraction
through the use of meta-variables. We insert a meta-variable in the correct place
in every occurrence of the predicate. The class of this predicate is restricted
through the predicate definition, which will have been refined to include the
class of this extra predicate. The presence of these meta-variables means that
the ontology remains consistent, but causes some problems during replanning.
In order to produce an executable plan, it is necessary to fully instantiate all the
actions in the plan. Furthermore, during the planning process, it will often be
impossible to form a plan if preconditions of actions are not fully instantiated.
If propositional refinement is performed, there is always exactly one occurrence
of the predicate that is fully instantiated: the occurrence that led to the diagnosis
of propositional refinement. Due to the surprising question, we have informa¬
tion about how this extra argument should be instantiated. However, we have
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no information about how to instantiate any of the other predicates. The meta¬
variable will be instantiated to the default value or, if none is given, the first
individual that is of the correct class. This is not a perfect solution, as it allows
the possibility of error creeping in: we cannot be sure we are choosing the cor¬
rect instantiation, even if a default value is given. However, this approach allows
us a solution that is reasonably likely to succeed, and which enables us to main¬
tain a consistent ontology and thus continue planning. Dealing more fully with
this problem is outside the scope of the project. It seems that there is much that
can be done to improve this situation, but nothing that could be done to remove
the problem entirely and allow us to instantiate all occurrences with certainty.
5.5.1 Translating the Refinements
Once the diagnosis has been made, the refinement information has to be translated into
KIF, so that it can be used to alter the KIF ontology correctly. The refinement trans¬
lation process returns a list of items that are relevant to the refinement. The contents
of this list depend on the type of refinement. As an example, we list below the four
anti-abstractions, with an example of the predicate that calls the refinement system,
and an explanation of what this information is.
• Propositional anti-abstraction: an extra argument is added to a predicate:
Refinement command:
refine(propositionalAA,['MoneyCurrency' ,3,2]).
The information in this predicate refers to, in order:
- The predicate name, suitably translated;
- The class of the new argument, appropriately translated. If this class is
not already contained in the ontology, this will entail another kind of re¬
finement: an alteration of the class hierarchy will be required. This is
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determined during the diagnostic process, and an add class refinement per¬
formed in addition to this;
- The position in which the new argument must be placed;
- The arity of the original predicate




- The predicate name, suitably translated.
- The original class of the argument, suitably translated.
- The new class of the argument, suitably translated.
- The position of the argument that is to be altered.
Precondition anti-abstraction: a new precondition is to be added to a rule:
Refinement command:
refine(preconditionAA,['Buy','(Money ?Agent ?Amount)']).
- The name of the rule that is to be altered, suitably translated.
- The new precondition, suitably translated. This means that not only are all
the names in the precondition altered appropriately, but also the syntax: for
example,
money(Agent,Amount) becomes (Money ?Agent ?Amount).
Predicate anti-abstraction: the name of a predicate is changed to a subclass:
Refinement command:
refine(predicateAA, ['Money'DollarsBuy-Rule']).
- The old name of the predicate, suitably translated.
- The new name of the predicate, suitably translated.
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- The name of the rule in which this change should take place, suitably trans¬
lated (see Section 5.5 for a discussion as to why this change is only imple¬
mented in a single rule).
The above list mentions the refine/2 predicate, which is the predicate that calls the
refinement process. See Appendix B for further information about how this refinement
predicate works, and for samples of the coding.
5.6 Summary
This chapter describes the central functionality of ORS: diagnosis and refinement. It
outlines what the various components of the system are and how they interact. It ex¬
plains what kind of ontological mismatches we are expecting to encounter, and how
we propose to diagnose and refine these mismatches. Figure 5.9 illustrates the propor¬
tion of ontological changes the system can handle. All of the ontological objects are
listed, with the types of changes that could be made to them. These are divided into
the different ways in which these changes can occur. White boxes indicate situations
in which accurate diagnosis and refinement can always be made. Blue boxes indicate
situations in which accurate diagnosis and refinement can sometimes be made: some¬
times a plausible but uncertain diagnosis and/or refinement can be made; sometimes
no diagnosis or refinement is possible. Red boxes indicate situations in which accurate
or even plausible diagnosis and refinement cannot be made.
Adding new ontological objects is difficult because this can require a great deal of
information. For a class this is not a problem, because we have a very simple definition
of what a class is. If an unknown class is mentioned by another agent, we can be sure it
is possible to determine its name and superclass. Deriving all the necessary information
for predicates is sometimes possible; for action-rules, it never is. Dealing with action-
rules is difficult because very little information about these is revealed through agent
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communication. Some of these shaded boxes are not certain to succeed, but work very
often, such as adding missing preconditions; some are difficult to diagnose and refine
correctly, such as changes in effects: information about this is only extractable through
the Shapiro algorithm. Sometimes, our approach is not good for detecting ontological
mismatch simply because it doesn't apply in the planning context in which our system
is set. For example, it is hard to diagnose that a rule has an extra precondition, because
this will never lead to plan failure, although investigating questions that are not asked
when they are expected could be helpful here.
Many of the ontological mismatches that we are not capable of diagnosing are those
that are of a more random or chaotic nature, and thus it is very difficult to develop any
kind of diagnostic techniques that would be able not only to identify the problem but to
correctly diagnose a solution. Although it is of some use to diagnose problems even if
we cannot find a solution for them, it is clearly more useful to concentrate on situations
in which both diagnosis and refinement are possible, and this has been our approach.
There are some cases, outlined above, where, in looking for fixable problems, we may
encounter problems that we do not know how to repair. In these cases we can only flag
these ontological objects as unusable without adding any information about how they
may be made usable. This information is certainly of some use in making executable
plans, but we concentrate on situations where we can not only diagnose but also fix
problems.
As explained in the previous chapter, the techniques we have outlined are only appro¬
priate for first-order ontologies. The same kind of approach would be applicable for
non-first-order ontologies, but the potential mismatches we would identify would be
different. Additionally, if our techniques were applied to a first-order ontology with
more complex or additional ontological objects, there may be areas in which our tech¬
niques would not work; further research would be necessary here. In particular, our
notion of an ontology has a rather simple approach to classes, which are used merely
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to create the class hierarchy and to designate the classes of individuals. It is common
in ontologies to use a much more sophisticated approach to classes, where much addi¬
tional information is assigned to classes. The same approach can be used to develop
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Figure 5.9: Refinements Covered by the System
 
Chapter 6
Subsystems of the ORS
6.1 Introduction
In this section we introduce the subsystems on which the diagnosis and refinement are
built.
6.2 Agent Communication System
The entire process of diagnosis and refinement is being carried out within the frame¬
work of an agent communication system; thus the development of such a system is a
vital part of the ORS. At the same time, the agent communication system is merely
part of the framework and is not itself a focus of our research.
Developing an agent communication system can be a problem of significant complex¬
ity. There are many issues that one might wish to consider concerning agent behaviour,
agent languages, agent protocols and such like. For our purposes, however, all of these
concerns are side issues. We require an agent communication system as a platform for
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exploring our ideas of diagnosis and refinement and thus do not wish to address these
these agent issues in much detail. What we require from the agent communication
system is a platform to allow agents to pass messages to one another. All we require
is that the agents can freely communicate, can ask for actions to be performed and can
ask questions concerning these actions if necessary. We make whatever assumptions
are necessary concerning the interaction of agents. We feel free to make simplifying
assumptions about the agents in all areas other than those we are directly investigating.
Specifically, we assume that agents are honest, helpful, are always available and can
be found in the places where we expect them to be. We assume that they will perform
tasks that they are capable of performing if the necessary conditions are fulfilled, and
hence refusal to perform a task means that either they are the wrong agent, or that
they believe that the preconditions are not fulfilled. We assume that communication is
always reliable and that messages are never simply lost.
However, we do not wish to make too many assumptions about the agents' behaviour
regarding their ontologies. The basis of our research is the ability of agents to interpret
the ontologies of other agents in light of their actions and to analyse how these other
ontologies differ from their own. If we assume too much about how willing or capable
the other agents may be to divulge information about their ontologies, then our research
will be limited in applicability. It is very difficult to make predications about how we
can expect agents to behave, since there is great disparity between different agents and
a high degree of freedom for the designer of agents to make his own mind up about
these things. Therefore, in order to ensure a reasonable generality to our system, we
are making the assumption that agents will not reveal very much about their ontologies.
We assume that agents respond only to the following types of communications:
• request(ax), where a is an action name, and x are the appropriate arguments.
This represents another agent asking for action a to be performed. The agent
receiving this query will reply that the action has been performed if it is able to
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perform the action, and if it can ascertain that all the preconditions of the action
are fulfilled (possibly through communication with other agents), and will reply
that the action has not been performed otherwise.
• query(/3c), where / is a predicate name, and x are arguments.
This represents another agent asking for information concerning a specific pred¬
icate. There are two possible situations:
- All of the arguments are instantiated. In this case, the agent receiving the
query will reply as to whether it believes this instantiated predicate (or fact)
to be true or false. The agent may find this predicate (or its negated version)
as a fact in its ontology, either because it originally believed it to be true
or because it has been made true during previous interactions, or it may be
able to infer the truth of this fact.
- One or more of the arguments are uninstantiated. In this case, if the agent
has a fact that is a fully instantiated version of this predicate, it will return
this, or, if there is more than one fact that will match, it returns one of these.
For example:
query: (Money PA ?Currency 2Amount)
reply: (Money PA Dollars 1000),
or
query: (Money PA Euros lAmount)
reply: (Money PA Euros 500)
If the agent has no fact in its ontology that matches this predicate, it will
reply that this is false.
There is no facility for forcing an agent to reveal more information than this. In partic¬
ular, there is no way of directly enquiring about action rules.
We believe that this approach is the most plausible one to take. The kinds of interaction
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described above are standard forms of agent interaction, and it is reasonable to expect
most agents encountered in a Semantic Web like environment to be able to behave
in such ways. The kind of interaction that would be required to discover more about
another agent's ontology is not part of standard agent interaction, and we do not believe
that it is reasonable to expect agents that have not been designed specifically for this
purpose to be able to behave in such ways. It is important for the applicability of
the system that we expect agents who make use of it only to behave in ways that are
standardly exhibited by agents, rather than to expect them exhibit specialist behaviour.
Additionally, we cannot assume that agents would be prepared to reveal more than this
about their ontologies because of the security issues this would entail. Many agents
have commercially sensitive information: for example, an agent that is providing a
particular service for a fee would not wish to reveal very much information about how
this was done, as this information is of material value to it (or its owner). It may also be
the case that the underlying ontology of an agent is completely different to the format
that is used for communication; it would thus be completely unhelpful to have direct
access to the ontology. For these reasons, we assume that agents will reply to direct
questions and requests for actions to be performed only. We use a purely message-
passing architecture; agents can only interact by message exchange. There is no global
clock, no direct observation of other agents' definitions, no shared knowledge.
Another important assumption we make is that the PA alone is concerned with bringing
its ontology in line with that of other agents. There is no negotiation about which agent
should alter its ontology, and the service-providing agents are not concerned that their
ontologies are not in line with the PA. When the PA identifies ontological mismatches,
it alters its ontology in order to eradicate these; it does not question to what extent it
ought to believe the other agents. We believe that these assumptions are plausible in the
scenario we are investigating, because the PA's interaction with other agents consists
entirely of asking service-providing agents to provide services for it. If it wants these
services to be provided, it has to conform to what the service-providing agents what
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of it, and therefore is always prepared to take on the submissive role. Additionally,
making this assumption simplifies the situation to the extent that an initial working
system can be produced. However, making this process more sophisticated, by making
the refinement process more interactive between the agents, would be an important
addition to the system. This issue is discussed further in Section 8.4.2.
In summary, our assumptions about agent behaviour are:
• Agents have particular roles, which they stick to throughout the course of the in¬
teraction; for example, a buying agent cannot simultaneously be a selling agent;
• Agents are helpful and honest; what they tell us may not be true, but this oc¬
curs because they are mistaken in their beliefs, not because they are deliberately
dishonest;
• We are aware of all the agents involved in the system, and the world only changes
through these agents interacting the PA;
• Agents are able to communicate only by exchanging messages;
• Agents will always perform actions for one another if possible; an action will
only fail if an inappropriate agent is contacted or if the preconditions of the
action are not fulfilled;
• Agents share a common protocol; it is only in the content of the messages that
mismatches occur.
As a result of these assumptions, the implementation of the agent communication sys¬
tem is relatively straightforward.
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Implementation of the Agent Communication System
The Agent Communication System is based on Linda, which is a set of language
extensions based on a tuple-space, where a tuple-space is a shared memory storage
abstraction which provides a global storage mechanism for nodes operating within a
network [Patterson et al., 1993]. The tuples, together with a small set of primitives,
provide for interprocess creation, communication and synchronisation. We are us¬
ing a version of Linda written in Sicstus Prolog [Sicstus, 2005]. One process runs
as a server and one or more processes run as clients: thus the agents in the system
are Linda clients, with a Linda server present to facilitate agent communication. The
server acts as a blackboard which agents can write to, read from and delete messages
from. This is similar to a broadcast mode of communication, except that reading a
message consumes it, so that it is no longer available.
The agent communication system that we build on top of this is fairly basic. The agents
send queries to one another by using the writing predicate out/1, where the argument
taken by this predicate is the outgoing message, specified by the agent protocol de¬
scribed in 6.2.3. Agents read messages for themselves and, once read, remove them
by using the read-and-delete predicate in/1. There are two versions of this predicate:
the standard in/1 and also injioblock/1. When the former is used, this causes the agent
concerned to wait until an appropriate message appears on the blackboard, only con¬
tinuing with other tasks once this has occurred. When the latter is used, the agent
concerned checks the blackboard for a message, and fails if an appropriate message
is not present. Service-providing agents have a more limited function than the PA;
they are there simply to perform tasks for other agents, and will wait around until such
a task is required from them. Thus they use the in/1 predicate. PAs, on the other
hand, are performing other tasks than simply communicating with other agents: for
example, forming plans; and hence use the iriMoblock/1 predicate. In a more complex
system, such as the one we envisage developing as a future extension to the system,
6.2. Agent Communication System 157
service-providing agents may also be PAs; they may perform many actions including
plan execution in addition to performing their given task. Thus they would then use the
injioblock/1 predicate. The disadvantage of using this predicate is that it creates the
possibility of agents missing messages, and failing because a message was not present,
when in fact the message may have appeared after a time lapse. In our system, we
safeguard against this happening by calling the injioblock/1 command and, if it fails,
sleeping for two seconds and then calling it again. If it fails this second time, it is
assumed that the communication has failed for some reason. This simple safeguard
is sufficient in our system where the interaction is not complex, because most of the
agents are doing nothing but waiting to perform tasks. In a more complex system, such
concerns would become more difficult to control, and a more sophisticated approach
may be necessary.
6.2.2 Algorithm of Service-Providing Agents
The algorithms of the PA are described in detail in Chapter 5. Here, we outline the
algorithm of service-providing agents, illustrated in Figures 6.1 and 6.2. This is much
simpler than the algorithms of the PA, since the functionality is much less. The service-
providing agent must check whether it can, in fact, perform this action and, if so, must
step through the preconditions one by one to verify if they are correct. Preconditions
need to be dealt with differently: the truth of some is established through asking the
PA; the truth of others through asking other agents (for example, an airline agent may
be able to provide information as to whether there is a free seat on a given flight);
the service-providing agent may be able to ascertain the truth of other preconditions
itself; and others may be ascertainable by the service-providing agent once certain
information has been received (for example, a precondition that states the price of a seat
must be under a certain value can be ascertained once the airline agent has responded
as to what price seats are still available.) If any preconditions do not hold, failure is
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reported. If all of the preconditions do hold, the service-providing agent updates its
ontology according to the effects of the action, and reports success.
Report Success
Figure 6.1: Service-Providing Agent Algorithm
6.2.3 Agent Protocol
We have developed a simple agent protocol for use during agent communication. The
protocol for performing actions is illustrated in Figure 6.3.
When a request to perform an action is made of a service-providing agent, that agent
can respond in three ways: report failure in performing the action {problem), success¬
fully perform the action {ok), or request further information from the request-making
agent {query(X)). If a query is made, the PA must respond to it, though this response
may indicate an inability to correctly answer the query. Again, the service-providing
agent can respond in any of the above three ways. This process is repeated until the
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Figure 6.2: Precondition Checking Algorithm
service-providing agent is satisfied that all the preconditions for the action are ful¬
filled. This means that the number of queries made by the service-providing agent
cannot be greater than the number of preconditions for the action (it is usually fewer,
because some of the preconditions can be checked without making queries). Once all
the preconditions have been checked, the service-providing agent has only two options
of response: ok or problem. The protocol terminates whenever a response of ok or
problem is received.
This protocol contains only two performatives: query and reply (equivalent to ask and
tell). These are of the form:
query(SendingAgent,ReceivingAgent,QueryType,Query)
reply(SendingAgent,ReceivingAgent, QueryType,Answer)
















n < = no. preconditions
Figure 6.3: Action Performing Protocol
Thus the agents are all constrained to either asking questions (which can include re¬
questing actions to be performed) or responding to these questions, which may be with
an answer to the question, or with an intermediate question if the answer cannot be
immediately ascertained.
These two performatives are subdivided into different types, determined by the third
argument, QueryType. This argument can take the following values:
• Request: this is a request for the Receiving Agent (service-providing agent) to
perform a task for the Sending Agent (PA). The ultimate response is ok if the
task has been performed, or problem if it has not. There may be intermediate
queries and responses whilst the receiving agent is tries to ascertain whether or
not it can perform the task.
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• Question: this is a request for the Receiving Agent to respond to a direct ques¬
tion from the agent. The response to this may be yes or no, or it may be an
instantiation of the query (if the query contained uninstantiated variables).
Since we require only two performatives, we have not made use of standard perfor¬
mative languages such as FIPA-ACL [FIPA-ACL, 2002] or KQML [KQML, 2005],
The kinds of functionality that these languages are designed to facilitate are similar to,
though more complex, than the functionality that can be performed in our system. The
purposes of performatives in FIPA-ACL can be grouped into five categories: passing
information, requesting information, negotiation, performing actions and error han¬
dling [Wooldridge, 2002]. Our system is designed to deal with four of these categories;
negotiation is not dealt with. However, the richness of the FIPA-ACL specification al¬
lows these to be dealt with in a much more sophisticated manner than is possible in
our system. For example, there are five different performatives which are designed
for passing information: confirm, disconfirm, inform, inform-if and inform-ref.
In our basic performative language, passing information is performed with only one
performative: reply.
Since it was important to keep agent communication simple, we decided to avoid mak¬
ing use of the richness of a performative language such as FIPA-ACL or KQML. How¬
ever, many of the extensions we would like to make to the system, discussed in Chapter
8, require more complex agent communication. In order to allow for this, it would be
advantageous to make the system FIPA compliant; thus we can take advantage of the
additional functionality provided by such a language. Additionally, making the system
FIPA compliant would make it accessible to a much broader community, as FIPA-ACL
is the standard performative language. Without a shared performative language, suc¬
cessful interaction is generally impossible (though some work is being done on adding
some flexibility to this [McGinnis and Robertson, 2004a, McGinnis and Robertson,
2004b]). Thus making the system FIPA-ACL compliant would greatly increase the ap-
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plicability of the system. These issues are discussed in Section 8.2. Another approach
we have investigated is conducting agent communication with agent protocols, such
as the electronic institution framework [Esteva et al., 2001, Sierra et al., 1998]. Our
ideas about basing our refinement techniques in such a system are discussed in Section
8.4.6.
6.3 Planning System
The role of the planning system is to return a plan for achieving the desired goal, which
is annotated with an appropriate justification. The justification is required in order to
provide information about how the plan relates to the ontology: which rule was used
to perform a particular action; what the preconditions of this rule are; why we believed
each of the preconditions to be true in the given situation; what the effects of the rule
are.
As discussed in Section 5.3.4, this justification is not always necessary. Sometimes,
the information revealed directly through the agent locutions is sufficient to link the
cause of plan failure to a specific part of the underlying ontology. However, in some
situations this information is not sufficient; in these cases, we need to make use of the
plan justification through the Shapiro algorithm.
If we wish to extract this information from a planner, we require a planner which will
use such first-order reasoning techniques to build a plan, and then be willing and able
to divulge this information to the user. A first-order planner - a Prolog planner, for
example - would be able to do this and would not be difficult to build from scratch.
However, such planners are seldom used in planning because their search techniques
are inherently inefficient. They are usually very resource intensive, and it can often be
impossible to develop plans that are more than a few steps long. It seems, therefore,
very unwise to build a system that is dependent on such a planner. Even if we are
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initially only using small plans that could be built on such a planner, we do not wish to
build this limitation into the system.
On the other hand, efficient planners are not first-order and are not capable of returning
the kind of information we need. A common search tactic is to take an ontology that
appears to be first-order, together with all possible variables, instantiate the ontology
in all possible ways and then perform a search through the propositional space. It is
clear that such a search technique is not helpful for returning the higher-level reasoning
information that we require. In addition, many planners are black-box in nature and
unable to return much information about the planning process.
We have therefore developed a plan deconstructor, which will take a completed plan,
provided by any sort of planner, and reconstruct a first-order justification for the plan.
We are thus able to make use of an efficient planner and also to receive the reasoning
information we require. This is discussed in detail in Section 6.3.2
6.3.1 Planner
Given that we have developed the plan deconstructor separately, the requirements of
the planner were few. We simply require an efficient modem planner that is capable
of producing linear plans, since these are the only kinds of plans the system currently
deals with. Due to the modular nature of the planning system, the choice of planner is
by no means fixed; we can slot in a different planner if we wish with minimal impact on
the system. This would affect the interpretation of the plan; every planner represents
plans in a slightly different format, and therefore the part of the system that reads and
interprets the plan so that it can be read by the agent and the plan deconstructor would
have to written independently for each planner. However, this is a very small part of
the overall system; the rest of the system would not be affected.
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6.3.1.1 Choice of Planner
There were two primary concerns for the choice of planner:
• it is preferably to have a modern, widely recognised planner;
• the choice of the specific planner should limit the system as little as possible.
The first concern is important for two reasons. Firstly, we wish the system to be as
efficient as possible, and automated planning can be a timely and difficult process.
Secondly, in order to make this work as widely applicable as possible, and in particular,
to demonstrate to the planning community that this work makes a viable and important
contribution to multi-agent planning, we wish to choose a planner that was already
well-established and well-regarded.
The second concern entails avoiding making the entire system dependent on a planner
that may at some time become outdated, but rather that it would always be capable of
making use of the most advanced planners. With this in mind, it seemed desirable to
use a planner that accepted knowledge in the PDDL representation. This choice does
not limit the system to a great extent. If we wished to change to a planner that used
another representation, the PDDL section of the translation process would have to be
rewritten. However, the other aspects of the system would remain unaffected.
With the above concerns in mind, we chose Metric-FF as our planner [Hoffmann,
2003], Metric-FF was developed by Jorg Hoffman as an extension to his planner FF.
FF (Fast-Forward) [Hoffmann, 2005] is a domain independent planning system. It
was awarded for outstanding performance at the 2nd International Planning Competi¬
tion [PlanComp2, 2000], and was the top performer in the STRIPS track at the 3rd In¬
ternational Planning Competition [PlanComp3, 2002], Metric-FF is designed to work
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with PDDL-2.1 which incorporates, among other things, the ability to deal with dura-
tive actions [Fox and Long, 2003], Metric-FF was the top performer in the numeric
track at the 3rd International Planning Competition [PlanComp3, 2002],
6.3.1.2 Limitations of the Planner
Automated planning is very difficult; hence, although we have chosen a state-of-the-
art planner, this does not mean that planner is without limitations. If the PDDL input
is of sufficient complexity, Metric-FF may be unable to find a plan even if one exists.
In such cases, the planner will run out of memory and not return any information as
to whether a plan is possible. In particular, increasing the arity of a predicate greatly
increases the complexity of finding a plan. We have found the presence of predicates
with an arity of five or more creates problems for Metric-FF, and it is either extremely
slow to produce a plan, or runs out of memory. Even if the class restrictions of the extra
predicate are such that the complexity of the search space is not hugely increased: for
example, restricting the class such that only two individuals exist that are relevant,
hence only doubling the search space, Metric-FF may nevertheless fail to find a plan.
This is because much of the work is done in pre-processing, where the class of the
extra argument may not even be noticed.
The only refinement that is really affected by this limitation is propositional refinement.
In order to avoid situations where the planner fails, we have restricted our examples
of this refinement to predicates that have an arity no greater than 3, and thus, after re¬
finement, have an arity no greater than 4. This is regrettable, and may create situations
where it is impossible to diagnose the correct refinement. However, this is a limitation
of modern planners, which comes about because automated planning is a very difficult
task, and thus, if there is to be a planning element to our system, we cannot help but be
restricted by this. Also, it is unusual to encounter predicates that have an arity greater
than 4; most ontologies do not contain predicates of such high complexity.
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6.3.2 Plan Deconstructor
The role of the plan deconstructor is to produce a first-order ontological justification
for the plan produced by the planner. It is not attempting to reproduce the steps taken
by the planner since this, as has been discussed above, will not provide the necessary
information.
The justification for the plan is a list of justifications for each action in the plan, and is
of the form:
[lastJustification,...,firstJustification].
Each action justification is of the form:
[Action,RuleNo,Preconds,Effects,State,Situation]
and contains the following information:
• the name of the action
• the identifier for the rule
• the instantiated preconditions for the action
• the effects for the action - these will generally be instantiated in the justification,
but in some cases some arguments may depend on information provided by the
agent performing the action for us; these must necessarily be instantiated after
the justification is produced, during execution.
• a version of the state, updated for that action. The state contains information
about how fluents are changing during plan execution, and is explained in more
detail below.
• a version of the situation, updated for that action. The situation is a list of all the
plan steps that have been executed so far, thus describing the situation in which
the preconditions of each action are held to be true. The situation is updated by
appending the current action to the situation list.
6.3. Planning System 167
The state is perhaps the most important part of the justification, and it is to this that
we turn when we require information about what may have caused errors earlier in the
plan execution. The state is of the following form:
[[[values offacts altered in sitl ],[sitl ]],
[[values offacts altered in sit2],[sit2]],...]
The values in the state are very similar to the effects for each action, but are not identi¬
cal. The state values represent processed versions of the effects: for example, an effect
may be a calculation to be performed, e.g., NewAmount = OldAmount - Cost. When
the state is updated, this calculation will be performed, and any effect that contains the
variable NewAmount can be instantiated, but the calculation itself is not listed in the
state. We list both the effects and the state in the justification for convenience, since
we at times need to refer to one and at other times to the other. It would not be espe¬
cially complicated in such cases to calculate the state from the effects, though not vice
versa. However, it is more useful to carry this information in a list created during plan
deconstruction, so that it can be referred to at any point without further calculation.
6.3.2.1 Implementation of the Plan Deconstructor
The plan deconstructor follows the specification described in Section 6.3.2. The de-
constructor, written in Prolog, uses the Prolog version of the ontology. It performs the
following actions:
• it builds a list of facts of the initial state by observing which facts are true in the
original ontology;
• it attempts to meta-interpret the plan by finding an action with the correct name
in the ontology, and then verifying that all the preconditions of that action hold
in the current state;
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• it builds up a new state by creating a list of all the effects of the action that has
just been performed, and appending them to the situation, which describes which
actions have taken place thus far. This list contains, in STRIPS terminology, both
the add-list and the delete-list, as it contains information about what has been
made true and what is no longer true. This new list is appended to the current
state;
• these lists of effects of the actions that have been performed are appended to the
relevant situations in the justification of the plan, and formed into a list contain¬
ing all the effects of actions with the relevant situation: this list explains why
each fact is considered to be true, and at what point it came to be made true.
We give below an example of what the deconstruction might look like after the first






[(Class IsabellePaperDvi DviPaper), (Class Lucas Agent), (HasPaper Lucas IsabellePa¬
perDvi)],
Effects:
[(Class IsabellePaperPs PsPaper),(Class Lucas Agent),(HasPaper Lucas lsabellePa-
perPs)],
State:
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[
[[(Class IsabellePaperPs PsPaper),
(HasPaper Lucas IsabellePaperPs), (Class Lucas Agent),
[(ConvertPaper IsabellePaperPs Lucas IsabellePaperDvi), start]],
[[(Accommodationlnfo Cade 50), (HasPaper Lucas IsabellePaperDvi),
(Location Cade Miami),(Location Lucas Edinburgh),(Money Lucas 1000),




[(ConvertPaper IsabellePaperPs Lucas IsabellePaperDvi),Start]]]
The first four items give information concerning the most recent (and, in this case,
the only) action: here, it is the action ConvertPaper. The fifth item, the state, lists
not only the information for this particular action, but gives a snapshot of the truth of
each fact at each point in the deconstruction thus far. Thus the first part of it lists the
facts that have become true after the first action has been performed; at this point, the
situation is [(ConvertPaper IsabellePaperPs Lucas IsabellePaperDvi),Start]], and this
is part of the list of facts, so that the context in which these facts are true is immediately
clear. The second part of the state lists the facts that are true at the previous step of
the deconstruction: in this case, this is at the start. Again, that situation is attached to
the facts. Finally, the situation (which, as discussed above, also appears in the state) is
explicitly stated.
The plan deconstructor behaves in a similar manner to a first-order planner, except
that the huge search problems encountered by first-order planners have already been
dealt with by a more efficient planner. Thus the combination of the planner and the
plan deconstructor combines the efficiency of a state-of-the-art planner, with the plan
formation information provided by a first-order planner.
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6.3.2.2 Relation of the Plan Deconstruction to Plan Formation
As has been discussed above, the justification provided by the plan deconstructor is an
explanation of how the plan might have been formed, not how it actually was formed.
There are two reasons why we choose to use this information, rather than information
about how it actually was formed:
• For the kind of efficient planners we would want to use, it is usually impossible
to retrieve such a justification.
• Even if it were possible to retrieve this information, it would not be the kind of
first-order reasoning we require to investigate the problem, because these plan¬
ners are propositional and use SAT solvers or similar to solve the search prob¬
lems. Thus this information would not be very helpful for the kind of analysis
we need to do.
It seems reasonable to assume that in many, or even most, cases, the justification pro¬
vided by the plan deconstructor will point us to exactly the problem that is causing the
plan execution failure. However, this may not always be the case; it may be that there
is more than one way to justify a plan, and that the way that the plan deconstructor
finds is not the one that will lead to the discovery of the problem that actually caused
the failure. Certainly, any justification that is formed by the plan deconstructor will
be a valid justification for the plan, and any valid justification for an inexecutable plan
must be based on onto some kind of ontological error. We can be sure that there is
some kind of error, highlighted by this particular justification, that would lead to the
plan being inexecutable. Thus, if we diagnose and refine as normal, we will always
reach a state where the ontology is closer than it was before, since one source of onto¬
logical mismatch has been patched, and possibly a state from which an executable plan
can theoretically be developed (this will depend on whether the justification included
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more than one ontological error). If we then replan, we would hope that the planner
would use the refined ontology to produce a slightly different plan to the one produced
previously, which would then be executable (or would fail at another stage due to an¬
other error). However, if there is more than one way to justify this plan, then it may
be that exactly the same plan will be produced, since if there is still a way to justify
the old plan, it is still possible that it could be developed from the updated ontology.
Ideally, this will be a iterative process, where we go through the justifications one by
one, each time refining the error on which that particular justification is based, until it
is no longer possible for the planner to develop the inexecutable plan. This seems like a
laborious process; however, we are, at each stage, learning more about the domain and
refining the ontology in a way that may well be helpful to us later, and additionally,
it seems unlikely that there will be many situations in which there is more than one
differing justification for the same plan, and certainly not many situations where there
are several.
6.3.2.3 Completeness of Plan Deconstructor
In order to be sure that this is a reasonable way to do things, we need to be sure that:
• If it is possible to develop a plan to reach a given goal from a given ontology,
then the planner will be able to find such a plan.
• If it is possible to justify a developed plan from a given ontology (which, from a
technical standpoint, is equivalent to it being possible to develop that plan from
that ontology), then the plan deconstructor will find such a justification; i.e., that
the plan deconstructor is complete.
If the above two criteria are met, then we can be sure that deconstructing the plan
separately to creating the plan will not lead to a situation where the ontology cannot
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be refined appropriately. More specifically, it will not lead to the formation of a plan
that cannot be deconstructed, nor will it lead to a failure to form a plan, where decon-
struction of a potential plan, or formation of a plan using a first-order planner, is still
possible.
Additionally, we can be sure that refining the plan by using a justification produced
externally to the planner will always eventually end in the refinement of the precise
problem in the original plan (barring limitations in the diagnosis and refinement pro¬
cesses). In most cases, unless we have many different actions with the same name, it
is probable that plans can only be deconstructed in one way, and hence only one cycle
of refinement is necessary until the plan is fixed for the particular point of plan failure.
But if the two criteria are fulfilled, then we will always be able to find the correct re¬
finement, even if this takes more than one refinement cycle. The maximum number of
refinement cycles this could take is the number of ways in which the ontology differs
from the ontology to which it is being mapped, which is equal to the number of differ¬
ent ways the planner may have formed the plan. It is usually not possible to get into
loops. However, consider the situation in which PA is trying to execute the plan:
P = A, B, C; where A,B and C are actions.
Imagine there are two ways of justifying this plan:
A\, Bi, Ci, or
A2; #2, C2,
where A\ and A2 are rules that enable the performing of action A, and so on.
If plan P is not executable, there must be a flaw in both of the justifications: perhaps
there are problems with the preconditions of rule B\ and those of A2. Imagine plan
execution failure is encountered during the attempted execution of action C. If the first
justification is being used, the problem will be traced back to the problem with B\; this
will be refined and replanning can commence. A justification for this inexecutable plan
can still be found: the second justification, for example. However, such a justification
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could not include rule B\ unless that rule had an additional flaw that also led to plan
execution failure. If B\ is not able to be included in the justification, then we can
always be sure that are getting closer to the situation where this inexecutable plan
cannot be justified, and hence cannot be formed from the ontology. If B\ had more
than one problem, it is possible that problem could still be in a new justification. If the
plan execution fails in a different place, and if this is traced back to the rule B\, and if
the refinement that was diagnosed to solve this problem was the exact inverse of the
refinement that had previously been performed on B\, to solve the previous cause of
plan execution failure, then the process may loop. This scenario is clearly unlikely, but
cannot be ignored. The simplest way to solve this problem is to check the record of
past refinements to see if the same refinement has been performed more than once. If
so, that ontological object should temporarily be excluded from use in a justification.
This process will stop as soon as the deconstructor finds the deconstruction that corre¬
sponds to the way in which the planner formed the plan. The presence of this upper
limit of refinement cycles means that this will always be a finite procedure, unless we
are not only using an infinite ontology, but also an ontology where there are an infinite
number of rules with the same name, hence allowing for an infinite number of possible
deconstructions of the same plan. A simple way to avoid all these problems is to allow
each action name only one rule which can perform it, which is, in fact, standard in
most ontological representations. Two rules would then be able to produce the same
effects, but they would have to have different names. Then there would be only one
way of justifying each plan.
6.3.2.4 Psychological Justification of Plan Deconstruction
This post-hoc justification of plan formation may seem in some ways unsatisfactory,
since we can never be sure that the justification corresponds to the way in which the
plan was actually formed. We have shown above that this is going to be a rare problem
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that will be solvable even in its worst form. However, this kind of post-hoc reasoning
is also interesting because of the way in which it mirrors human reasoning.
[Nisbett and Wilson, 1984] discusses how people generally do not know why they per¬
formed certain actions. If challenged, they will subconsciously make up a justification
that sounds plausible, and be convinced that this is, in fact, why they performed the
action. However, there is no true introspection when people report on their cognitive
processes. Instead, their reports are based on a priori, implicit causal theories. Accu¬
rate reports occur if it is logical to conclude that the stimuli caused the response, and
not otherwise. In a human, there are often complicated psychological reasons behind
why people arrive at their explanations; for example subconscious moral justifications
for action they feel uneasy about. However, according to Nisbett and Wilson, the con¬
structive processes themselves never appear in consciousness, only their products do.
Likewise, in the plan deconstructor, the planner provides only the plan and not the jus¬
tification for the plan. The justification is reconstructed by the plan deconstructor. As
discussed above, this post-hoc justification proceeds along more logical lines than is
common in human post-justification of actions.
6.4 Translation
Since we are working with three different representations, it is necessary to be able to
translate freely between them. In this section, we describe the process of translation
and the logical implications of these translations.
Both of the translation processes are one-way. It is not necessary to translate the whole
ontology from PDDL or Prolog back into KIF, because the KIF ontology is maintained
as the central ontology. Any ontological changes that occur during this process are
also made individually to the KIF ontology at the end of the process. During plan
execution, the Prolog ontology is more up to date than the KIF ontology, but as soon
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as plan execution terminates, all of this updated information is then passed to the KIF
ontology. Refinements are made to the KIF ontology only. After the refinement has
been performed, the translation process is performed again so that the changes can be
propagated to the PDDL and Prolog representations.
Since the agent communication system is written in Prolog, small translations outside
of the two translations of the whole ontology are necessary. There are three types of
these:
1. When the goal is passed to the agent, it must be passed in Prolog. It is then
translated directly into syntax readable by PDDL (which is coincidentally the
same representation as used by KIF), so that it can be passed to the planner. For
example,
attendConference(researcherMcneill, aiConference05)
would be translated to:
(Attend-Conference Researcher-Mcneill Ai-Conference05)
2. When the plan is produced, it is written to an output file. In addition to the plan,
a lot of extraneous information is produced; for example, number of plan steps,
time to produce the plan, and so on. The file is sifted for the plan steps, which
are then translated into a format that is readable by the agent (which is written in
Prolog).
3. When information from the agent is used to alter the KIF ontology, this needs to
be translated into KIF. This happens both during normal updating of the ontol¬
ogy after plan execution terminates, and when refinements are performed. In the
former situation, we are dealing only with facts. In the latter, we may be dealing
with facts, or we may be altering definitions of predicates, rules, or class hierar¬
chy. Such translations from Prolog to KIF are very small: for example, they may
concern the name of a predicate and a new name that it should take, and both
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these names would need to have their initial letter changed to uppercase. Further
detail of this process is given in Section 5.5.1.
6.4.1 The Top Level Translation Process
Before translation to either PDDL or the Prolog representation begins, some initial
processing of the KIF ontology is carried out. First of all, the KIF ontology is read
and each line is sorted appropriately. Lines that do not contain ontological objects, for
example, blank lines and marker lines, are discarded. Lines that do contain ontological
objects are sorted into relevant lists to produce a list of axioms, a list of individuals,
and so on. The situational arguments, that describe in which situation a fact is true, are
removed in all cases. This situational information is not required by the planner, since it
can keep track of the situation implicitly. Nor is it required in the Prolog version: since
the actions are not presented as implication rules in Prolog, the situational arguments
are not necessary to maintain consistency. Once these lists have been produced, they
are then processed further to extract the relevant information, and to remove all the KIF
markup in the axiom, which would be irrelevant in PDDL and Prolog. Each axiom in
the axiom list is converted into a list containing the axiom name, the preconditions of
the action, and the effects of the action. The relation list is sorted so that each relation
becomes a list that contains information about its name, what class its arguments are
and what order they are in.
The most difficult list to build is the fact list. Facts are not ontological objects in their
own right in a KIF ontology. Instead, they are attached to the individual (or one of the
individuals) to which they pertain. Thus the fact list is built up simultaneously with the
individual list.
At the end of this process, seven lists are produced:
• rule (or action) list
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• predicate (or relation) list
• numerical predicate (or function) list
• individuals list
• fact list
• class hierarchy list
• class list (for the problem file)
• class list (for the domain file)
The last two lists contain the same information. They are processed in different ways
because different representation is required for the problem file to the domain file.
Processing them differently at this level simplifies the process later on. Note that the
names problem and domain refer to the needs of the PDDL translation process; this is
because it is here that we need to make the distinction, and these names are used for
clarity. Only the problem file class list is passed to the translation to Prolog process.
Also, the list of individuals is not passed to Prolog. This is needed in PDDL because
every individual must be declared. In the Prolog representation this is not necessary;
individuals need only be referred to in the context of facts that concern them, and in
their class information, and this is contained in the fact list.
These lists (with the exceptions mentioned above) are then passed to the translate-
ToPDDL process and the translateToProlog process.
6.4.2 The Meta-Ontology
Once the main ontology has been processed by the top level translation process, the
meta-ontology is dealt with. First of all, a list is produced containing all the rele¬
vant lines from the ontology. Much of the relevant information concerns individuals,
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because in the meta-ontology, objects that in the ordinary ontology are functions, or
relations, or actions, become individuals. There are a few relations defined in the
meta-ontology: agentNeeded, which attaches an individual agent to an individual ac¬
tion, and various unary relations that predicates can take that determine how they are
to be interpreted during plan execution. These are discussed in more detail in Section
6.4.4.2. The class hierarchy of predicates is included in the meta-ontology since when
we consider the predicates to be individuals rather than relations, we can assign a class
to them.
The information contained in the meta-ontology is processed to produce list of pred¬
icate names that are attached to descriptions of their behaviour, plus declarations of
instantiations of the meta-predicate agentNeeded.
6.4.3 Translation From KIF To PDDL
The work discussed in this section has been published in [McNeill et al., 2004a], As
discussed above, the KIF ontology is separated into two parts: the meta-level ontology
and the object level ontology. The meta-level ontology contains information for the
agent about how to communicate with other agents and how to manipulate the pred¬
icates during this process. Because the PDDL version of the ontology is used only
for generating plans, and the information received from this process informs the agent
only of the plan steps it must execute, there is no need to encode the meta-level on¬
tology in the PDDL ontology: the object-level ontology contains all the information
required for the generation of plans.
6.4.3.1 KIF and PDDL Representation
There are six different types of ontological objects in a KIF ontology: functions, re¬
lations, axioms, classes, individuals and frames. Note that the term function has a
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slightly different meaning in KIF to PDDL. In KIF, a function refers to a kind of re¬
lation (or predicate), that, given instantiations for n— 1 arguments, has a precisely
determined value for the nth argument. On the other hand, a PDDL predicate for
which the above holds is only referred to as a function if the nth argument is numeri¬
cal [Fox and Long, 2003]. A KIF relation corresponds to a PDDL predicate, with the
exceptions stated above: PDDL predicates include those that are uniquely determined
but non-numerical, whereas in KIF, these would be considered to be functions and not
relations. To avoid confusion, we prefer instead to refer to predicates and numerical
functions. A KIF axiom corresponds to a PDDL action', that is, a rule describing the
preconditions and effects of a named action, with the exception that KIF axioms have
preconditions and effects that contain situational arguments, and PDDL actions do not.
KIF classes correspond to PDDL types. In the ontologies we have been working with,
KIF frames and individuals both correspond to PDDL objects, although in more com¬
plex ontologies, frames can refer to any ontological object, e.g., classes. Since we
have used simple versions of the other ontological objects, it has not been necessary to
consider these as frames. A frame is an individual that has initial facts attached to it;
an individual has none. The initial status of the problem is extracted from information
contained within the frames and individuals of the KIF ontology. The different types
of ontological objects allowed in each representation are summarised in Table 6.1.
Our KIF ontologies have been developed using the Ontolingua Ontology editor [Gru-
ber, 1992,Farquhar et al., 1996]. This produces an HTML page containing the whole
ontology, which can be saved to a single file. PDDL requires this file to be translated
into two files, the domain file and the problem file (see Figure 6.4 and the example
below). In PDDL, the domain file contains information that is general to the whole
domain: the names of predicates, the numbers of arguments they take, the axioms, and
so on. The problem file contains the information that is specific to a particular prob-
1 note that in our restricted KIF, frames always translate into PDDL objects. However, this is not
generally true with full KIF.
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KIF PDDL
Relation Predicate





Table 6.1: Comparison of KIF and PDDL Objects
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lem: the individuals, their classes, the facts and the goal. Hence a single domain file
can be paired with many different problem files. In Ontolingua-KIF the whole ontol¬
ogy is contained in a single file. Some types of KIF ontological objects are put in the
problem file, and some in the domain file, because the KIF ontology contains not only
a description of the domain, but also facts and individuals.
Figure 6.4: Architecture of PDDL Translation System
6.4.3.2 Motivating Example
Consider the situation in which a virtual travel agent is given a goal to purchase an
plane ticket online. In order to achieve this goal, several steps must be carried out. For
example, the agent must locate a ticket selling agent, it must ensure it has sufficient
funds, it must work out the correct origin and destination for the flight, and so on.
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Clearly, before the agent can act, it must have a plan for how to achieve the goal.
Therefore, as soon as the agent identifies a goal, it sends the whole ontology, together
with a suitable representation of this goal, to the translator. PDDL files for the ontology
are produced, which can then be sent to the planner. The planner will produce a plan
for how to achieve this goal, which can be translated into a format that is readable by
the KIF agent. Once the KIF agent has the plan, it can then begin to execute the plan
steps.
In this short example, we have the following ontological objects in the KIF ontology:
(Define-Frame Travel-Agent :Own-Slots ((Instance-Of Agent))
:Axioms ((Money Travel-Agent 500 [(Start)])))
(Define-Frame Edinburgh :0wn-Slots ((Instance-Of City))
:Axioms ((Flight Edinburgh London 300 [(Start)])))
(Define-Individual London (City))
(Define-Function Flight (?Place-0 ?Place-l ?Situation) :-> ?Value
:Def (And (Place ?Place-0) (Place ?Place-l)
(Situation ?Situation) (Number ?Value)))
(Define-Function Money (?Agent-0 ?Situation) :-> ?Value
:Def (And (Agent ?Agent-0)
(Situation ?Situation) (Number ?Value)))
(Define-Class Agent (?X) :Def (And (Thing ?X)))
(Define-Class City (?X) :Def (And (Place ?X)))
(Define-Class Place (?X) :Def (And (Thing ?X)))
(Define-Axiom Book-Flight :=
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(=> (And (Flight ?Origin ?Destination ?Price ?Sitl)
(Money ?Agent ?Amount ?Sitl)
(< ?Price ?Amount))
(And (Has-Ticket ?Agent ?Sit2)
(= PNewamount (- PAmount PPrice))
(Money PAgent PNewamount ?Sit2)
(Not (Money PAgent PAmount ?Sit2)))))
Note: there are objects referred to in the axiom that are not defined in the ontology
section above. These have been omitted for brevity.
This would produce the following PDDL domain file:
(define (domain domain Ont)
(:requirements :strips :fluents :typing)






parameters (PAgent POrigin PDestination)
preconditions (And (< (Flight POrigin PDestination) (Money PAgent))
(Agent PAgent) (City POrigin) (City PDestination))
:effects (And (Has-Ticket PAgent)
(decrease (Money PAgent) (Flight POrigin PDestination)))
)
)
and the following PDDL problem file:
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(define (problem problemOnt)
(:domain domainOnt)





(= (Money Travelling-Agent) 500)







The agent wishing to form a plan will already have (or will prompt for) a goal. As
shown in Figure 6.4, this goal will then be passed, together with a file containing the
KIF ontology, to the translator. The translator produces two files, the domain file and
the problem file, as discussed above. Figure 6.5 illustrates the steps and dependencies
involved in translation, which are discussed in more detail below.
The translator is written in Prolog and works largely through pattern matching. For
example, a key predicate is the matchExpression predicate, which takes a range of
characters and an identifier that may or may not appear within that range and, if it finds
the identifier, returns what comes before and after that identifier, and otherwise fails:
matchExpression(-BeforeIdentifier, +Identifier,-Afterldentifier, +Range)
In the above expression, following the Prolog convention, + indicates that this argu¬




















































Figure 6.5: Translation Process
uninstantiated when the predicate is called and is instantiated by the predicate. That is,
matchExpression is passed an identifier and a range of code, and returns what comes




After = ' Agent)
Dealing with Numerical Functions
The most significant difference between KIF and PDDL is the way that numerical
functions are dealt with. The example ontology in 6.4.3.2 illustrates that the way in
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which KIF functions are defined does differentiate them from KIF predicates. The
arguments of a function are defined, e.g., (?Place-0 ?Place-1)y ?Value rather than
simply as (?Place-0 ?Place-l ?Value). That is, in a function definition, n arguments
are mapped to a single argument, whereas a corresponding predicate definition would
simply have n+ 1 arguments. (Note that it is coincidental that ?Value is numerical:
a KIF function would be defined in such a way even if it did not contain numerical
arguments). However, when a numerical function is referred to in a KIF ontology,
either within an action or as an initial fact, it is dealt with not as a function but as a
predicate. For example, a numerical function might be described as:
(Define-Function Money (?Agent) :—> ?Amount),
that is, as a function, but a possible instantiation would be:
(Money PA 100),
so that it looks like a predicate.
In PDDL, the numerical argument is not included in the predicate definition, but rather
it is written as a function, so that it would be stated:
(Money ?Agent)
and would appear within the function definitions in the domain file rather than in the
predicate definitions.
The specific value of this function is not explicitly mentioned. The PDDL planner
would be aware that this had a numerical value attached to it because it would be
declared within functions rather than within predicates. Although it appears that in¬
formation has been lost here, this is not, in fact, the case. The value of the function is
tracked implicitly by PDDL; thus the information remains but it is no longer explicitly
represented. If there is an instantiation for this numerical function in this initial state,
then the value of this would be stated as follows:
(= (Money Agent) 100).
During the planning process, the PDDL planner will keep track of the value of all the
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functions and these changing values are not referred to specifically within the axioms.
However, in a KIF axiom, these values must be referred to and are thus given explicit
names. For example, a Buy rule may have a precondition that the amount of money the
buying-agent has must be greater than the cost of the item which is purchased. In KIF
this would be stated as follows:
(Money ?Agent ?Amount) A (Cost ?ltem ?Price) A (> ?Amount ?Price)
whereas in PDDL, this would be stated as:
(> (Money ?Agent) (Cost ?Item))
An effect for the same action might be that the money that the agent now has is the
original amount less the cost of the item. In KIF, this would be:
(= ?Newamount (- ?Amount ?Price)) A (Money ?Agent ?Newamount) A (Not (Money
(?Agent ?Amount))).
In PDDL, this would be:
(decrease (Money ?Agent) (Cost ?Item))
Dealing with this difference in representation for numerical predicates is by far the
most difficult aspect of the translation process. It causes some difficulties in writing
the problem file, though these are not particularly hard to solve. More complex are the
difficulties this creates in writing the domain file, and particularly in the statement of
the axioms. These problems are discussed below.
Writing the Problem File
A PDDL problem file contains the specific details of this particular problem within
the domain described in the domain file. The input for this process is the goal, and
the list containing all the KIF definitions relevant for the problem file, which are those
pertaining to individuals. The PDDL problem file needs to contain:
• A list of the names of the individuals
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• A list of what is true initially, which includes:
- A list of the classes of individuals
- A list of the initial facts; i.e., initial instantiations of the predicates
• The goal
In KIF, facts are not stated independently but instead are attached to the first individual
to which they pertain. For example, (Location Agentl Timbuktu) would be contained
within the definition for the individual Agentl.
The individual information contained in the list sent to the problem file has not been
processed at this stage, merely sifted for information relevant to the problem file. All
the definitions within this relevant list are exactly as they appear in the KIF ontology.
The first step is to process this list by extracting the useful information from the KIF
definitions and forming it into three lists that correspond to the three items listed above
(excluding the goal). This is done by searching for key markers within the definition.
For example, an individual will either begin with the statement Define-Individual, if
there are no facts attached to this individual definition, or Define-Frame if there are
attached facts. The name of the individual always appears immediately after this ini¬
tial marker. If the marker is Define-Individual, we need only extract the class of this
individual. If the marker is Define-Frame, we then need to find the facts attached to
this individual.
Examples are given below:
(Define-Individual Isabelle-Paper-Dvi (Dvi-Paper))
This line, when processed, adds Isabelle-Paper-Dvi to the list of individuals and (Dvi-






:Axioms ((Money Lucas 1000)))
This line adds Lucas to the list of individuals, (Agent Lucas) to the list of classes and
(Has-Paper Lucas Isabelle-Paper-Dvi) and (Location Lucas Edinburgh) to the list of
facts. The fact (Money Lucas 1000) is also extracted from this line. However, because
Money is a numerical function, it requires further processing, and (= (Money Lucas)
1000) is added to the list of facts.
Once the entire list of relevant definitions is processed, the lists containing this infor¬
mation, together with the goal, are passed to a predicate which writes the problem file.
This first writes the necessary initial information, such as the name of the problem that
is being defined and the name of the domain within which the problem is described,
to the problem file. The three lists (of individuals, classes of individuals and facts)
are processed by simply writing them member by member within the correct brackets
and initialisers. Finally, the goal, which has been translated from the Prolog format in
which is was input to a format readable by PDDL, is inserted into the correct place.
Writing the Domain File
The domain file contains:
• Predicates, which includes:
- all predicates that do not have a numerical value
- class names
• Functions (numerical predicates)
• Actions, which contain the following information:
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- a list of all the variables mentioned in that action
- the preconditions of the action
- the effects of the action
The relevant lines of definitions are those defining KIF functions, relations, axioms
and classes. As discussed above, KIF functions do not correspond directly to PDDL
functions, because PDDL only considers KIF numerical functions to be functions;
non-numerical functions are considered to be predicates. KIF axioms correspond to
PDDL actions. These input lines are processed to create four lists of information re¬
quired by the domain file: a list of all the predicates (this includes both numerical and
non-numerical predicates, i.e., both KIF relations and KIF functions, and both PDDL
predicates and PDDL functions), a list of the classes, a list of the actions and a list of
the numerical functions. The format of the list of all the predicates and the list of the
numerical functions is different, because the former are represented as predicates and
the latter as functions. In the latter, the predicates are listed with the numerical argu¬
ment removed (which is how they must be expressed in PDDL; see above), whereas in
the predicates list, because they are not identified as being numerical, each is listed as
a predicate name, followed by a list of all the arguments and their classes. In the list
of actions, each action is stored as an action name followed by a list containing all the
preconditions, as they appear in the KIF ontology, and all the effects.
Writing the domain file is more complex than writing the problem file, largely due
to the difficulties with actions, which are discussed below. The file is initialised by
stating the name of the domain file and the PDDL requirements. The predicate and
class lists are adapted without too much difficulty so that they can be written down in
the appropriate place. The numerical function list is used to write down the functions.
Note that in our system at the moment, numerical functions are written down both as
predicates and as functions. In the former version they have an extra argument (the
numerical argument) which is not included when they are written as functions. It is
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fairly trivial to check predicates against the numerical predicate list and only write
down those that are not numerical in the ordinary predicate slot. However, this is not
done for reasons discussed in the discussion of pseudo-variables below. Expressing
these numerical functions twice in different ways and in two different definition areas
does not raise problems, as the planner considers them to be two different objects. It is
never possible that both the function and the predicate version can be used in planning,
and so this does not lead to confusion in planning. A more detailed explanation of this
is given after the use of pseudo-variables has been explained.
Pseudo-Variables
One of the limitations of PDDL is that it cannot deal with uninstantiated variables. This
is because, although PDDL appears to be a first-order language, most PDDL planners
are in fact only pseudo-first-order, and work by creating all possible instantiations of
the problem and searching through them in a propositional manner. This is a problem
for our system, as we wish to deal with agent plans in which there are unknowns
after planning. For example, an agent may have a plan to attend a conference which
involves registering at the conference and thereby receiving a registration number, and
then using that number when actually attending the conference. Such confirmation
numbers are useful in an agent system, as they allow the tracking of external objects
that the agents possess, or privileges to which they are entitled. When forming a plan, it
is not necessary, and indeed it is impossible, to know what these confirmation numbers
are. These can only be instantiated during plan execution.
In order to force PDDL to deal with these uninstantiated variables, we have developed
a class called Confirmation-Number and an individual belonging to that class called
Pseudo-Variable. When writing an ontology, if we are creating an axiom in which a
particular variable cannot be instantiated until plan execution, the individual
Pseudo-Variable is inserted in place of this variable. This variable may or may not
be numerical; that is, this pseudo-variable will sometimes be found in predicates that
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PDDL considers to be ordinary predicates, and sometimes in predicates that PDDL
considers to be functions. However, if we are using Pseudo-Variable as a place holder
in a predicate in some action, we do not want this predicate to be considered to be
a function, since this means that PDDL will expect to be able to assign a specific
numerical value to it.
When we are dealing with numerical functions, we either want them to be considered
as ordinary predicates, if the numerical argument is replaced by Pseudo-Variable, or as
functions if it is not. The difficulty is that these Pseudo-Variable markers do not appear
in the definition of the predicates, but only within specific actions. It is impossible to
tell from the definition of a numerical function whether we will want to deal with it
as a predicate or as a function. For this reason, since it does not create a problem
with the planner, we define numerical functions as both predicates and functions (with
one fewer argument), thus allowing PDDL to consider them as either, depending on
the axiom it is currently dealing with. We can, moreover, always be sure that either
the function definition is always used and the predicate definition is never used, or
vice versa, and thus be sure that no confusion will arise in the planning due to this
double definition. Any function or predicate can only be used in planning if there is an
instantiation of it. Thus there must either be an instantiation of it in the initial situation,
or it must be made true as an effect of an action. A numerical predicate that requires
a pseudo-variable can never exist in an instantiation with a numerical argument, and
vice versa, because neither will it be instantiated in this way in the initial state, nor
will it be instantiated in this way as the effect of an action. Thus, for a numerical
predicate that requires a pseudo-variable, the function declaration of it will never have
an instantiation, and thus cannot be used in planning, and vice versa.
It is also necessary to number pseudo-variables, otherwise the planner will believe that
they all refer to the same individual. Every time a Pseudo-Variable is used to refer
to a specific thing, the same identifying number must be used. Thus if an effect of
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an action is (Has-Ticket Agent Pseudo-VariableX), then if this same predicate appears
as a precondition to a different action, the identifying number of the Pseudo-Variable
must again be X\ otherwise PDDL will consider the two pseudo-variables to refer to
different individuals, and the effect of the first rule cannot be used as a precondition to
the second rule. To facilitate this, the preconditions and effects of each action are pro¬
cessed as normal, with each numerical variable that is to be treated as non-numerical
being named Pseudo-Variable. When all the axioms have been processed in this man¬
ner, the pseudo-variables are then updated. Firstly, the preconditions of each action are
processed, adding an identifying number to each occurrence of Pseudo-Variable. The
name of each predicate in which this pseudo-variable occurred is recorded, together
with the identifying number for that predicate and the other arguments of that predi¬
cate, so that each identified Pseudo-Variable can be reliably tied to the correct predi¬
cate. The effects are then processed, attaching the correct identifying number to each
Pseudo-Variable. The above processing also returns the number of Pseudo-Variables.
Thus when the problem file is written, this number of Pseudo-Variable individuals can
be declared and their classes (Confirmation-Number) given.
During the cyclical process of the system, it may be that a new fact is asserted which
instantiates a pseudo-variable; this will happen if an action is performed for which this
new fact is an effect. When the updated ontology containing this new fact is translated
into PDDL, the translator would naturally translate this into a numerical predicate; for
example:
( = (Has-Ticket Agent) 125),
where 125 is the instantiated pseudo-variable. However, this way of representing this
predicate will clash with the way in which it is represented in the actions, since there
it is represented as non-numerical. We do not wish to change the representation of the
actions, since we wish these to be applicable to any situation: we may wish to book
more flights with unknown reference numbers, and we still need to represent these as
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non-numerical. Therefore, this fact is represented as if it were non-numerical:
(Has-Ticket Agent Pseudo-VariableX).
We use the list of pseudo-variable identifiers and the predicates to which they are at¬
tached, which is built up when processing the domain file as discussed above, to decide
what the value of X should be. If this does not tally with the identifying number used
in the rules, then the fact (Has-Ticket Agent Pseudo-VariableX) cannot be used to fulfil
precondition (Has-Ticket Agent Pseudo-VariableY) of an action.
It may seem that by removing the numerical value of this predicate and replacing it with
a pseudo-variable, we are removing pertinent information from the ontology. However,
it must be remembered that the PDDL representation is used only in planning; the
Prolog representation is used during agent interaction, and the KIF representation is
the definitive representation. It is precisely because the value of the pseudo-variables
is not relevant in planning, but only in plan execution, that we are able to use them to
replace variables in this manner. Thus it is not important that this information is lost to
the planning representation.
Meta-variables
After refinements have been performed, it may be the case that the KEF ontology con¬
tains facts with meta-variables in them. This situation cannot be replicated in the
PDDL version of the ontology, because variables are not permitted in PDDL. In or¬
der for the planner to be able to produce a plan, it is essential that the meta-variables
are instantiated.
We solve this problem by finding all the objects of the correct class, and picking one
of them to replace the meta-variable in the PDDL representation. The object is chosen
by observing which object was referred to by the agent which caused the refinement:
propositional anti-abstraction is diagnosed when the PA encounters an agent using a
version of a predicate in its ontology which has a higher arity than expected. The
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way in which the agent instantiates this argument is taken to be the way in which
this argument should be instantiated in our ontology. It should be emphasised that
this choice of specific argument only occurs in the PDDL representation. In the KIF
ontology, this remains as a meta-variable until the instantiation has been successfully
used during plan execution. If the instantiation is not used in planning, or if it is used in
a plan that fails during execution, it remains as a meta-variable in the KIF ontology. For
example, if a predicate (Money ?Agent ?Amount) is refined to (Money ?Agent ?Amount
?Currency) because a question was asked about (Money AgentX ?Amount Dollars),
then all money facts in the KIF would be altered to (Money Agent Amount Meta-Var)
(with Agent and Amount instantiated appropriately). However, when such facts were
translated, the variable could not remain if they were to be used by the planner. Thus
the known instantiation is used, and the facts would become, in the PDDL version,
(Money Agent Amount Dollars).
This solution is clearly unsatisfactory. We cannot know what the correct way to instan¬
tiate any of these arguments is, and, in choosing this course, we may be introducing
further error into our ontology. On the other hand, by using this approach, we at least
have the option to keep on planning with our ontology, which would be impossible
otherwise. It may be better to allow the translation process to choose how to instan¬
tiate each argument, rather than assuming that it will be instantiated in the same way
as the other agent instantiated it. It is clear that during that particular interaction we
would need it to be instantiated in that way, but other occurrences of it may be instan¬
tiated differently. This would be possible by adding multiple occurrences of the fact
to the PDDL representation, each one instantiating the extra argument differently so
that every possible combination was tried. However, this would imply that all of these
possibilities were true simultaneously, which would not be the case. It is not possible
in PDDL to represent the idea that exactly one of many options is possible; once one
has been chosen, the rest are no longer possible. The best way to simulate this would
be to keep in the KIF ontology information about which instantiations had been tried,
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and if plan failure occurs in a way that implies this fact may have been at fault, another
instantiation is tried. However, this is not currently implemented in ORS.
Creating Actions
One of the more difficult tasks involved in writing the domain file is dealing with the
numerical functions within the actions. In action definitions, it is not simply a case of
inserting definitions. Instead, we must sometimes deal with arithmetic operations. An
example of a KIF rule containing arithmetic operations, and its PDDL equivalent, are
given below:
KIF rule:
(Define-Axiom Buy ''this describes a buy action'' :=




(And (Has ?Agent ?Item)
(= ?Newamount (- ?Amount ?Cost))
(Money ?Agent ?Newamount)
(Not (Money ?Agent ?Amount)))))
PDDL rule:
(:action Buy
parameters (?Item ?Agent ?Shop)










The first step is to alter the logic of the KIF to bring it in line with the logic of PDDL.
That is, turn the KIF predicates into functions by removing the explicit representation
of the value. For example, the precondition
(Money ?Agent ?Amount)
would be rewritten to the precondition:
(Money ?Agent).
It appears that information has been lost in this process. However, the information
contained in the variable ?Amount still exists, it is just not explicit. PDDL tracks the
values of all of the functions: a value will have been declared for (Money ?Agent)
either initially or in a previous rule. The value contained in ?Amount will be assigned
implicitly to the PDDL function, and thus there is no need to represent it explicitly.
However, we cannot immediately forget about the variable ?Amount, because this will
be used at other stages of the rule to refer to the value of (Money ?Agent). It is still
necessary to link these functions to the variable that represented their value, so that we
know how these should be replaced within the arithmetic. ?Amount is a marker for
the value of (Money ?Agent), and one can always refer to ?Amount at any place in the
KIF preconditions or effects of that action, and this will be a reference to the value of
(Money ?Agent). Thus if we wish to change the amount of money, we can change the
value of ?Amount and assert this as the new argument of the predicate:
(= ?NewAmount (- ?Amount ?Cost)) A (Money ?Agent ?NewAmount) A (Not (Money
?Agent ?Amount)). When we treat these predicates as functions, we lose this value
marker. In PDDL, it is not necessary to have a marker for the value of a function,
because these values are automatically tracked by the planner. However, when we are
translating to PDDL, we need to keep a record of these markers so as to be able to
determine where these new functions should be placed.
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We perform the transformation:
(/?x?^)A<D=><f{?y/(/?r)}
In the above expression, / indicates a function, Ix indicates one or more variables, ly
indicates a single variable and O indicates the whole of the preconditions and effects.
O { ?v/ (fix)} indicates the preconditions and effects, with every occurrence of (fix)
replaced by the variable ly; ly is the marker for the function (fix).
The first thing to be done is to strip all the predicates that will become numerical func¬
tions from the rule, keeping a record of their markers, and then replace any occurrence
of these markers with the numerical functions. For example:
preconditions (And (Money ?Agent ?Amount) (Price litem ?Cost) (< ?Cost Amount)
(Location ?Agent ?Shop))
.•effects (And (= ?NewAmount (- ?Amount ?Cost)) (Money ?Agent ?NewAmount)
(Not (Money ?Agent ?Amount)))
would first of all become:
Preconditions: (And(< ?Cost ?Amount) (Location ?Agent ?Shop))
Effects: (And (- ?NewAmount (- ?Amount ICost))),
with stored information:
[ ?Amount(Money ?Agent), ?Cost(Price litem), 1NewAmount(Money 1Agent)]
The role in KIF of these predicates that have been removed is to create an identifier
for the value. That is, by stating (Money 1Agent 1Amount) in the KIF preconditions,
we have declared that 1Amount is the temporary name given to the amount of money
that 1Agent has. Note that we now have two different markers for the numerical func¬
tion (Money 1Agent), because the value of this function is changed by the rule. In
KIF, there is no problem with having the same predicate with different markers, as
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the markers distinguish them. However, if we were to replace both these markers by
the functions to which they are attached, we would have two occurrences of the same
function, (Money ?Agent), which would each time take a different value. For example,
this would lead to statements such as:
(= (Money ?Agent) (- (Money ?Agent) (Price ?ltem)))
which, since (Price ?ltem) has a non-zero value, is not logically consistent. The rea¬
son these inconsistencies occur is because we have, at this stage, changed the logic but
not changed the syntax. Since these predicates have now become functions, we have
no need to assign values to them in the previous manner: we do not need an equality
statement. For this reason, we do not replace markers that come immediately after
an equals sign. Instead, we leave them in for this stage of the rewriting, and remove
them later when the syntax is altered. So, after we have replaced the markers with the
numerical functions, we have:
Preconditions: (And (< (Price ?Item) (Money ?Agent)) (Location ?Agent ?Shop))
Effects: (And (= ?NewAmount (- (Money ?Agent) (Price ?Item))))
with stored information:
[ ?NewAmount(Money ?Agent)]
We now need to alter the syntax so that is also in line with PDDL. There are three
different types of operators that we need to consider: comparative operators, arith¬
metical operators and assignment operators. For comparative operators, the syntax of
KIF matches the syntax of PDDL: once we have replaced the markers with the func¬
tions, we already have a readable PDDL comparator:
(< (Price ?Item) (Money ?Agent))
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However, arithmetical and assignment operators are rather more complex. In KIF,
assignment operators are always denoted by an equals sign, and the manner in which
the assignment is being made is contained within the equality. For example,:
(= ?NewAmount (- ?Amount ?Cost))
means assign to the variable ?NewAmount the value of ?Amount less the value of
?Cost. The arithmetical operator - gives further information about the way in which
the value is assigned: in order to find the value of ?NewAmount, we decrease ?Amount
by a certain amount. In PDDL, there are five assignment operators: assign, scale-up,
scale-down, increase and decrease. So an expression in KIF that requires two arith¬
metical operators, = and -, can be represented in PDDL by a single operator, decrease.
Likewise, an equality statement containing a + would correspond to increase, one con¬
taining a * would correspond to scale-up, and one containing a / would correspond to
scale-down. We use these four assignment operators, as opposed to simply assign,
because the function to which the value is being assigned is the same as one of the
functions in the arithmetic expression: in this case, we are finding a new value for
(Money ?Agent) by altering the old value by the amount represented by (Cost ?Item).
However, if we are assigning a value to a different function, we use assign.
In our above example,
(= ?NewAmount (- ?Amount ?Cost))
will eventually become:
(decrease (Money ?Agent) (Price ?Item)).
However, if the variable that was being assigned a value (in this case ?NewAmount)
did not correspond to a function within the equality statement, we would use assign.
For example, if ?NewAmount was a marker for a function (Random-Value), the above
statement would be converted to:
(assign (Random-Value) (- (Money ?Agent) (Price ?Item)))
or perhaps ?NewAmount refers to the money of another agent. We would then have:
(assign (Money ?Agent1) (- (Money ?Agent) (Price ?Item)))-
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In this situation, because the arithmetical operator is not contained within the assign¬
ment operator, as it is in decrease, it must be used explicitly.
Sometimes, KIF statements assign values to variables that do not correspond to func¬
tions at all. For example:
Preconditions: (And (Price ?Iteml ?Costl) (Price ?ltem2 ?Cost2)
(Price ?Item3 ?Cost3) (Money ?Agent ?Amount))
Effects: (And(- ?Total(+ ?Costl ?Cost2 ?Cost3))
(= ?NewAmount (- ?Amount ?Total)) (Money ?Agent ?NewAmount))
This is similar to the preconditions and effects of the rule above, except that we have
a variable ?Total which is a place holder for an expression, rather than a marker for
a function. This is dealt with in a similar way to the function markers. The variable
?Total is removed from the expression but information about what it is referring to
is retained. It can then be inserted into the statement at a later stage. This would
eventually lead us to:
Preconditions: (And())
Effects: (And (decrease (Money ?Agent) (+ (Price ?lteml) (Price ?Item2)
(Price ?Item3))))
However, this would still not be correct PDDL. In KIF, the arithmetic function + can
take two or more arguments, whereas in PDDL, + can only take exactly two arguments.
Thus, if we find a + expression with more than two arguments, they must be nested.
So the effects would become:
Effects: (And (decrease (Money ?Agent) (+ (Price ?lteml) ( + (Price ?Item2)
(Price ?Item3)))))
We have similar problems with the other arithmetical operators, and they are dealt with
in a similar manner.
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Although there are certain complications with the translation of preconditions and ef¬
fects, some of which have been discussed above, it is nevertheless relatively straight¬
forward to show that every case has been considered. There are a small number of KIF
operators which correspond to a small number of PDDL operators and so, once the
translation of some has been implemented, it is not difficult to generalise it so that it
can apply to any KIF arithmetical statement.
Once the preconditions and the effects have been processed, all that remains to be
done is to identify the variables used in the action, so that these can be declared. This
is done simply by building a list of variables by stripping all the variables from the
processed preconditions and postconditions, and then removing any duplicates from
this list. This must be done after the preconditions and effects have been processed, as
otherwise we will declare variables that do not appear in the processed preconditions
and effects, such as ?NewAmount or ?Total.
Once these three lines of information — the variables (parameters), the preconditions
and the effects — have been developed, the action can very easily be written down in
the correct place in the file. All that remains is to locate the name of the action and
place that in the proper place.
In summary, the main changes that need to be made are:
• Remove the numerical arguments from KIF numerical predicates, so that the
predicate is folded into a PDDL function;
• Remove all occurrences of that numerical predicate that do not appear in an
arithmetical expression from the rule; these are there to assign values to the
predicate, and are not necessary for PDDL functions;
• Replace all occurrences of the marker (the name of the numerical variable in
KIF) with the PDDL function;
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• Rearrange the arithmetic and the assignment operators accordingly.
6.4.4 Translation From KIF To Prolog
Ontolingua already has a built-in translator from KIF to Prolog that we could have
made use of. However, the output of this translation process is not particular satisfac¬
tory [da Silva et al., 2002] and would have required much post-processing to produce
an appropriate format. Since the most suitable output for our system has fairly spe¬
cific requirements, we therefore decided that it would be better to produce our own
translator.
The translation to Prolog is significantly less complicated than the translation to PDDL.
In the latter process, we had to conform to a representation that was not specified by us;
any deviation from this would result in a representation that could not be considered
PDDL. However, when translating to the Prolog representation, the only constraints is
that the result must be readable by an agent written in Prolog. Beyond that, we are
free to choose a representation that fits in easily with the KIF translation, since this
representation is only for the internal workings of the agent communication system,
and is not required to conform to any other specifications.
In the plan deconstructor, the Prolog representation is also split into two files. The
signature file contains the class hierarchy, the information about predicates and the
information from the meta-ontology; the theory file contains the initial facts, class
information for each individual and the actions, corresponding to the PDDL domain
and problem files.
6.4.4.1 Writing the Theory File
The theory file contains the facts, the class definitions and the information concerning
which agent is required for each action. The agent information comes from the meta-
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ontology and is represented as a Prolog fact:
agentNeeded(agentX,actionl).
The facts are extracted from the list of facts that was created during pre-processing,
and are expressed as follows:
fact(hasltem(agentX, item)).
The classes are extracted from the class list and are expressed as follows:
class(agentX, agent).
Unlike in PDDL, in the Prolog representation, the superclasses of objects are not ex¬
pressed explicitly; rather, this information exists in the class hierarchy contained in the
signature file. Thus, since Agent is a subclass of Thing, we would list, in PDDL, not
only the above fact, but also the information that agentX was of class Thing. In the
Prolog representation, this is omitted.
The major part of the translation is just to convert the items in the processed lists into
a format that can be read by Prolog. In both KIF and PDDL, a variable is indicated
by a question mark preceding a name with an uppercase initial letter, e.g., ?Variable,
and a constant is indicated by a name with an uppercase initial letter without a pre¬
ceding question mark, e.g., Constant. In Prolog, however, variables are indicated by
names with uppercase initial letters, and constants are indicated by names with low¬
ercase initial letters. Thus ?Variable must be converted to Variable, and Constant to
constant. There are many other syntactical changes that must be made; for example,
replacing spaces between arguments with commas, but these are all quite simple to




In the Prolog representation, it is not necessary that the meta-variable place holders be
instantiated. In fact, this is undesirable, since we wish to leave the choice as to how
to instantiate these until we are forced to make it. This will not cause the Prolog rep¬
resentation to become out of sync with the plan formed by the PDDL representation,
which instantiates all of these variables. If one of these instantiated variables is used
in the planner, this will be reflected in the output plan, and thus this will cause the
uninstantiated variable in the Prolog representation to be instantiated in the same way.
Thus we leave these variables uninstantiated, to be instantiated either in the way forced
by the plan if this occurs, or through further information gleaned through agent com¬
munication. We therefore require only that when the conversion of the names takes
place, any individual with the name Meta-Var is left with an uppercase initial letter.
6.4.4.2 Writing the Signature File
Writing the signature file is more complex than writing the theory file because it con¬
tains the actions, which are the most complex of the ontological objects. These are







The signature file also contains the class hierarchy, as well as the meta-information
about predicates and actions, which includes the following information:
• myFacts list: a list of predicates about which the PA has authority. This does not
mean that they cannot be wrong or that the PA cannot investigate how it came to
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believe them; rather, it means that the PA cannot directly ask another agent what
their value is, but instead should have some information about that itself. This
includes predicates such as money and has.
• nonFacts list: a list of items that are not stated as facts. This includes such things
as class and member. When the PA is processing preconditions and effects, the
items mentioned in this list need to be treated differently to ordinary predicates.
• inform list: a list of predicates which, if they appear as postconditions, require
the PA to ensure that the service-providing agent has given out some informa¬
tion. For example, registered(PA,thisConference,RegistrationNo) would require
information from the service-providing agent, so that RegistrationNo could be
instantiated properly.
• agentNeeded information. For every action, information concerning which service-
providing agent should be contacted to perform it is listed in the form: agent-
Needed(actionX,agentY).
The class hierarchy is expressed as a list of subclass relations, for example:
subclass(city,place),
subclass(place, thing).
All classes are ultimately a subclass of thing. If this is stated explicitly in the class
hierarchy, it means that it is a direct subclass (that is, a class with thing as its immediate
superclass).
The information necessary for forming the rules and the class hierarchy come from the
main ontology, and is part of the processed lists created during the top level transla¬
tion process. The information concerning the predicates and the actions, listed above,
comes from the lists created from the meta-ontology.
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A great deal of the processing required for the translation to PDDL is reused for the
translation to Prolog. However, the most difficult part of that — dealing with numerical
functions — is not required for the translation to Prolog, as we choose a representation
for the numerical functions that is very similar to how they are expressed in KIF. We
use the techniques from translation to PDDL to find all the preconditions and effect
of each rule, and, again using translation to PDDL processes, extract the class of each
variable so that it can be declared as part of the conditions. If this is not done, the
variables will not be bound and may be instantiated incorrectly. Additionally, any
condition that contains a calculation is wrapped in a calculation predicate, so that the
agent can deal with it properly.
Thus preconditions:
(And (Money ?Agent ?Amount) (Price ?Item ?Cost) (< ?Cost ?Amount) (Location
?Agent ?Shop))
would become:
[monery(Agent,Amount),price(Item, Cost), calculation( Cost < Amount),
location(Agent,Shop), class(Agent, agent), class(Item, item), class(Shop, shop)]
Additionally, the meta-information concerning the inform list is used during the pro¬
cessing of the conditions. Any predicate that is a member of the inform list will be
wrapped in an inform predicate if it appears as a postcondition:
(And (Registered ?Agent ?Conference ?Pseudo-Var) ...)
will become:
[inform(registered(agent, conference,Pseudo- Var)),...]
These inform predicates appear exactly when there are pseudo-variables present. The
purpose of the information received from inform predicates is to instantiate the pseudo-
vars. If inform predicates appear in the preconditions of an action, then they are not
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wrapped in an inform predicate. They can only appear in the preconditions of an action
if they are either fully instantiated, or if the value of the instantiated is immaterial to
the action. It is not possible to receive information about one of the preconditions of
an action from the service-providing agent; the PA ought already to know how this
precondition should be instantiated before the action is performed. Despite the fact
that the planner considers pseudo-vars to be instantiated, we can be sure that it will
never happen that a predicate which has a pseudo-var that cannot yet be instantiated is
used as a precondition to an action. This is because if there is no information about that
predicate as a fact in the initial ontology (in which case there must be an instantiation
for the pseudo-var), then this predicate cannot be used as a precondition because no
instantiation of it holds in the current state. Thus, if it is to be used as a precondition,
it must have been made true by being the postcondition of a previous action. But if it
appears as a postcondition, it will be wrapped in an inform predicate, and the PA will
have already discovered how it should be instantiated.
Pseudo-Variables
Pseudo-variables in KIF are less of a problem when translating to Prolog, as opposed
to when translating to PDDL, since Prolog can deal with variables and we do not have
to pretend that these are instantiated. It would thus be perfectly feasible to call them
by any convenient name, such as RegistrationNo. However, because the actions are
processed centrally before being passed to the translation to the PDDL process and
the translation to the Prolog processes, to avoid repeating processing, they are already
referred to as Pseudo-Vars when passed to the Prolog translation. We thus leave them
referred to as such. In Prolog, it is not a problem if several different variables are
referred to by the same name, as long as these variables do not appear in the same












(note that many of the conditions, including the class declarations, are removed here
for the sake of clarity)
then Prolog will not expect the two references to PseudoVar to refer to the same object.
This contrasts to PDDL, where if PseudoVar appears anywhere in the domain or prob¬
lem file, then another reference to it anywhere else would be expected to refer to the
same objects. However, if two references to a certain name are found within a clause,






could not be executed correctly, because the two pseudo-variables would be expected
to refer to the same object, but in fact do not. We therefore number the pseudo-variables
within each predicate. Thus the above examples of submitPaper and bookAccom would
be left unchanged, since each rule definition contains only one reference to PseudoVar.
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Meta-Variables
Dealing with meta-variables in Prolog is also not difficult. If these meta-variables
appear in the theory file, this will be because they are contained in a fact. When
facts are translated normally, the initial letters of each of each argument is translated
from upper-case (indicating a constant in KIF) to lower-case (indicating a constant in
Prolog). If a fact contains a meta-variable, we need to ensure that it is not translated
into lower-case, but remains upper-case. This means that Prolog will interpret it as
a variable. In action rules, the meta-variables also remain as variables, with a class
declaration declaring the class that this meta-variable must take.
6.5 Updating the Ontology
There are two situations in which the KIF ontology must be altered. One is when
mismatches are diagnosed and the KIF ontology must be refined accordingly; this is
dealt with by the refinement system. However, it is also necessary to keep the KIF
ontology up to date with respect to the effects of actions that have been performed.
This affects only the facts, and not any other ontological objects.
As has been discussed previously, the KIF ontology is not updated every time an ac¬
tion is performed; instead, the PA's Prolog ontology is updated and a record kept of the
changes made. However, as soon as planning stops, whether this is because of execu¬
tion failure or because the goal has been achieved, it is essential that the KIF ontology
is updated as well. This is performed by the updating system.
This process is fairly simple. First, the facts to be updated need to be translated from
Prolog representation (e.g., money(agentX, 100)) to KIF representation (e.g., (Money
AgentX 100)). The appropriate place to insert the fact is searched for — in this case,
as part of the declaration of the individual AgentX — and the fact is included. If the
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effect of an action is to negate a fact, then this fact is searched for in the appropriate
place and removed.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter we have described the three non-central subsystems of ORS, whose




7.1 Aims of Evaluation
The purpose of this chapter is to provide evidence for the hypothesis we outlined in the
introduction:
Using dynamic ontology refinement to locate and correct ontological
mismatches between agents can enable successful communication which
would otherwise be impossible.
We outlined three aims of the project that would fulfil this hypothesis:
1. To provide a framework in which agents with first-order, largely similar ontolo¬
gies can diagnose ontological mismatches between them;
2. To integrate this framework into a system, ORS, that enables an environment
where planning agents can use this ability to reach goals that would otherwise
have been unreachable. This system must be fully automated;
3. To evaluate these abilities against genuine examples of ontological mismatches,
to demonstrate that these abilities are useful and can be successfully performed.
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Our approach to this is twofold: firstly, we explore the importance and relevance of
the theory described in Chapter 5; secondly we demonstrate what ORS is capable of
doing, and place this capability in the context of real-world ontologies.
The evaluation of the system is important because this demonstrates the applicability
of the theory. However, the scope of the theory is much broader than the scope of the
system, since the system, inevitably having to be placed in a particular context, is a
reflection of the theory as implemented in that context only. The system reflects the
implementation of the theory within a planning context, but the theory is not inextri¬
cably linked to a planning context and could be implemented in many other contexts.
We therefore explore firstly how important and useful the theory is within the context
of the system, by evaluating the performance of the system, and then investigate the
broader implications of the theory, and discuss its usefulness in other domains.
In evaluating the system, we wish to establish answers to the following questions:
• How broad are the capabilities of the system?
• How well do these capabilities correspond with external examples of ontology
mismatch; i.e., does the system fix problems that actually exist?
• In what areas does the system fail to perform satisfactorily, and why does this
occur? Which of these are limitations of the system, that could be overcome by
further implementation, and which are limitations of the theory?
In evaluating the theory, we wish to answer these questions:
• How could the theory be used to create a version of the system which worked in
different domains?
• What areas of ontological mismatch is the theory inapplicable to?
• How much further could the theory be developed to extend beyond its original
context?
7.1. Aims ofEvaluation
7.1.1 The Context of the Solution
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Both the theory and the system have been developed within particular contexts, as
discussed above. By context, we mean not a particular domain, but the restrictions
they are subject to: for example, the theory is only directly applicable for ontologies
written in restricted KIF, and would need to be adapted and extended to work in the
context of a different representation. The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate both
how well the theory and the system perform within those contexts, and how they could
be extended to other contexts. In order to make the evaluation clear, we explicitly state
the contexts of both the theory and the system.
7.1.1.1 Context of the Theory
The theory has been developed to deal with first-order ontologies, and is not directly
applicable to other forms of ontological representations, such as Description Logics.
The presence of precondition refinement in the theory introduces some concept of
rules, and thus change, which occurs through these rules. The ideas behind the theory
may well be applicable to a much broader domain; this is discussed in Chapter 8. Since
first-order logic is more expressive than most ontological representations, we believe
developing the theory in this context gives it greater flexibility than if we had developed
it for a more restricted representation. However, the particular theory of refinements
discussed in Chapter 5 is restricted to the context of first-order logic, and is not directly
applicable to other forms of ontological representation.
7.1.1.2 Context of the System
The system is built on top of the theory, and thus experiences all the restraints of the
theory. That is, the system is designed to deal with first-order ontologies. In addi¬
tion, in order to make the development of a system viable, further restraints have been
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added. Firstly, a particular first-order ontological representation, namely KIF, has been
chosen, and, in fact, deals only with a subset of KIF (see Section 5.5). Secondly,
the context for the detection of ontological mismatch, and the evaluation of whether
a particular refinement was successful, has been chosen as planning. This does not
mean that the theory is only applicable to a planning domain, or, indeed, that it is only
applicable to KIF ontologies; this is simply the context that has been chosen for the
implementation of the system. The rationale behind this choice is discussed in Section
4.1.3.
7.1.2 Evaluation Issues
There are some difficult issues that need to be considered in the evaluation. These
are mostly concerned with the fact that this kind of technology is new: ontologies
are developed and altered without the assumptions that the techniques provided by our
system are possible; thus the techniques used are not geared towards this. Additionally,
the background in which this kind of technology would be most useful, such as the
Semantic Web, are themselves only partially developed. It is important to develop
the techniques that will be essential for their smooth running, such as the ability for
agents of different background to communicate, but in the developmental stages there
is simply not enough background information for a thorough evaluation of how these
techniques would really perform on the Semantic Web. Evaluation must instead be
performed on approximations of what the technology will be like, and estimations of
how good these approximations are. As the technology develops, the evaluation will
improve, and the systems can be developed accordingly.
7.1.2.1 Finding Suitable Ontologies
The ideal ontologies for evaluating our system would be:
7.1. Aims ofEvaluation 217
• ones for which we had several different versions, so we could find genuine on-
tological mismatches;
• ones which described some kind of planning environment;
• ones which are written in the appropriate simplified from of KIF.
Unfortunately, such ontologies proved impossible to find. There are few ontologies for
which different versions are publicly available; it is far more common to make only
the most recent version of an ontology available. It is very difficult to find suitable
ontologies in the planning domain. Historically, there has been a separation between
the ontology community and the planning community; this undesirable separation has
recently been addressed in a workshop at ICAPS 2005 (International Conference on
Automated Planning and Scheduling) [McNeill et al., 2005]. The result of this is that,
although ontologies are important in planning, they have tended to be regarded merely
as means for testing the efficiency of planners and planning techniques. There has
therefore been little incentive to document changes made to planning ontologies, and
to keep records of old versions.
There are numerous planning ontologies, usually written in PDDL, for which genuine
different versions are not available. There are also some large ontologies, not designed
for a planning environment, and written in a variety of different versions, which are
publicly available.
Our solution has been to take what ontologies we can for which we have different ver¬
sions, rewrite a sub-section of them in restricted KIF, and impose a planning scenario
on top of them by adding action-rules. In some cases, the mismatches that occurred
were found in ontological objects that do not have a direct equivalent in restricted
KIF; these were rewritten as restricted-KIF objects. Slightly different ontologies were
created for different agents, that reflected the ontological mismatches we discovered
between the different versions of the ontology. Additionally, we developed planning
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scenarios in KIF representations, and introduced plausible ontological mismatches be¬
tween agents. These ontologies were run on the system to determine whether the
system was capable of appropriately diagnosing and refining them.
7.1.2.2 Methods of Altering Ontologies
Another evaluation challenge is the way in which ontologies are currently updated.
Since the techniques implemented in this project are not currently available to ontol¬
ogy editors, it is assumed that matching and updating of ontologies will not be done
automatically, but by human users. Thus, when ontologies are altered, no effort is
made to describe these alterations in ways that could be understood by automated
agents. Generally, explanations about how new or altered objects fit into the ontol¬
ogy are given in natural language commenting, assuming that any user will be able to
interpret them. Most agents are not able to interpret natural language comments; an
agent's vocabulary consists only in the vocabulary of the ontology, and thus in order
to be able to interpret how unknown objects fit into the ontology, they need to be able
to relate them to existing ontological objects. This does not mean that our automated
techniques do not work on existing ontologies available in different versions; it is of¬
ten possible to disregard commenting and deduce the ontological difference purely by
reference to existing ontological objects. However, we believe that the fact that as¬
sumptions are made that humans will interpret these changes means that it is much
harder for an automated system to successfully interpret them. For example, a human
may change the name of an object because it occurs to them that the name is not fully
descriptive. A human reader would be able to understand that this name was related to
the old name, and why it had been changed. However, this information would not be
accessible to an agent. It is not necessary that these updates should conform to some
standard semantic mapping formalism, or that ontology changes should be limited to
specific prescribed changes. But if the ontology updater was assuming that agents
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might require this information, there would less tendency to rely on natural language
interpretation for describing changes, rather than explaining new ontological objects
in terms of old or existing ones, not changing names in such a way that the connection
is only obvious to those that can interpret natural language, and so on.
Although our system performs reasonably even on existing ontologies, we claim that
the success rate of ontology matching would be much higher if people updated ontolo¬
gies with an assumption that these changes might be investigated automatically. Thus
the results of the evaluation, although they show the system to be successful in many
cases, do not reflect the true potential of the system.
7.2 Real World Ontologies
We have based our evaluation on three real-world ontologies, which are available on¬
line, and for which different versions can be found: AKT, PSL and SUMO. These
ontologies are all written in first-order logic, which is essential if they are to be used
to evaluate ORS. Naturally, none are written in the restricted KIF we have used for
ORS, and thus some amount of manual translation has been necessary in order to run
them on ORS. However, the fact that they are first-order ensures that the mismatches
we discover in them are relevant to ORS.
These three ontologies were chosen because, of the limited amount of ontologies for
which it is possible to access several different versions, these were the most compatible
with our restricted KIF.
7.2.1 AKT
Advanced Knowledge Technology (AKT) [AKT, 2002] is a collaborative project in¬
volving the Universities of Aberdeen, Edinburgh, Sheffield, Southampton and the
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Open University. The project aims to develop and extend a range of technologies
providing integrated methods and services for the capture, modelling, publishing, re¬
use and management of knowledge. The project aims to facilitate knowledge use by







There are many different sub-ontologies in AKT; we have examined two of these:
AKT-portal and AKT-support. These further divide into several smaller ontologies:
• AKT-portal: docs; events; load; new; organizations; projects; research-areas;
techs.
• AKT-support: additional-stuff; basic; foundations; frames; load; new; time.
The AKT ontology was developed primarily for the CS AKTive Portal application,
which geographically visualises information in order to provide researchers with a
view of the computer science landscape in the UK.
These ontologies are available in several versions: AKT-portal in versions 1, 2.1, 2.2,
2.3 and 2.5; AKT-support in versions 1, 2.1, 2.2 and 2.5. Although many of these
ontologies are very small, they nevertheless provide between them many mismatch
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examples; far more than are provided by PSL and SUMO. The mismatch examples
chosen for the practical evaluations are from the AKT-portal-organizations ontology.
The AKT ontology is written in KIF, and so would seem to be rather a suitable ontology
to test ORS on. However, the main way in which we restrict the KIF that ORS uses is
by limiting the complexity of class definitions, and complex class definitions form the
heart of the AKT ontology. It is thus unsuitable as input for ORS both because ORS
cannot handle such class definitions and because the AKT ontology is very static: there
are no actions and few relations and individuals. In creating the AKT ontology to run
on ORS, we have had to rewrite the ontology to a fairly large extent.
7.2.2 SUMO
Suggested Upper Merged Ontology (SUMO) [SUMO, 2005] was developed within the
Standard Upper Ontology Working Group, and its purpose is to promote data interop¬
erability, information search and retrieval, automated inferencing and natural language
processing. SUMO is not specific to a particular domain; instead, it provides a struc¬
ture and a set of general concepts upon which domain ontologies could be constructed.
The SUMO website has access to various past versions of the ontology. We have
investigated mismatches that appear between versions 1.50 and 1.51, and 1.51 and
1.52.
The SUMO ontology is written in SUO-KIF (Standard Upper Ontology Knowledge
Interchange Format) [SUO-KIF, 2003], which was derived from KIF to support the
definition of the Standard Upper Merged Ontology [SUMO, 2005], It is thus related
to standard KIF. Again, we have had to impose a planning context onto the SUMO
ontology and translate various terms so that they comply both with restricted KIF and
with our planning scenario.
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7.2.3 PSL
Process Specification Language (PSL) [PSL, 2005] defines a neutral representation for
manufacturing processes. Its goal is to create a process representation that is common
to all manufacturing applications, generic enough to be decoupled from any given ap¬
plication, and robust enough to be able to represent the necessary process information
for any given application. This representation would facilitate communication between
the various applications because they would all speak the same language.
PSL is also written in KIF, and again differs from the required input to ORS because
it is static and depends on complex class definitions. We have thus had to impose a
planning context onto it and translate it where necessary into restricted KIF.
Less information about the differences between versions of the ontologies was avail¬
able for PSL than for AKT and SUMO. All that was available was a commentary on
the changes that had been made between versions 2.0 and 2.1.
7.3 Practical Evaluation
We have evaluated ORS against the three real world ontologies described above: PSL,
SUMO and AKT. We have also evaluated the system against three ontologies that are
inspired by genuine planning ontologies, for which we have invented plausible mis¬
matches. These ontologies are from the PLANET (European Network of Excellence)
repository [PLANET, 2004], In all cases, ORS successfully diagnosed and refined a
range of ontological mismatches, resulting in the successful execution of plans which
had initially been inexecutable.
It should be noted that the three real-world ontologies each had a large number of
ontological mismatches between their different versions, for which only a few were
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chosen for the practical evaluation. The statistics produced in the theoretical evalu¬
ation represent all of the mismatches found in these ontologies; however, not all of
them have been used in example scenarios and run on the system. This is because at¬
tempting to tie these mismatches together within a plausible planning scenario that can
be overlaid onto the ontology is difficult. Plausible goals must be developed, together
with action-rules that would take ontological objects as preconditions and effects, so
that these mismatches could be discovered within the context of the system. Because
this was a slow and difficult task, it was not possible to encode a large number of
these mismatches in each ontology. The mismatches were chosen so as to illustrate
a range of different ontological mismatches ORS can perform, and to be mismatches
that ORS was capable of diagnosing and refining. We have not ignored the ontolog¬
ical mismatches that ORS could not perform; these are discussed in detail in Section
7.4, where we provide statistical evaluation of what proportion of mismatches ORS
can refine, and a discussion concerning those that it cannot. The practical evaluation
was intended to demonstrate that those mismatches that we claim ORS can perform
are indeed successfully performed. There seemed no point in demonstrating that ORS
cannot successfully refine mismatches that we do not claim that it is able to.
7.3.1 Results
In this section, we describe the ontologies that we have evaluated the system with,
and explain which refinements were performed in the successful execution of the plan
for each. Brief output of the system can be found in Appendix C. More detailed
output, together with full ontologies before and after refinement and descriptions, with
differences highlighted in lines, of how the ontologies changed during refinement can
be found on the project website1.
For each ontology, we give the goal to be achieved and explain what it means. We then
'http://dream.inf.ed.ac.uk/projects/dor/
224 Chapter 7. Results and Evaluation
give the plan that was produced, explaining briefly the significance. Each plan step in
the plan output by Metric-FF and interpreted into Prolog has a list of arguments that
cover every individual mentioned in the preconditions and effects of the relevant action
rule. The order of the arguments is determined by the order in which they are declared
in the PDDL domain file, which is determined by the order in which the translation
process encounters them. Since it is not obvious what these individuals refer to just
from reading the plan, without reference to the ontology, we will briefly explain them
where relevant. The action names for each plan step are shown in bold.
We then indicate at which of these plan steps execution failed, and explain the diag¬
nosis given by the system. After each refinement has been implemented, a new plan
is produced, which is given. This plan is sometimes identical to the first plan. This
does not mean that no change has taken place: the underlying ontology has been al¬
tered, allowing the agent to respond appropriately to questions about the preconditions.
However, this does not always require a different plan to be produced: the same plan
can be executed successfully with the updated ontology. Sometimes the plan steps are
the same but the number of arguments they list is different, due to changes in the pre¬
conditions and effects; sometimes plan steps must be added or removed from plans.
Additionally, plan steps that have been successfully executed before failure occurred
will not appear in the new plan unless they need to be repeated, since replanning will
not occur in the same environment as the original planning: the environment has been
changed through the actions performed thus far.
We will explicitly state the preconditions and effects of plan steps where this is useful
for understanding the mismatch.
In each example, the following information is given:
• A list of the refinements that are performed;
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• A list of all the pertinent stages, including the goal, all of the plans, the point of
failure and the diagnosed refinement;
• An explanation of what occurred, particularly focused on why the particular re¬
finements were made.
In each case, the edited output of the system is displayed in a Refinement Output figure,
and an explanation of this output is given in the main body of the text. Note that the
output is given in Prolog notation, rather than in KIF notation as is standard in the rest
of the thesis. This is because it is taken directly from output from ORS, which is in
Prolog.
7.3.1.1 Online Shopping
This ontology, and the mismatches it encodes, were created by us, based on a plausible
scenario for a planning agent in a Semantic Web. The relevant output is shown in
Refinement Output 1.
Refinements performed:
1. tightening class restrictions
2. incorrect agent contacted
3. propositional anti-abstraction
The PA, named shoppingAgent, has a task to buy the book ourMutualFriend. The
PA produces a plan (Plan 1) to achieve this. Note that the slightly incongruous argu¬
ment aiGroup is present because the PA believes it is necessary to belong to an online
group in order to buy items, and this is an online group that it belongs to.
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[putInBasket (ourMutualFriend, shoppingAgent, aiGroup),
buy (ourMutualFriend,shoppingAgent)]
• Failure: at action putlnBasket. There was a surprising question:
class (aiGroup, shoppingGroup). aiGroup is currently constrained to be of class group, due
to the definition of registered-member, which is a precondition of put-in-basket.
• Refinement: tightening class restrictions
• Plan 2:
[ joinGroupfbookShopGroup, shoppingAgent) ,
putlnBasket (ourMutualFriend, shoppingAgent ,bookShopGroup),
buy (ourMutualFriend,shoppingAgent)]
• Failure: at action joinGroup, immediately after requesting the action to be performed.
• Refinement: incorrect agent contacted - the agent replied, on questioning, that it was not able
to perform the appropriate action, and the information that that agent could perform that task
was thus removed from the meta-ontology.
• Plan 3:
[joinGroup (bookShopGroup, shoppingAgent) ,
putlnBasket (ourMutualFriend, shoppingAgent,bookShopGroup),
buy (ourMutualFriend,shoppingAgent)]
• Failure: at action buy. There was a surprising question:
money (shoppingAgent, dollars, Amount), which has a predicate match with expected
precondition money (shoppingAgent, 100). An extra argument of class currency needs to be
added as the second argument.
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This plan fails at the first action: putlnBasket. Diagnosis reveals that the class re¬
strictions on one of the arguments was too loose: it was restricted to class group,
and thus the planner allowed the argument to be instantiated to an object with class
academicGroup, since this is a subclass of group. In fact, the class restriction should
have been shoppingGroup. The necessary refinement is performed.
The PA then replans to produce Plan 2. This again fails at the first action, which this
time is joinGroup. Diagnosis reveals that the incorrect agent was contacted. The
necessary refinement is performed.
The PA replans to produce Plan 3. This plan is identical to Plan 2, because the pre¬
vious refinement affected the meta-ontology. Thus the plan produced, from the top
level ontology, is the same, but the PA's ability to execute the plan, which depends
also on the meta-ontology, is improved, because this time it knows to contact a differ¬
ent service-providing agent. This time failure occurs at the third action, buy. Diag¬
nosis reveals that the precondition money (shoppingAgent, 100) was expected to be
money (shoppingAgent,dollars, _56691), thus indicating that the money predicate
is missing an argument of class currency.
The PA replans to produce Plan 4. This is successfully executed.
7.3.1.2 Blocks World
This ontology is based on a standard planning scenario, which has been adapted as
necessary. The relevant output is shown in Refinement Output 2.
Refinements performed:
1. Switching arguments
2. locating an incorrect fact: removing an incorrect fact from the ontology and
altering the effects of a rule
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moveToBl ock (armOne, blockX, blockY),
moveToBlock(armOne,blockY,blockZ),
order (blockZ,blockY,blockX) ]
• Failure: at action moveToBlock (armOne, blockX, blockY). There was a surprising ques¬
tion: holding (armOne, blockX), which has a predicate match with expected precondition
holding (blockX, armOne); the arguments are transposed.
• Refinement: Switch arguments
• Plan 2:
[pickUpFromBlock (blockZ, blockX, armOne) ,
moveToBlock (armOne, blockX, blockY),
moveToBlock (armOne,blockY, blockZ),
order (blockZ, blockY,blockX) ]
• Failure: at action order, immediately after the request to perform this action was made.
• Refinement: incorrect fact located - The service-providing agent confirmed it could provide
the service; thus an incorrect precondition was searched for. empty (armOne) was found to be
incorrect, and it was believed to be true as it is a precondition of a previous action. Thus the
incorrect fact was removed from the ontology and the effects of the relevant rule altered.
• Plan:
[ emptyArm (armOne), order (blockZ, blockY, blockX) ]
• Success
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The goal is to place the three blocks in the correct order, which is a single column in al¬
phabetical order, with the arm empty. The PA produces Plan 1 to achieve this. Note that
the last action of this plan, order, is an action which verifies that the order of the blocks
is correct and that the arm is empty. This fails at action moveToBlockarmOne, blockX,
blockY). Diagnosis reveals that an unexpected query was received: holding (armOne,
blockX). This corresponds with an expected precondition: holding (blockX, armOne)
They have the same arity and classes of arguments, but these classes are reversed.
Switching arguments is therefore diagnosed.
The PA replans to produce Plan 2. This fails at the action order. This failure occurred
immediately after a request was made to perform order. A problem precondition was
discovered: empty (armOne). The Shapiro algorithm reveals that this fact was an effect
of the action moveToBlock. An assumption has been made that the arm can only hold
one block; thus when it puts that block down, it is now empty. However, in reality,
the arm can hold more than one block, and so is not necessarily empty after a block
has been put down. The agent that performed moveToBlock is consulted to see if it
believes that empty (armOne) is an effect of the action and, since it agrees with the
agent that attempted to perform order that it is not true, PA removes it as an effect
of the action. It must also remove the fact that states this is true, since this has been
shown to be incorrect. Note the assumption entails that this is also falsely believed to
be an effect of the action moveToTable. However, since this action is not part of the
plan, this is not noticed. This will be fixed if it causes plan execution failure at another
time.
The PA replans to produce Plan 3. This is successfully executed.
7.3.1.3 Lift Scheduling
This ontology is based on a standard planning scenario. The relevant output is shown
in Refinement Output 3. Note that floor has been abbreviated to f 1 and person has
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been abbreviated to pers.
Refinements performed:
1. locating an incorrect fact
2. negating a precondition
3. propositional abstraction
The PA produces Plan 1. This fails at action serveLiftCustomer (persOne, f lOne,
liftOne, securityCleared, flZero, onsiteEngineer). The plan failed immedi¬
ately after a request was made to perform serveLiftCustomer (persOne, f lOne,
liftOne, securityCleared, flZero, onsiteEngineer) Diagnosis shows that there
is a problem precondition: inService (liftOne, onsiteEngineer). The Shapiro
algorithm reveals this was not made true by a previous action, but was a fact in the
original ontology. Refinement thus removes this fact from the ontology.
The PA replans to produce Plan 2. Failure occurs at the action serveLiftCustomer (
persOne,flOne,liftOne,securityCleared,flZero,onsiteEngineer). The plan
fails after a query about hasAccess (persOne, flOne). This was an expected query,
and it was believed that a negative answer was appropriate, because a precondition is
not (hasAccess (persOne, flOne). Since this answer was not appropriate, we must
negate the precondition, and replace it with hasAccess (persOne, f lOne) .
The PA replans to produce Plan 3. This fails at action serveLiftCustomer (persOne,
flOne, liftOne, securityCleared, flZero, onsiteEngineer). Diagnosis reveals
that a query was received about call (persOne, liftOne), which was not expected.
This matches expected precondition call (persOne, liftOne, securityCleared),
but has a lower arity.
The PA replans to produce Plan 4. This is successfully executed.
7.3. Practical Evaluation 231
Refinement Output 3 Lift Scheduling Ontology
• Goal: and(served(persOne),served(persTwo),served(persThree))
• Plan 1: [serveLiftCustonier(persOne,flOne,liftOne,securityCleared,flZero,onsiteEngineer) ,
serveLif tCustomer (persTwo, flZero, liftOne, securityCleared, flOne, onsiteEngineer),
serveLif tCustomer (persThree, flTwo, liftOne, securityCleared, flZero,onsiteEngineer) ]
• Failure: at action serveLiftCustomer(persOne,flOne,liftOne,
securityCleared, flZero, onsiteEngineer), immediately after the request to perform the
action was made.
• Refinement: incorrect fact located. The service-providing agent it could perform the task. An
incorrect preocndition inService(lifeOne,onsiteEngineer) was discovered to be a fact in
the original ontology, and removed.
• Plan 2: [moveEmptyLi f t (flOne, liftOne, flZero), serviceLif t (liftOne),
serveLif tCustomer (persOne, flOne, liftOne, securityCleared, flZero, onsiteEngineer),
serveLif tCustomer (persTwo, flZero, liftOne, securityCleared, flOne, onsiteEngineer),
serveLiftCustomer (persThree, flTwo, liftOne, securityCleared, flZero, onsiteEngineer) ]
• Failure: at action serveLiftCustomer (persOne, flOne, liftOne,
securityCleared, flZero, onsiteEngineer), immediately after the expected question
hasAccess (personOne, f loorOne): the expectations about the truth value of this precondition
must thus be incorrect.
• Refinement: negate precondition
• Plan 3: [grantAccess(flOne,persOne), gran£Access(flZero,persTwo),
grantAccess(flTwo,persThree),
serveLif tCustomer (persOne, flOne, liftOne, securityCleared, flZero, onsiteEngineer),
serveLif tCustomer (persTwo, flZero, liftOne, securityCleared, flOne, onsiteEngineer),
serveLiftCustomer (persThree, flTwo, liftOne, securityCleared, flZero, onsiteEngineer) ]
• Failure: at action serveLiftCustomer (persOne, flOne, liftOne,
securityCleared, flZero, onsiteEngineer). There was a surprising question:
call (personOne, liftOne), which has a predicate match with expected precondition
call (personOne, lifeOne, securityCleared). The final argument must thus be removed.
• Refinement: propositional abstraction.
• Plan 4 : [serveLif tCustomer (persOne, flOne, liftOne, flZero, onsiteEngineer),
serveLiftCustomer (persTwo, flZero, liftOne, flOne, onsiteEngineer) ,
serveLiftCustomer (persThree, flTwo, liftOne, flZero, onsiteEngineer) ]
• Success
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7.3.1.4 AKT




3. adding a class
Note that the mismatch diagnosed as precondition anti-abstraction corresponds in the
original ontology to a condition that is added to a class. Since that cannot be repro¬
duced in restricted KIF, it is interpreted as adding a precondition to an action. Addi¬
tionally, the propositional anti-abstraction is not a genuine mismatch from the AKT
ontology, but is included as a device to reveal the new class, which is a genuine mis¬
match.
This goal states that researchAgent, which is an agent of type researcher should be
enrolled as a member of refinementSig, which is of class Sig (Special Interest Group),
which is itself of class Organisational-Unit. The PA forms Plan 1 to achieve the goal.
The plan contains only one action: to enrol the agent in the Sig. The arguments re¬
fer to the organisation to be joined, the researcher that wishes to enrol, the institute
to which the researcher belongs, the subscription fee that is payable, and the general
research interest which must belong to both the organisation and the researcher. The
fact that there is only one action indicates that the preconditions of this rule are already
believed to be fulfilled. This plan fails at action becomeMemberOrganization. The
communication with the service-providing agent indicates the existence of a precondi¬
tion hasEmailAddress (researchAgent, _297427). This precondition indicates that
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[becomeMemberOrgani zation( refinementSig, researchAgent,
schoolOfInformaticsAtEdinburgh,subscriptionFee,
ontologyRefinement)]
• Failure: at action becomeMemberOrganization. There was a surprising question:
hasEmailAddress (researchAgent, Address), which does not match any expected precon¬
ditions. It is therefore assumed to be a missing precondition.
• Refinement: Precondition anti-abstraction
• Plan 2:
[generateEmai 1Address (researchAgent,
schoolOf InformaticsAtEdinburgh) , becomeMemberOrganization(
refinementSig,researchAgent, schoolOfInformaticsAtEdinburgh,
subscriptionFee, ontologyRefinement)]
• Failure: at action becomeMemberOrganization. There was a surprising ques¬
tion: memberAcademicUnit(researchAgent,schoolOfInformaticsAtEdinburgh),
which has a predicate match with expected precondtion
memberAcademicUnit(researchAgent,schoolOfInformaticsAtEdinburgh). The
expected precondition is missing a third argument of class organizationUnit.
• Refinement: propositional anti-abstraction and adding a class
• Plan 3:
[becomeMemberOrgani zation (refinementSig, researchAgent,
ukCsDepts,schoolOfInformaticsAtEdinburgh,subscriptionFee,
ontologyRefinement)]
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in order for an agent to join the Sig, it must have an email address. The second argu¬
ment is a Prolog indication of an uninstantiated variable. This means that the service-
providing agent wishes the PA to instantiate this variable. It might be that any instan¬
tiation is acceptable; the service-providing agent just wishes to ensure that it is true
for some argument; this is the case in this situation. In some situations, only certain
instantiations would constitute an acceptable answer. The PA attempts to link this pre¬
condition to any of its existing preconditions, but, in this situation, fails. Therefore it
concludes that this is a missing precondition, and refines its ontology accordingly. A
warning message is given to indicate that this may not be correct: it may be that the
precondition is linked to an existing precondition in a way the PA cannot determine.
The PA replans to produce Plan 2. This fails at action becomeMemberOrganization.
Diagnosis reveals that a query was received about memberAcademicUnit (
researchAgent,schoolOfInformaticsAtEdinburgh,ukCsDepts), which was not
expected. However, this matched expected precondition memberAcademicUnit (
researchAgent, schoolOf InformaticsAtEdinburgh). The class of this extra argu¬
ment was not known, but the service-providing agent informed the PA it was of class
educationalOrganizationalUnit. This class does not exist in PA's class hierar¬
chy, so it needed to ask the superclass of this class and fit it into its class hierarchy
accordingly.
The PA replans to produce Plan 3, which is successfully executed. Note that in order to
form an appropriate plan, the newly refined precondition memberAcademicUnit (Agent,
Unit, MetaVar) must be instantiated. Since PA did not know of the class
educationalOrganizationalUnit before the refinement, it does not know any in¬
stances of the class. However, it has encountered an instance during querying: this was
the prompt for the refinement. Therefore it adds the object ukCsDepts to its ontology
as an individual of class educationalOrganizationalUnit. This is the only value
MetaVar can be instantiated to.
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7.3.1.5 SUMO




This goal indicates that a given agent wishes to know a particular communication.
The PA produces Plan 1. This fails at the first action, doB. A query was received
about resultRel (actionA, obj ectA), which was not expected. This matched the
expected precondition resultRel (actionA, entityA), except that the class of the
second argument was different: an expected argument of class entity mismatched
an actual argument of class object, object is a superclass of entity, so domain
abstraction was diagnosed.
The PA replans to produce Plan 2. This plan is the same as the previous plan, except
entityA has been replaced by obj ectA. The plan failed at action tell. A query
was received about represents (physicalA, obj ectA), which was not expected. No
precondition matched the name, and the PA could not find any related precondition, but
the service-providing agent said that the precondition refers (physicalA, obj ectA)
is a subclass of represents, so predicate abstraction was diagnosed.
The PA replaned to produce Plan 3. This was successfully executed. Note that
represents (physicalA, obj ectA) is an effect of the action doB; in order to make
refers (physicalA, obj ectA) true, doA must be performed instead.
7.3.1.6 PSL
The relevant output is shown in Refinement Output 6.
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• Failure: at action doB. There was a surprising question: resultRel(actionA,objectA),
which has a predicate match with resultRel (actionA, entityA). The class of objectA
(object) is a subclass of the class of entityA (entity).




• Failure: at action tell. There was a surprising question: represents (physicalA, obj ectA).
The predicate name is a superclass of the predicate name of an expected precondition:
refers(physicalA,obj ectA).









The goal is to make occurrence occ into a simple object. The PA produced Plan 1,
which failed at action ruleOne. A query was received about mono (subOccTwo, occOne,
actTreeOne), which was not expected. This matches the precondition mono (sub
OccOne, subOccTwo), but they have different arity. Thus propositional anti-abstraction
was performed.
The PA replaned to produce Plan 2. This failed at action ruleThree. A query was
received about sameTree (occTwo, occ), which was not expected. No preconditions
matched the name, but the PA found its precondition sameGrove (occTwo, occ) was a
superclass of sameTree. Predicate anti-abstraction was diagnosed.
The PA replaned to produce Plan 3. This was successfully executed.
7.3.2 Missing Refinements
The refinements performed using the three real-world ontologies show a good range
of the abstractions and anti-abstractions. However, there are some types of refine¬
ments that do not appear naturally in these ontologies. These are refinements such as
precondition refinement and discovering problem preconditions and using the Shapiro
algorithm to discover their source. This is because these refinements are concerned
with action rules and individuals. Such ontological objects are central to planning on¬
tologies but are not so important to static ontologies. Usually, these have few, or no,
individuals and action rules. It is thus difficult to demonstrate these refinements using
our off-the-shelf ontologies; these are demonstrated using our planning ontologies.
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ruleTwo (occTwo, occOne) ,
rul eThree( occ, occTwo, occOne) ]
• Failure: at action ruleOne. There was a surprising question:
mono (subOccTwo, occOne, actTreeOne), which has a predicate match with expected
precondition mono (subOccTwo, occOne). The expected precondition is missing a third
argument of class activityTree.
• Refinement: propositional anti-abstraction
• Plan 2:






• Failure: at action ruleThree. There was a surprising question: sameTreefoccTwo,occ).
The predicate name is a subclass of the predicate name of an expected precondtion:
sameGrove(occTwo,occ).
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7.3.2.1 Mismatches that Cannot be Diagnosed by ORS
Precondition Abstraction
One of the mismatches we have defined is not amenable to discovery through plan
execution failure. Mismatches are only highlighted by plan execution failure if they
can cause plan execution failure; some mismatches cannot. Precondition abstraction
entails an action rule having tighter restrictions on it than necessary. It may lead to a
situation where it appears impossible to form a plan, when the correct preconditions
would allow the formation of a plan. However, if a plan is formed, it cannot fail
due to this mismatch, as all the correct preconditions - and more - are fulfilled. This
situation is inherent in any version of ORS that diagnosed mismatches purely through
plan execution failure. If the primary aim of the system is to enable successful plan
execution, then this does not constitute a problem. However, it does mean that an
ontology cannot be automatically updated to cover this change using ORS.
Domain Anti-abstraction
The system also does not diagnose domain anti-abstraction. This differs from the in¬
ability to diagnose precondition abstraction because the latter inability is a limitation
of the system, albeit an unavoidable one in the context, whereas the former reflects
the fact that domain anti-abstraction does not reveal an underlying mismatch in the
ontologies.
Consider, for example, the situation in which PA has an expected precondition:
(Holding Arm-A Block-A),
It then receives the following query from the service-providing agent:
(Holding Object-A Block-A)
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Clearly, there is an instantiation clash here; the precondition, which concerns an object
named Arm-A, does not match the query, which concerns an object named Object-A.
PA knows that Arm-A is of class Arm, and so there seems to be a class mismatch, as
Object-A is of class Object. However, PA also knows that class Arm is a subclass
of Object. Thus, although Object-A is of a class not anticipated by PA, it does not
represent a ontology mismatch.
7.4 Evaluation of the Theory
We have evaluated above how good the system is at performing the tasks that we
designed it to perform. In this section, we attempt to evaluate how well this ability
meets the actual demands of ontological mismatch. We evaluate this by examining
the mismatches we encounter in the three off-the-shelf ontologies for which we have
different versions. We have explained in the beginning of the section why evaluating
ORS against such ontologies is not especially favourable to it; this is explained in more
detail in Section 7.4.1, where we explore the situations in which ORS would be unable
to perform the appropriate refinement.
We define four different categories into which mismatches may fall, one of which is
further subdivided:
1. ORS could refine the mismatch;
2. ORS could not currently refine the mismatch, but non-major changes to the sys¬
tem would allow ORS to refine it;
3. ORS could not refine the mismatch. This is because:
(a) ORS did not have sufficient functionality;
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(b) This particular mismatch is outside the scope of the project;
(c) This mismatch is irrelevant to an automated system — this is usually a
change to commenting or formatting;
(d) This mismatch could not occur in the restricted KIF that ORS is designed
to use;
(e) This mismatch could not be highlighted in a planning context.
4. The information we had about the mismatch was insufficient to diagnose which
of the above categories it would fall into.
From the above categories, it is clearly desirable that as many as possible fall into
category 1; such mismatches indicate a successful outcome for ORS. However, given
the assumptions we have had to make in ORS and the unsuitability of the ontologies
against which it is evaluated, it is to be expected that many will fall into categories
3b)- 3e). A poor outcome for ORS would be represented by many mismatches falling
into category 3a). It may seem fairly arbitrary whether mismatches are assigned to
category 3a) or category 3b): is a mismatch unrefinable because it is outside the scope
of the project, or because ORS does not have sufficient functionality? A generous
interpretation may say that anything that ORS has not been designed to perform is
outside the scope of the project, and therefore nothing should be assigned to 3a); a less
generous interpretation may say that any mismatch that cannot be refined for reasons
that are not due to restriction of context (3c-3e) indicate a lack of functionality in ORS,
and therefore nothing should be assigned to 3b). We take a middle line here. We assign
mismatches to 3b) if they belong to categories that we have discussed in previous
chapters and explained the importance to the project of not to attempt to include such
functionality in ORS; otherwise we assign them to 3a). Under such circumstances,
mismatches being assigned to 3a) is the worst outcome; nevertheless, a large number
of mismatches being assigned to 3b) would indicate that ORS is not especially well
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adapted to the task it is attempting to perform. A large number of mismatches in 3d)
does not directly provide a poor outcome for ORS, since we have made and justified
a decision to limit the ontologies with which ORS can operate, and also the general
problem is undecidable. However, a high percentage in this category would indicate
that the amount of work required to adapt ORS to full KIF or to another ontological
representation would be reasonably large.
It may also seem arbitrary whether mismatches fall into category 2 or category 3a).
We only assign mismatches to category 2 if they could be diagnosed and appropriately
refined by techniques that are similar to the techniques already contained in the system
and would not require much extension of the theory. For each of the kinds of mis¬
matches that we assign to this category, we give a justification of why we believe it
meets this criterion.
Given that it is hard to get full information about these ontologies, we must expect a
few mismatches to fall into category 4: this is not a reflection on ORS, merely on the
data we have available. In most cases, this allocation is given to mismatches that could
be easily refinable in certain circumstances, but would not be in others, and where the
context is not clear enough to determine which of these is the case.
It is important to stress that ORS has not actually performed all those mismatches that
fall into category 1: testing ontologies on ORS is a complicated process, involving
rewriting the ontologies in restricted KIF, overlaying a planning context in such a way
that the mismatches can be highlighted, developing agents to perform the tasks that
the ontology requires and writing ontologies for them that are subtly and appropriately
different, and so on. It was only practical to run ORS with a subsection of these
mismatches, chosen to fully indicate the functionality of the system. The remainder
of the mismatches were evaluated theoretically; we assign them to category 1 if they
correspond with mismatches that we have demonstrated ORS can refine.
In some cases, there were mismatches that fell into more than one category. For ex-
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ample, in the AKT ontology, a common mismatch was the addition of a new class.
Adding a new class can be performed by ORS, but ORS deals with only simple class
definitions, and thus if there is complex information attached to this class definition, it
cannot be added. We considered these to be two different mismatches: the adding of
the class itself, stating its place in the class hierarchy, which would fall into category 1,
and the adding of complex information about that class, which would fall into category
3d).
Below, we summarise our results in tables and piecharts, where the proportions of
mismatches that fall into each category are illustrated. The significance of these results
is explained in Section 7.4.1. The complete ontologies from which these results came,
and the complete set of their mismatches, can be found through links from the project
website2. The mismatches on the website are highlighted to illustrate which category
each mismatch falls into.
In Table 7.1, we give the total number of mismatches in each category for each on¬
tology and in total. Table 7.2 then restates this information as percentages of the total
number of mismatches. Tables 7.3 and 7.4 give different perspectives on these per¬
centages. In Table 7.3, we omit categories 3c) and 4. The number of alterations to
commenting is really not relevant to an evaluation of the performance of ORS: to an au¬
tomated system commenting can be disregarded. Additionally, the evidence provided
by mismatches of category 4 is impossible to evaluate, as we do not know what they
indicate about the performance of the system. We thus consider that this table gives
the percentages for each category of significant mismatches. In Table 7.4, we also omit
categories 3d) and 3e), which are those mismatches that are outside the context of the
project. These percentages therefore reflect the proportion of relevant mismatches in
each category. We then illustrate this information in pie-charts.
Note that these results are much more heavily influenced by the AKT ontology than by
2http://dream.inf.ed.ac.uk/projects/dor/
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Category PSL SUMO AKT Total
1 15 16 95 126
2 6 0 15 21
3a) 0 2 0 2
3b) 5 16 8 29
3c) 3 17 17 37
3d) 0 2 83 85
3e) 1 6 10 17
4 6 1 1 8
Total 36 60 229 325
Table 7.1: Numbers of Mismatches per Category
the other two, since we have far more data from the AKT ontology. The effect of this
is discussed in Section 7.4.1.
7.4.1 Analysis of Results
The results illustrated in the tables and charts indicate a reasonably good performance
for ORS. ORS can perform 38.8% of all mismatches, 45.0% of significant mismatches,
and 70.8% of relevant mismatches. Here, we discuss the kinds of refinements that fall
into each of the categories.
• Category 1
The practical evaluation discussed in Section 7.3 illustrates that a wide range of
the potential mismatches we identified can actually be found in these ontologies.
Additionally, we see that a fairly high proportion of mismatches fall into this
category, despite the unsuitability of the ontologies, discussed in Section 7.1.2.
However, we should qualify these results to some extent by explaining in more
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Category PSL SUMO AKT Total
1 41.7 26.7 41.5 38.8
2 16.7 0 6.6 6.5
3a) 0 3.3 0 0.6
3b) 13.9 26.7 3.5 8.9
3c) 8.3 28.3 7.4 11.4
3d) 0 3.3 36.2 26.2
3e) 2.8 10.0 4.4 5.2
4 16.7 1.7 0.4 2.5
Table 7.2: Percentage of Mismatches per Category
Category PSL SUMO AKT Total
1 55.6 38.0 45.0 45.0
2 22.2 0 7.1 7.5
3a) 0 4.7 0 0.7
3b) 18.5 38.1 3.8 10.4
3c)
3d) 0 4.8 39.3 30.3
3e) 3.7 14.3 4.7 6.1
4
Table 7.3: Percentage of Mismatches per Significant Category
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Category PSL SUMO AKT Total
1 57.7 44.4 80.5 70.8
2 23.1 0 12.7 11.8
3a) 0 5.6 0 1.1





Table 7.4: Percentage of Mismatches per Relevant Category
38.8%
26.2%
Figure 7.1: Total Percentage of Mismatches per Category
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45.0%
30.3%
Figure 7.2: Total Percentage of Mismatches per Significant Category
11.8%
Figure 7.3: Total Percentage of Mismatches per Relevant Category
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detail what the percentages mean. The results obtained from the AKT ontology
have a high impact on these good results; this is especially so for the results for
relevant categories. Whilst we can find a reasonable spread of mismatches in
AKT, this result is heavily influenced by some of the more simple refinements,
and in particular, adding classes. A high percentage of category 1 mismatches
from AKT involve merely adding a class to the ontology; thus, although this is
a good result for ORS because it can perform this, it does not indicate that the
full functionality of ORS is not being used quite as widely as might be imagined
from the results.
• Category 2
Only 6.5% of mismatches fell into this catagory. All of these fell into three
different groups:
- Changing the superclass of a class:
ORS can already alter the class hierarchy in simple ways: for example,
by adding a class. It cannot, however, alter the superclass of an existing
class. This mismatch would be easy to refine, but would be difficult in
most circumstances to diagnose.
- Changing the class of an instance:
This is very similar to the above situation.
- Adding relations and functions to the ontology:
In some situations, it would be easy to diagnose this: if, for example, this
new relation or function was a precondition of an action, it would be re¬
vealed through questioning. It would not be difficult to refine the ontology
to add a new relation if the name of the relation and the number and classes
of the arguments was known. It would, however, be very difficult to deter¬
mine whether an unknown predicate represented a relation or a function.
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In cases of uncertainty, it would probably be better to add a relation rather
than a function, as this is a more general case.
• Category 3a)
The results in this category are very low, which is a good result for ORS. In fact,
only two of all the mismatches fell into this category. These two occurrences
both appeared in the SUMO ontology.
- The first was concerned with an axiom: the original axiom contained a
double implication as the top-level operator, and this was altered to a sin¬
gle implication. This could be viewed as removing an axiom, though it is
represented as an alteration of an existing axiom. It is not clear how this
problem could be identified by ORS, though the rule could be marked as
unusable if it failed to be executed successfully when no problem precon¬
dition could be found.
- The second concerned an object called Null Set which was defined as an
individual in the original ontology but redefined as a class in the updated
ontology. Its original definition was that it was the set that contains no in¬
stances, whereas the updated definition was that it was any set or class that
contains no instances; hence the change of categorisation. Such a change
would be difficult for ORS to diagnose.
• Category 3b)
The percentage of mismatches that fall into this category are far more numerous
than those that fall into the previous category. The percentages are still much
less than those for category 1, illustrating that the limitation of scope that we
enforced on this project does not impact the effectiveness of ORS to a very large
degree. Nevertheless, nearly 9% of all mismatches, and over 16% of relevant
mismatches, fell into this somewhat undesirable category. We briefly examine
those that did, justifying why they were not put into category 3a), and discussing
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why ORS could not be expected to refine them.
We consider these mismatches to be outside the scope of the project because
they fall into one of two categories:
- Multiple interacting mismatches:
Often, more than one mismatch is made simultaneously in such a way that
these mismatches are dependent on one another. ORS can diagnose two
mismatches if this can be done consecutively: first one mismatch is diag¬
nosed and refined, then plan execution failure occurs again, then the second
mismatch is diagnosed and refined. This is clearly not possible if the mis¬
matches affect one another.
Many mismatches that fall into this category are those that involve the rules.
Adding a new rule is complex. It is impossible to diagnose through plan ex¬
ecution failure (thus should perhaps be assigned to category 3e)), and it also
involves several different ontological objects: all the preconditions and ef¬
fects; and hence can be viewed a series of multiple interaction mismatches.
Equally difficult, and fairly common, is the replacement of existing rules
by one or more restated rules. In this situation, it might be possible to diag¬
nose that the old rule no longer existed; it would not be possible to diagnose
how it should be replaced.
Sometimes, single preconditions are restated as several new preconditions,






(not (and (true 7F0RMULA1 True)
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(true 7FORMULA2 True))))
These two statements are logically equivalent. However, for an automated
system to detect the complex interaction of mismatches here could be dif¬
ficult. This could only really be done as a human does it: through analysis
of the interaction of logical operators. This would be easily detectable for
a system that could interpret logic, but not for a system that was attempting
to diagnose mismatch only with reference to existing ontological objects,
and without a built in understanding of logical equivalence.
We believe that this is the situation that most suffers from the assumption
that human users, rather than automated users will be the ones to interpret
and update ontologies. If automated users are considered, it will probably
become much less common to restate conditions in this way. However, the
problem of adding rules remains: it would not be desirable to completely
remove the potential to add rules to an ontology, and yet these will be
difficult to refine, particularly in a planning context.
- Arbitrary changes to the ontology:
Again, we believe that this occurs more frequently because of the assump¬
tion that the process of updating ontologies is not automated. One way in
which this manifests itself is the correction of errors in the original ontol¬
ogy. This would fall into the category of arbitrary changes to the ontology,
since the original error in the ontology would be random. We have made
the assumption that the ontologies we are working with do not contain er¬
rors, and therefore we consider these problems to be outside the scope of
the project.
Changing the names of ontological objects is also very difficult to diag¬
nose. ORS can deal with this in a situation where it is done systematically:
for example, changing the name to a sub- or super-class. However, if it is
done arbitrarily - perhaps, for example, because it sounds better or makes
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more sense - this is hard to detect automatically. One example of this is
a name change from R&D-INSTITUTE to R-and-D-INSTITUTE. There are
ways in which this problem could be lessened: for example, an online dic¬
tionary could be used to detect synonyms, and standard conversions be¬
tween natural language words and symbols (such as & and and) could be
listed. However, we have not attempted to implement any of these, as we
do not consider arbitrary changes to be within the scope of the project.
• Category 3c)
Mismatches that fall into this category are not really interesting to the evalua¬
tion. However, the fact that they occur reasonably frequently (11.4% of all mis¬
matches) indicates that there is much information in these ontologies which is
not readable automatically by agents that cannot interpret natural language, and
that some effort is put into updating this information. This may not be impor¬
tant: in some situations, commenting merely explains what is clearly stated by
the ontological objects themselves, but in a more human-understandable manner.
However, it may be that the commenting explains complex interactions of onto¬
logical objects that could not be derived by an automated system interpreting
only the ontological objects themselves. This is particularly true in refinement
situations: the relation of the new information to the old is explained in a way
that might not be explained explicitly using the ontological objects themselves.
Again, this is a reflection of the assumption that this information is relevant only
to human users. If automated systems perform this task more commonly, effort
will be put into explaining these changes using ontological objects rather than
through commenting.
• Category 3d)
Mismatches that could not occur in the restricted KIF that ORS uses occurred
very rarely in the PSL and SUMO ontologies, but were frequent in the AKT
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ontology (over 25% of all mismatches). This may seem surprising, since AKT
is written in KIF, and we might therefore expect it to correspond well with the
mismatches ORS is able to perform. However, the complex class definitions of
AKT mean that there is actually a significant difference in the AKT ontology
and ORS acceptable ontologies. Almost all these mismatches involved adding
to or altering slots on the classes. The only exceptions to this are two cases of
classes being assigned an additional superclass; in our restricted KIF, we only
allow each class to have a single superclass.
The only example of this outside the AKT ontology was a single occurrence in
the SUMO ontology. This involved quantification, which we do not allow in our
restricted KIF.
• Category 3e)
Mismatches in this category are not very common: just over 5% of all mis¬
matches. They are exclusively concerned with objects being removed from the
ontology. It is possible in a planning context to diagnose that certain ontological
objects should not be used in certain situations, but it is not possible to detect that
they should be removed from the ontology altogether. This could potentially lead
to problematic situations. Consider the situation in which a certain instantiation
of a relation is believed to be a precondition of a rule. If this relation is removed
from the ontology, it will not be possible to make a particular instantiation of it
true. Any rule for which it was an effect would have been altered so that it was
no longer an effect when the relation was removed. It would be possible to use
our techniques to determine that it was falsely believed to be an effect for each
of the rules for which this was previously believed to be the case. However, it
would not be possible to determine that it was erroneously believed to be a pre¬
condition: thus we would be in a situation where it was not possible to fulfil the
(supposed) preconditions of an action, and hence it may not be possible to form
a valid plan. This is a problem that is inherent in the approach we have taken to
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ontology refinement: discovering ontological mismatch through plan execution
failure.
• Category 4
There are few mismatches in this category: only 2.5% of the total number of
mismatches. These mostly occur in the PSL ontology, for which we do not have
a great deal of information about the ontology. We do not have access to both
versions of the ontology for PSL, only to a description of what changes have
been made, and thus it is not always possible to determine how these match
our refinements. These mismatches concern statements such as The definition
o/subtree_embed has been tightened. Without knowing what the definition of
subtree_embed is, or exactly how it has been tightened, it is not possible to tell
if this is something ORS could refine or not.
7.5 Comparison with Similar Work
An important part of the evaluation is showing not only that the system works and that
it performs useful tasks, but also placing the work in the context of other work in the
field.
Chapter 3 describe the fields that also deal with the problems of mismatch and refine¬
ment. In this section, we examine in more detail how our work relates to those fields.
7.5.1 Ontology Mismatch
The field in which we are working in this project is that of ontology mismatch. As
has been described in Section 3.1, this is a field in which much work has been done,
particularly in recent years.
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The techniques and systems described in Section 3.1 vary considerably, and in this
section we attempt to explain how our work relates to these various approaches.
There are a few main variables that can be seen in this field:
1. How much of the ontology is available when the mapping/merging/alignment
process is carried out? Is the whole of both (or all) of the relevant ontologies
available, or are there some inaccessible parts?
2. How highly structured is the ontology, and how much of this structure is con¬
sidered during mapping? Is the mapping/merging/alignment process concerned
only with the concepts (classes) and concept hierarchy of the ontology, or are
more complex ontological objects such as relations considered?
3. How similar are the ontologies assumed to be?
4. When is this mapping process to take place?
5. How much of the ontologies are mapped?
6. How much user interaction is required?
For ORS, the answers to these questions are:
1. We assume that only one of the ontologies is fully visible whilst this process is
taking place; very little is known about the other ontology;
2. We consider highly structured ontologies. Mapping concepts is a part of what
ORS is capable of, but it is also capable of mapping much more complex onto¬
logical objects: relations, functions and axioms;
3. We assume that the ontologies are already reasonably similar;
4. The mapping process takes place incrementally, whilst interaction is taking place;
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5. Only those parts of the ontologies that are directly involved in communication
failure are mapped;
6. The process is fully automated.
These questions reveal the main difference between our work and that of most of the
work in the field (for example, [Giunchiglia and Shvaiko, 2003, Giunchiglia et al.,
2005a, Doan et al., 2003, Campbell and Shapiro, 1998, Kalfoglou and Schorlemmer,
2003a, Wiesman et al., 2002]). For a more standard ontology mapping system, the
answers to the above questions would be:
1. Both (all) of the ontologies are assumed to be fully visible;
2. The process is entirely concerned with mapping concepts;
3. The ontologies do not need to be similar;
4. The mapping process takes place before interaction is commenced;
5. All of the ontologies are mapped;
6. The process is interactive.
The answers to these questions underline the difference in emphasis between our work
and more standard work on ontology mapping. Our work is both stronger and weaker:
it is effective even when there is very little information about what we are mapping
to (we have explained in previous chapters why we believe this to be important), but,
unlike standard ontology mapping, it can only work with ontologies that are already
fairly similar. Rather than being another version of ontology mapping, our work is, in
fact, orthogonal to standard ontology mapping. Much of ontology mapping could be
said to be concerned with the following questions:
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"given that we have a number of pre-defined ontologies that agents have access to,
how can we map between these ontologies so that agents that subscribe to different
pre-defined ontologies can communicate. "
Our work, on the other hand, attempts to answer the question:
"given that the pre-defined ontologies that agents have access to are not, in fact, static
but are developing and are being altered by individual users, how can we refine mis¬
matches that are found between these two similar but non-identical ontologies?".
Thus our approach to ontology refinement is complementary to the standard approach
to ontology mapping. We still require ontology mapping to bridge the gap between
ontologies that are significantly different. We add to the field of ontology mapping by
removing the implicit assumption that pre-defined ontologies are fixed and do not have
different versions. Our approach is necessarily rather different, because it is reasonable
to assume that pre-defined ontologies are available for analysis, and this does not have
to be done at run-time. However, this is not a reasonable assumptions for small changes
and updates that have been made by any number of people, and thus this must be done
during run-time. We therefore have constraints on us that are not present in standard
ontology mapping: user interaction is not practical; we cannot assume we can access
very much information about the other ontology; the PA cannot understand terms in
other agent's ontologies unless it can relate them to terms in its own.
The relationship between our work and standard ontology mapping is illustrated in
Figure 7.4.
Ontologies A1 - A3 represent versions of Ontology A that have been altered slightly,
as B1 and B2 do for Ontology B. Thus for an agent using Ontology A (with no vari¬
ations) to communicate with an agent Ontology B, ontology mapping would be re¬
quired; for an agent using Ontology A1 to communicate with an agent using Ontology
A2, dynamic ontology refinement would be needed; for an agent using Ontology A1
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Figure 7.4: Ontology Mapping and ORS
to communicate with an agent using Ontology Bl, both would be needed. In the latter
case, a complete mapping between Ontology A and Ontology B would be established
before any communication took place, and then, during runtime, dynamic ontology
refinement could be used to deal with the instances where the ontologies of the agents
do not actually conform to expectations, due to the variations between Ontology A and
Ontology A1 and between Ontology B and Ontology Bl.
Note that we do not claim that ORS can, as it stands, be used in tandem with any
particular ontology mapping system to perform such tasks; we are merely trying to
illustrate how the theories are related.
7.5.1.1 Determining Potential Mismatches
In terms of developing techniques to identify the causes of mismatches, our approach
of predefining the potential mismatch can be seen in other systems. These were out¬
lined in Section 3.1.5. Many of these are different to those that we have defined,
because the way in which they define their ontologies differ. For example, many of
Visser's potential mismatches [Visser et al., 1997] are based on the notion of ontolog-
ical objects being defined by a tuple < T,D,C >, where T is the term that is being
defined, D is what it is defined in terms of, and C is the ontology-concept description
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to be defined, in natural language. Since this is not how objects in our ontologies, nor
in most ontologies, are defined, the potential mismatches defined on this basis are not
relevant.
Many of the mismatches defined are, in fact, classes of mismatches rather than partic¬
ular mismatches: for example, those defined by Wiederhold [Wiederhold, 1997] and
Shaw and Gaines [Shaw and Gaines, 1989]. Additionally, almost all the ideas exam¬
ined were not implemented, but are merely theoretical description of how things might
change.
7.5.2 Belief Revision
The theory of belief revision is discussed in detail in Section 3.2. In this section, we
discuss its relevance to ORS. The central difference with the theory of ORS is that
belief revision is not concerned with representation issues but with the problem of
whether a particular fact is true or false in a particular situation. In belief revision it is
assumed that the signature is the same for all instantiated facts. It is thus not directly
relevant to those parts of the ORS concerned with signature change.
In addition to signature change, ORS is also concerned with some aspects of theory
revision: namely, changing action rules (including by precondition refinement) and re¬
moving facts from the ontology when they are discovered to be problem preconditions.
The first of these issues is again not particularly relevant to standard belief revision,
because refinements that alter rules are concerned with the structure of those rules, and
with the question of how the preconditions or effects of a rule can be changed so that
the rule is more correct. Even if we are facing a situation where we know that a rule is
incorrect, but do not know how we can alter it appropriately, we do not need to make
use of belief revision, because all we can do is mark this rule unusable. The difficult
issues of belief revision revolve around what effect removing a belief from a set of be-
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liefs has on that set, and how consistency can be maintained. However, action rules are
not interdependent in the way that beliefs in a belief set are, so this question is moot.
If the rule is marked unusable, then we may not be able to perform that action, but it
will not affect our beliefs in the other action rules. It is possible that a more complex
version of ORS might have some appreciation of the inter-relation of rules. A very
complex ontology might organise rules together into groups of rules that are somehow
similar, so that marking one as unusable could affect one's confidence in other similar
rules. However, no such complex interaction between rules exists in ORS, nor is it
seen as a priority to introduce such notions.
The second of these issues, that of removing facts from the ontology, is more directly
relevant to belief revision. ORS currently takes a naive approach to this by simply
removing the offending fact. However, belief revision could be used to find a more
sophisticated approach to this problem. This could become relevant if agents negoti¬
ated over which was to change its ontology, rather than the PA always taking this upon
itself (see Section 8.4.2). There is, however, a significant difference in the aims of
belief revision and the aims of the ORS. Belief revision is concerned only with main¬
taining a consistent knowledge base. ORS, on the other hand, not only has to maintain
a consistent knowledge base (or theory of the ontology), but also attempts to make this
knowledge base consistent with respect to the knowledge of other agents. Some kind
of belief revision could prove useful as an aspect of the negotiation process. An agent's
willingness to remove a fact from its ontology on the recommendation of another agent
could depend on what the epistemic entrenchment of that belief is, and how integral
that belief is to the ontology: how many other facts would be affected if it were re¬
moved. At the moment, there is no interdependency of beliefs within the ontology;
they are all considered to be independent entities. However, if a more complex view of
beliefs were incorporated into the ontology, then this would need to be managed using
some kind of belief revision.
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Whilst it seems that belief revision could be of some use in a more advanced version
of ORS, it is clear that the theory behind ORS is of an essentially different nature to
that of belief revision.
7.5.3 Theory Change
Some of the ideas discussed in Section 3.3 provide an interesting comparison to our
work. The work done on the development of mathematical theories by Lakatos [Lakatos,
1976] and Hayes-Roth [Hayes-Roth, 1983] is concerned with altering theories in the
light of counter-examples. For example, this may be by specifically excluding the
counter-example from the theory, by generalising the theory so that the counter-example
no longer refutes it, or perhaps by abandoning the theory altogether. These attempts to
alter theories have some relevance to the need in ORS to alter rules after their failure.
Lakatos's surrender (abandoning a conjecture in light of counter-examples) is similar
to what is done in ORS when a rule fails in a way that defeats diagnosis: it is simply
marked as unusable. Some of the ways in which ORS alters preconditions, such as pre¬
condition anti-abstraction, could be viewed as instances of Lakatos's monster-barring
(modifying a definition to exclude counter-examples), Lakatos's lemma incorporation
(adding a precondition) and Hayes-Roth's exclusion (barring the theory from applying
to the current situation). Hayes-Roth's retraction (restricting a theory's predications to
be consistent with observations) is similar to ORS altering the effects of an action after
it has been identified by the Shapiro algorithm as a cause of failure. One way in which
ORS might be improved is to increase its ability to diagnose and refine faulty rules,
in which case closer investigation of these techniques might be useful in considering
more complex ways in which rules might alter. However, not all of the techniques
would apply, because both Lakatos and Hayes-Roth are considering the more general
case of theory change rather than specifically action-rule change. In addition, these
approaches do not deal with the problem of signature change.
262 Chapter 7. Results and Evaluation
The machine learning approaches described in Section 3.3.3 are rather different to the
approach taken by ORS due to the different aims of the environment in which they are
learning. The emphasis is generally on learning over a large set of training examples,
and thus they are not directly relevant to the situation we are investigating, where
changes must be immediately implemented when failure is encountered. The situation
would be more similar to that of standard machine learning if we kept some kind of
past history 8.4.1 of changes that had been implemented before, but nevertheless the
approach taken to using these examples to derive useful information about a current
situation would necessarily be rather different to that of standard machine learning
techniques.
The explanation-based learning approach is more similar to our approach, because
EBL machines can create justified generalisations from single training instances [Ell-
man, 1989]. They also tend to depend, to some extent, on background knowledge of
the domain under study, just as ORS depends on a reasonable, though not exact, under¬
standing of mismatched ontologies. The main difference between EBL machines and
ORS is that EBL machines, like many methods of theory change, is concerned with
how explanations can be altered to converge to some better explanation; essentially
this is equivalent to investigating how rules can be altered to better reflect how services
are performed. This is certainly quite close to some aspects of ORS, but again does
not address the issues of signature refinement. As with Lakatos's and Hayes-Roth's
work, if ORS's approach to fixing faulty rules was made more sophisticated, then EBL
techniques should be explored more carefully.
Some of the approaches to correcting faulty formulae described in Section 3.3.4 are
again similar to some aspects of ORS. For example, the idea of adding a condition
so that a faulty formula becomes reliable in a more restricted situation is similar to
precondition anti-abstraction. However, the focus is again on how to alter theories to
be correct, and does not address the signature alteration part of ORS. The work on
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program debugging and repair, described in Section 3.3.5, is again different in empha¬
sis. The aim is to create a program that is correct rather than to deal with matching
two different representations. The point is to determine what the overall effect of a
program is, rather than on whether specific objects within the program, such as pred¬
icates, are correctly represented. Thus it is loosely relevant to those changes in ORS
that alter rules, but not to those that alter the signature. Additionally, the environment
in which these operations take place, namely the programming language of choice,
mean that the demands and assumptions are rather different to those that can be made
for a first-order ontology.
7.5.4 Fault-Catalogue and Model-Based Diagnosis
The work on diagnosis in these fields constitutes an interesting comparison to our own
diagnostic work. However, there are some key differences between them that make the
majority of work in fault-catalogue and model-diagnosis inapplicable in our situation.
A key difference is that the finding of faults is far more focused in ORS; the agent
communication gives information that considerably narrows down the search and, in
many cases, immediately identifies the offending ontological object. There is therefore
no need to compile conflict sets that list all the possible combinations of faults, which is
the key mechanism of diagnosis in these fields. However, in ORS we are not allowing
the full possibility of multiple faults. We are not using what would be termed in these
fields as the single fault assumption (i.e., that the problem is caused by a single fault)
because we allow the possibility of the problem being caused by multiple faults that can
be resolved serially, but we do rule out the possibility of the problem being caused by
multiple faults that interact with one another. We intend, at a later stage, to incorporate
this ability into the system. This would significantly complicate the diagnostic process
and creating conflict sets could then become a useful approach. It seems likely that it
would be rather difficult to calculate these conflict sets, especially if no limit was placed
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on the number of ontological objects that could be interacting. Another difference is
that these fields are concerned with internal inconsistency in a system, whereas we are
interested in differences between two distinct representations.
There is much more focus on how to find the causes of the problem than on how to
fix them, which is often left for the user to determine [Scholbach and Cornet, 2003].
However, in ORS, the finding of the offending ontological object and the determin¬
ing of the way in which it offends is part of the same process. In a few cases it is
only possible to determine with what object the fault lies, and not how to resolve it,
but in such cases the user is not involved and the fault is 'repaired' by removing the
object from the ontology. Additionally, much of this work is concerned with physical
systems, and the components that are considered as potential problems are physical
components. Thus the narrowing down of the error requires experimentation on the
part of the user. In our system, this narrowing down is done partially through obser¬
vation of past interaction and reasoning about ontological differences by the PA, and
partly through further interaction with relevant agents. Hence, although some kind of
focusing process is necessary in both approaches, the mechanisms are rather different.
In general, the diagnosis in these fields tends to be interactive, and the automation is
focused on making it easier for a user to discover and fix problems. However, because
ORS is concerned with agent interaction, it is essential that both the diagnosis and the
repair of faults is fully automated; the agents must be able to decide for themselves
how to proceed when faults and mismatches are encountered.
It seems initially that this project more closely resembles fault-catalogue diagnosis,
because diagnosis is based on a list of potential mismatches. However, the assump¬
tion that the ontologies of the agents are the same, and thus mismatches need only be
searched for if problems unexpectedly occur, means that the ontology of the PA can
be considered to be a model of the ontologies of the other agents, and the problem
of determining how the ontologies are mismatched is then equivalent to the problem
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of determining how the 'system' (the ontology of the other agent) differs from the
'model' (the PA's ontology). The predefined potential mismatches can then be seen
as a way in which the diagnostic processes is guided through the possible mismatches
between the model and the reality.
7.6 Summary
We believe that ORS successfully performs refinements that are useful in a multi-
agent system where agents do not always have identical ontologies. In this section,
we have demonstrated the grounds for such a belief, and given statistics that illustrate
the performance of ORS against real ontology mismatches. These results indicate that
ORS is already capable of performing well in the domain for which it is designed
and, following suggestions in this chapter and the following one, could be extended to
perform even more successfully. The results of this chapter indicate that the techniques
embodied by ORS could be the foundation of a system that can perform important
tasks in a real world situation, for which there are currently significant gaps: namely,
allowing agents with non-identical ontologies to interact successfully in a large and
complex multi-agent system, such as the Semantic Web.
We believe that we have thereby fulfilled the three aims of the project, outlined at
the beginning of this chapter and in Chapter 1, by providing a framework for agents to
diagnose ontological mismatches, integrating this within a fully automated system, and
evaluating the usefulness of this against real-world examples of ontology mismatch.
We have thus demonstrated the validity of our hypothesis: that using dynamic ontology
refinement to locate and correct ontological mismatches between agents can enable




The large and complex field in which we are basing our research could generate several
further projects as extensions to the work we have done thus far. Not only has our
research solved an interesting subset of the problem at hand, it has also raised many
ideas about how this could be applicable to a wider field. As has been discussed in
previous chapters, we had to limit the scope of what could have been an open-ended
project in order to produce valid results in the timescale. This means that there are
many avenues for further work: relaxing these constraints and exploring how the work
could be developed in less constrained domains.
An obvious way for the system to be developed would be in ways that would make it
more immediately usable on the Semantic Web. The system is currently not suitable
for use on the Semantic Web, partly due to these limitations of scope, and partly due to
the development being focused on first-order logic rather than on a Description Logic
based representation, such as OWL, which is far more commonly used on the Semantic
Web.
In this chapter we discuss the main ways in which the system would need to be devel¬
oped to function on the Semantic Web. In addition, we discuss other ways in which we
would like to extend the system beyond its original constraints.
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8.1 Adapting to Different Representations
One of the most obvious limitations of the system is that it is restricted to a specific type
of ontological representation, one that we cannot expect that any external agents will
be using. It would seem sensible to extend the system to make it compatible with full
KIF, as this would be a relatively small step from the current system and would make
the system usable in a real-world situation. However, if the system is to operate on
the Semantic Web, working with full KIF is of limited usefulness; much more useful
would be to adapt it to work with OWL. We discuss these two possibilities below.
8.1.1 Extending ORS to Full KIF
This would involve the need to allow for more complex class definitions and to allow
for quantification, and would require extensions to the diagnosis techniques. It is not
immediately clear how complex details about class definitions could be deduced from
the agent interaction. Currently, we only need to find the name of the class and then
put a direct question to the agent as to the superclass. Further information may require
the revealing of larger sections of the ontology, such as we do not permit in ORS. It
is also not obvious how information about quantification could be ascertained through
agent querying, unless direct questioning about the quantification of preconditions of
actions was permitted. Further research would be necessary to determine the effects
on plan execution failure of allowing quantification, and how it could be diagnosed as
the cause of plan execution failure.
If we allowed these two aspects of KIF to be included in ORS ontologies, there would
also need to be some additional work for the translation system. The class definitions
in full KIF are much more complex than those in PDDL, and we would have to con¬
sider how these could be represented in PDDL, or whether they could legitimately be
ignored in the PDDL files. If we allow quantification over infinite domains, we would
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need to devise a method of capturing a finite representation of this in the PDDL files;
this would probably involve much loss of expressivity and lead to PDDL files that
could not produce plans that would be valid with respect to the KIF ontology. Alterna¬
tively, we could use a first-order planner, but this could introduce considerable search
problems.
Once the above translation issues have been considered, it would certainly be possible
to get ORS to work with ontologies in full KIF, but it is uncertain how good ORS would
be at diagnosing some of the mismatches that could occur within these extended parts
of the ontology.
8.1.2 Adaptation to OWL
An important way in which the domain of ORS could be extended is to adapt it to dif¬
ferent ontological representations. The most obvious representations to choose would
be Description Logic based representations such as OWL and the DAML family of
languages, since these are very common forms of agent languages and are particularly
dominant in current research on the Semantic Web.
Re-implementing ORS so that it works with different ontological representations will
require some amount of effort. The central functionality of ORS — diagnosis and re¬
finement — is heavily dependent on the representation of the ontology. Some work
will be required to develop diagnostic algorithms that are appropriate for a new repre¬
sentation, and these will be based on analysis of what kinds of mismatches are possible
in such a representation, which may differ from the mismatches that are possible in re¬
stricted KIF. Additionally, a new translation process will be required to create PDDL
and Prolog files from this new representation. The planning system should be un¬
affected by a change in representation, as long as it is possible to form appropriate
PDDL files from the representation. The agent communication system would also be
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largely unaffected by such a change, except that the messages passed would be in a
new representation.
Nevertheless, although there would be many technical demands in making this change,
the theory behind ORS is adaptable to any representation, and the changes would be
mostly of an implementational nature. Clearly, the more different to KIF the new
representation, the more work would be required to adapt the system. However, OWL
has many similarities with KEF, and much of the existing theory would still apply.
8.1.2.1 Applying the Current Refinements to OWL Ontologies
In this section, we concentrate on the adaptation to OWL-DL, rather than OWL-lite
or OWL-full. OWL-DL has been designed with a particularly focus on tractability,
and is therefore less expressive than a full-first order representation. One of these lim¬
itations concerns relations. KIF relations and functions are equivalent to OWL-DL
relations; however, OWL-DL relations are always binary, which means that the appli¬
cations of propositional refinement (altering the arity of a relation or function) would
be much more limited. In addition, unary relations, called concepts, can be defined.
It would still be possible in theory to turn a concept into a relation and vice versa,
though whether this would ever be a useful thing to do is not certain. Since classes
of arguments in relations is still important, domain refinement (altering the class of
an argument) would be largely unaffected, as would switching arguments. Predicate
refinement (altering the class of a relation or function) would also be possible. The
implementation of this would be rather different, and rather more natural than the way
this is done for KIF ontologies by ORS, since this could be handled by the subProp-
ertyOf predicate, which describes hierarchies between relations, rather than by using
a meta-ontology. The most difficult refinements to mirror in OWL-DL would be those
concerning action rules. As mentioned in Section 2.3.1, OWL-DL is not directly capa¬
ble of describing services; this is done by OWL-S. However, the way in which services
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are described in OWL-S is very different from the inference rule style that we have
adopted in KIF. It is not possible to express preconditions and effects with OWL-S, so
tags or place-holders are used instead. Thus the diagnostic and refinement rules deal¬
ing with incorrect service descriptions would be very different to the current method
of dealing with action rules in ORS.
8.2 Improving the Agent Communication System
Currently, we believe that the agent communication system in ORS is sufficiently so¬
phisticated for the needs of ORS. However, if ORS is to be extended and used on the
Semantic Web this will cease to be the case, and hence a good preliminary to this
process is to improve the agent communication system. The most obvious way to do
this is to make the system FIPA compliant. This would also have the desirable effect
of bringing ORS more in line with standard agent technology; it would then be able
to communicate with any FIPA-compliant agent. Compliance with a standard agent
protocol is essential if we wish to use this system for agents not designed by us, and
thus is essential for practical application.
Adding such sophistication would not be particularly difficult and would not affect
any part of the system except the agent communication system. It might be possible to
make use of this additional information in the diagnostic system, since the additional
number of performatives provide more information than is provided using more simple
performatives: for example, the FIPA performative refuse (see Table 8.1) could be
used to indicate that the service-providing agent was either incapable of performing
that action, or perhaps was unwilling to divulge confidential information. However,
deriving useful information from this would be an optional addition to the diagnostic
system rather than an essential alteration.
The way in which the existing simple performatives in the ORS agent communica-
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tion system correspond to the more complex performatives of FIPA is illustrated in
Table 8.1. This shows that a large number of the FIPA performatives do not have
any parallel in the ORS performatives, and are not required for the simple agent in¬
teraction performed by ORS. This would not be a problem if we were making ORS
FIPA-compliant; it could be FIPA-compatible without itself making use of all of the
FIPA performatives. The ORS performative request is directly comparable with the
FIPA performative request. However, the ORS performative question is compatible
with both the FIPA performatives query-if and query-ref. Query-if allows an agent
to ask another whether or not some specific statement is true or not, whereas query-
ref is used by an agent to determine a specific value for an expression. There would
thus need to be a distinction made between these two situations in order to make ORS
FIPA-compatible. Likewise, the ORS performative reply is comparable with several
FIPA performatives. These situations would need to be distinguished in order to make
ORS FIPA-compatible. All of these situations already occur in ORS and distinguishing
between them would not be difficult; in fact, it may add to the clarity of the system.
A very useful addition to the performatives would be to provide a response that indi¬
cates a signature mismatch. Currently, the PA will reply no to a query if it is not able
to instantiate the query appropriately. This might be because its instantiations of that
predicate conform to a different signature to the query, or it might simply be that it has
no relevant information about that query. For example, if the query is:
(Money PA ?Amount Dollars)
then the service-providing agent is asking the PA to return the amount of dollars it has.
The PA will reply no to this question if there is a signature mismatch: perhaps the PA
has information in the following form:
(Money PA 100), or
(Dollars PA 100).
The PA will also reply no if this query matches the signature of service providing
agent's ontology, but nevertheless the PA has no appropriate instantiation: perhaps the
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PA's only instantiation is:
(Money PA 100 Sterling).
For refinement purposes, it would be useful to distinguish between these two situations.
Possibly the FIPA not-understand (see Table 8.1) could be used for this purpose.
We could also create agents that could provide more information about their ontolo¬
gies: for example, revealing entire action rules. However, for reasons discussed in
Section 6.2, we believe that it would be counter-productive to add this functionality. It
would make it much easier for ORS to accurately diagnose mismatches, but it would
make it unusable in any but purposely designed agent systems and additionally could
not be made FIPA compliant, as there are not FIPA performatives that cover this situa¬
tion.
8.3 Retaining Different Versions of Ontologies
One potentially useful addition to ORS would be the ability to keep several different
versions of ontologies: refinements are not performed to a central ontology, but instead
copies of the original ontologies are made and refinements are performed on these.
There is some justification for such an approach: we cannot always know whether we
are correctly diagnosing a mismatch with respect to the ontology of the agent we are
interacting with and, even if we are, we cannot be sure that this other agent has an on¬
tology that agrees with that of other agents. Therefore, creating a copy of the ontology
to which this refinement is performed and keeping a copy to which it is not performed
would allow us to keep our options open as to whether this refinement should be per¬
formed or not.
It would be very easy to create different versions of ontologies by making copies of the
original ontology every time a refinement was performed. We would need to decide
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how far this process should be taken. There are several ways in which this could be
done:
1. A new ontology is created every time we perform a refinement, which would re¬
sult in many ontologies each differing from the original ontology in one specific
way;
2. A single copy of the ontology is created, to which all refinements are performed;
3. A new copy of the ontology is created each time a refinement is performed, but
this is a copy not of the original ontology, so that the new copy would contain
only the most recent refinement, but of the refined ontology, so that the cumu¬
lative effects of the refinements could be seen. For example, if the following
series of refinements were performed: precondition anti-abstraction, domain ab¬
straction, adding a class, we would afterwards have four ontologies: the original
ontology, a copy on which precondition anti-abstraction had been performed,
a copy on which precondition anti-abstraction and domain abstraction had been
performed, and a copy on which all three of the refinements had been performed.
However, this does not seem a very sensible approach, as the order of the refine¬
ments is arbitrary;
4. Every time a refinement is performed, a copy of every existing ontology is taken,
and the refinement is performed to each of these. Thus there would be a copy of
the original ontology to which it was performed, there would also be a copy of
every version of the ontology to which only one refinement had been performed
to which the new refinement would be performed, and so on. However, this
would lead to a combinatorial explosion of the number of ontologies.
5. A new ontology is created for each agent with which the PA interacts. This
would have the advantage of disposing of the assumption that there is some
more correct ontology to which we can tend towards, thereby implying that our
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communication with all agents is likely to improve if we refine our ontology
to match a specific agent. Instead, this allows us to assume that agents have
different ontologies, and that there is no advantage in trying to create a better
ontology, but rather we create many ontologies that allow us to deal appropriately
with each agent. Whether we wish to assume that all agents are similar or that
all agents are different would depend on the circumstances. If we assume that all
agents are different when they are in fact similar, we are creating extra work for
the PA, because it will have to repeat the same refinement many times. However,
this is not nearly such a severe problem as would be found in option 4;
6. Every time the diagnosis was uncertain, the corresponding refinement could be
performed to one version of the ontology but not to another, or if there were a
wider choice, each choice could be performed on a given ontology.
The first option would make it easiest to unwind refinements if they later appeared
to be inadvisable. However, it would mean that no attention would be given to the
cumulative effects of refinements. ORS currently only performs refinements individu¬
ally; however, by performing many individual refinements, a situation may be reached
where an ontological object differs in more than one way from its original version.
Such situations could not be reflected in this option. If, for example, propositional
anti-abstraction had been performed on a predicate, and then domain abstraction, the
PA could chose to use either the original predicate, or the version with an additional
argument, or the version with a different class of argument, depending on what was
appropriate for the agent with which it was currently communicating. However, it
would not be able to use a version of the predicate that had an additional argument and
a different class for one of the arguments, since these refinements would have been
performed separately.
If the same situation occurred when the second option had been chosen, the PA would
be able to use a version of the predicate that had both an additional argument and a
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different class for one of the arguments, or use the original version of the predicate to
which neither of the refinements had been performed. It would not be able to use a
version of the predicate to which only one refinement had been performed.
If this situation occurred in the third option, the PA would be able to use a version
of the predicate to which both refinements had been performed, or only the first, or
neither. It would not be possible to use a version to which only the second refinement
had been performed.
The fourth option provides the most flexible approach for the PA: any version of the
predicate that is possible under any combination of the performed refinements would
be available. This is, therefore, perhaps the best option. The drawback of this is that it
could lead to the creation of vast numbers of ontologies, which would be expensive to
store and update. Every time a mismatch was diagnosed, it would need to be performed
to several ontologies, which would become increasingly inconvenient as the number
of ontologies increased.
The fifth option could provide some element of protection against choosing the incor¬
rect refinement, as the correct refinement would always have been performed on one
ontology, and also would keep the number of total ontologies lower than some of the
other options. However, this is only an attempt to deal with the problem that diagnosis
and refinement are not always certain, and does not deal with the question of whether
the PA ought to trust the ontology of the other agent as being more reliable than its
own.
Whenever actions are performed, the world state has been changed, and this needs to
be reflected in every ontology that exists. After a plan action has been successfully
performed, its effects change the facts in the domain. Since these are part of the on¬
tology, the ontology must be updated. Every possible world (all the ontologies) must
reflect this way in which the world has changed. This would lead to another disad-
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vantage if many versions of the ontology were kept: updating the state would become
increasingly onerous.
Another method of retaining the ability to undo undesirable refinements is the method
currently employed by the system: simply keeping a list of the refinements that have
been performed, so that their inverses can be performed if necessary. This, however,
is not a complete solution to the problem. Often, applying refinements to the ontology
involves removing information: propositional abstraction involves removing an argu¬
ment from a predicate definition and all its instantiations; domain abstraction involves
changing the class of an argument to a different one, and hence uninstantiating this
argument for all occurrences of this predicate, and allowing them to be reinstantiated
appropriately. Thus it is not always possible to return to the original ontology simply
by performing the inverse refinement; keeping different versions of the ontology pro¬
vides a more complete solution to the problem. In order to determine which of the
above options would be preferable, further research needs to be done into the precise
demands of the situation.
One way in which it would be possible to keep the potential for many different versions
of the ontology without having to store so much information would be to extend this
idea. A more detailed record could be kept of what changes had been made to the
ontology, so that it would be easier to rewind it if necessary. Thus, not only would
information be saved stating that propositional abstraction had been applied, but also
what details of all the information that had been removed from the ontology in applying
this refinement.
8.4 Relaxing the Constraints
Another category of changes that could be made to the system are those that are not
directly necessary for it to be used on the Semantic Web, but would improve the per-
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formance of ORS.
8.4.1 Using Previous History
In the current system, a record is kept of what refinements have been performed. How¬
ever, this is done only so that the user can observe what changes have been made to the
ontology; it is not used by the diagnostic process.
An interesting extension to ORS would be to investigate how it could use this previous
history in the diagnosis process. For example, it could be used as supporting evidence
when deciding whether to make an uncertain diagnosis. Section 7.3.2.1 discusses how
we do not diagnose domain anti-abstraction in ORS, because we don't have enough
evidence to suppose that this is a better diagnosis than diagnosing incorrect instantia¬
tion with no signature mismatch. However, if we had access to more detailed records
of previous mismatches, we could see how many times this particular situation had oc¬
curred. If there were several cases where this predicate had caused failure, and in every
case the particular instantiation involved a mismatch where the class of one of the ar¬
guments was a subclass of the expected class, and this subclass was always the same
subclass, we might then suppose that domain anti-abstraction was the more plausible
diagnosis.
We could also use this method to accumulate evidence for the other uncertain diag¬
nosis: precondition anti-abstraction. In this case, for reasons discussed in Section
7.3.2.1, we do diagnose precondition anti-abstraction even though we cannot be sure
this is correct (this diagnosis is never certain because it may be that there is an unknown
connection between the surprising question and one of the preconditions). If informa¬
tion about past occurrences of precondition anti-abstraction was stored, it would be
possible to compare the predicate of the surprising question with the predicate in the
preconditions. If we had many cases of a particular surprising question always appear-
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ing when a particular predicate was a member of the preconditions, and additionally
this precondition predicate never appeared in any questions, we may eventually have
enough evidence to conclude that some equivalence between these two predicates was
likely.
In the current system, these are the only two situations in which we would need to
rely on previous history, since the other diagnoses are certain. However, if we were
to extend the system to deal with multiple mismatches, this kind of information would
become much more important.
Previous history could also be used in detecting anomalous agents; this is discussed in
Section 8.4.3.
8.4.2 Negotiating about Refinements
In ORS, there is no negotiation about which agent is to refine its ontology: the PA
will always refine its ontology and the service-providing agent will be unaware and
unconcerned about the refinements that the PA is making to its ontology. This creates
a pattern of refinement which seems to imply that the service-providing agent has an
ontology that is somehow objectively better than the ontology of the PA, and that the
only desirable way that these two ontologies can be made compatible is through the
PA aping the service-providing agent.
We have justified this approach in ORS through appeal to the situation in which re¬
finement is being performed: the PA wants the service-providing agent to perform an
action for it, and is thus prepared to do whatever is necessary to ensure this happens,
whereas the service-providing agent is unconcerned whether the action is performed
or not, and thus will not make any effort to ensure it can be. Moreover, we believe that
it is justified to limit the scope of the project, so that it is coherent with the time-scale,
and thus we have chosen a simple approach to this problem.
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However, in reality most situations in agent-communication systems, and especially
those using peer-to-peer architecture, do not conform to this simplistic view of 'knowl¬
edgeable' agents and 'ignorant' agents. Rather, each agent is treated as an equal citizen
of the agent communication system. It may be that one agent has a more up-to-date
or more relevant version of the information than another agent, but this must be es¬
tablished through negotiation between the agents, and cannot be determined merely
through examination of their relative positions. If an agent wishes it to be established
that it has better information than another agent, it must present evidence for this. The
other agent is then not forced to accept the advice of the former agent, even if it cannot
offer evidence that its version is likely to be better. It may be that neither agent can
persuade the other to adapt their ontology, and then communication will fail. If this
happens, an agent that was initially unwilling to compromise, if it has a vested interest
in producing a positive outcome from the communication, may become willing. This
might happen in the situation encountered within the ORS: where the agent wishes
a service to be provided by the other agent. In the current system, service-providing
agents do not have any incentive to alter their ontologies to assist PAs. However, in¬
centives could be introduced. Perhaps agents receive payment for performing services,
and would therefore be willing to refine their ontologies to be able to perform them.
Alternatively, it might be standard, or even enforced, behaviour in a service-providing
agent that it should make some effort to comply with the demands of PAs by refining its
ontology where necessary. This would be especially likely if payment were involved
as not only, as mentioned above, would it benefit from performing the service, but also
it would be more attractive as an agent for performing this service as opposed to other
agents with the same capability, because it makes it easy for the PA to deal with it. As
in human interaction, helpful service-providing agents would naturally be preferred
over unhelpful agents.
In order to determine whether it was prepared to refine a particular part of its ontology,
agents might have some kind of mark-up in their ontology concerning their willingness
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to compromise over certain parts of the ontology. If it is a service-providing agent, it
may be the authority on the circumstances in which an action can be performed. It
would thus not be willing to change its opinion on this even to accommodate a fee-
paying agent, because it has more faith in its opinion than that of a customer agent.
If, for example, it refines its relevant action rule to accommodate a customer agent,
it may result in a rule that does not describe the situation in which the action can be
performed, and it will no longer be able to provide the service. Agents might also have
particular facts on which they consider themselves to be the best authority, or more
generally, predicates which they are unwilling to refine. This is related to the issue of
epistemic entrenchment, discussed in Section 3.2.2.
So far, we have discussed the possibility of agents negotiating over which one of them
is willing to be the one to refine its ontology. Another possibility is that they both refine
their ontologies towards some middle point. This sort of negotiation would be rather
more complicated. An agent who has detected a mismatch may begin the negotiations
by announcing that it is unwilling to fully refine its ontology to cover this mismatch,
but that it is prepared to refine it to a certain point, which would be stated. The other
agent can then work out if it is willing to refine its ontology to this middle point and,
if not, find some point it is willing to refine its ontology to and present this to the
other agent. This process would terminate if they could find a common point that they
are both prepared to meet, or if they have suggested and had rejected all the middle
ground they are prepared to reach. For many refinements, this kind of negotiation
would not be necessary. For example, if one agent has a binary predicate and the other
a ternary, then either the first performs propositional anti-abstraction or the second
performs propositional abstraction; there is no way they can find any middle ground
between these two cases. However, for some refinements this might be possible: for
example, if one agent had a binary predicate and the other had a 4-arity predicate, they
might both agree to refine their ontologies to reach a ternary predicate. This method
of negotiation would also be more relevant if the system were capable of dealing with
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multiple refinements, as discussed in Section 8.4.4; this may lead to more complex
situations in which there were many ways in which refinement could be done, and thus
negotiation is more necessary and more difficult.
The major limitation of this approach is that it could only work when all of the agents
involved were using ORS or a single system. Assuming that all agents one encounters
have access to ORS severely limits its applicability. We want agents to be able to
make use of ORS in a large and complex environment, where they cannot make many
assumptions or force restrictions on the agents that they encounter. One approach to
this would be to equip agents with the ability to negotiate over refinement with other
agents, and to use this ability when they encounter agents that can also perform this,
which would be agents that have access to this updated version of ORS. When they
encounter agents that do not have this ability, they would then be able to refine their
ontologies without negotiation.
8.4.3 Finding Anomalous Agents
A useful addition to ORS would be the ability to differentiate to some degree as to
which agent it is desirable to interact with. Currently in ORS, if there is more than one
agent that can perform a task, it chooses the agent merely on the basis of which was
listed first in the meta-ontology. However, if many plans were executed in the same
domain, thus requiring frequent interactions with the same agents, it would be worth
differentiating between agents in a more intelligent fashion.
A simple approach would be to look back over past interactions with that agent and
examine how many times the agent had successfully performed the action versus how
many times it had failed, and, when it did perform it successfully, how many refine¬
ments were necessary to allow this. Statistics could be built up for each agent, and
these could be compared to see which the PA should chose to interact with. If a service-
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providing agent refused to perform actions under circumstances in which other agents
would perform that service, this may also indicate that that agent should be avoided.
A more complex approach would be to observe the refinements that had been per¬
formed in response to an agent, and to examine whether any of these had had to be
undone at a later point during communication with another agent. It might be that
some agents are very similar to the PA and some are rather different. At least in the
short term, it is in the PA's interests to interact with the agents that are more similar;
however, if this restricted the PA to a small subset of agents, it might ultimately be
worthwhile trying to attempt to interact with the majority of agents that are not so sim¬
ilar to the PA. If the PA refines an ontological object to match that of a first agent, and
then refines it back to its original state to match that of a second agent, this implies that
this part of the second agent's ontology is closer to the PA's ontology than first agent's
is. If this happens repeatedly, it is clearly easier for the PA to deal with the second
agent where possible, and avoid all unnecessary interaction with the first agent. Ad¬
ditionally, if agents charge more for their services than other agents providing similar
services, this may be a cause to avoid them.
8.4.4 Dealing with Compound Mismatches
One obvious limitation of ORS is that it can only deal with refinements one at a time:
if an ontological object differs in two ways, then one way is identified first and refined
and then, when the updated object still leads to plan execution failure, the other mis¬
match is identified and refined. We assume that treating the mismatches as individuals
will not affect our ability to diagnose and refine them, and we assume this because it
restricts the complexity of the situation with which ORS has to deal. However, this is
not necessarily a valid assumption.
A simple example of how a compound mismatch would confuse diagnosis is the case of
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predicate that had had the class of an argument changed to a superclass, and had a new
argument added; thus the correct refinement would be domain abstraction and propo-
sitional anti-abstraction. The diagnostic algorithm checks first to see if mismatched
predicates with the same name have the same arity, and if not, diagnoses propositional
refinement. However, in order to fully diagnose how this should be refined, the position
of the extra argument needs to be identified, and this is done by matching the classes
of the arguments of the two predicates and finding the position of the unmatched argu¬
ment. The fact that the classes would not match would cause this process to fail. We
can see in this situation that additions that could be made to the diagnostic algorithm
might help. For example, if the classes do not match properly, the diagnostic algo¬
rithm could begin to look for subclass relations between them, and thus diagnose the
compound mismatch appropriately.
In order to equip ORS to deal with compound mismatches, research would need to
be done into exactly what sort of combinations of mismatches we might expect, and
how these could be identified. Theoretically, there is no limit on the number of com¬
binations we could encounter, because each type of mismatch could be applied many
times. This number would only be restricted by the size of the ontology. It would thus
be very difficult to identify all the potential mismatches, and may be extremely hard
or, in some cases, impossible to diagnose which was being encountered.
If the history of refinement and attempting refinement was available, then it might be
possible to revisit places where diagnosis had been impossible after further refinements
had been performed. It might be that this problem was impossible to diagnose because
it was due to some kind of complex mismatch, but that later refinement had caused
some part of that complex mismatch to be automatically refined, leaving a similar mis¬
match that could now be diagnosed, thus reducing a problem of compound mismatch
to one of simple mismatch.
It seems clear that it would not be possible to extend ORS so that it could infallibly
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diagnose and refine every possible combination of mismatches. However, it seems
equally clear that it would be possible to extend the functionality of ORS to be able
to diagnose and refine some mismatch combinations, and that this functionality could
be extremely useful. Research could be done to determine what the most common
kinds of compound mismatches would be, and diagnostic algorithms for those could
be developed where this was possible.
8.4.5 Complex Planning
Currently, ORS deals only with the linear plans produced by Metric-FF. However, there
has been much work in the field of planning to produce planners that can produce more
complex plans (see Section 2.6). It may be useful to take advantage of this ability
within ORS.
Some forms of planning, such as conditional planning, partial-order planning or hier¬
archical planning, would allow for situations in which the failure of an action to be
performed would not inevitably lead to the abandonment of the entire plan, and thus to
refinement and replanning. Instead, some alternative plan could be followed or devel¬
oped from the point at which failure occurred, without the need to stop the process and
begin again, as happens currently in ORS. However, it is unclear quite how much of
an advantage this would be. Is the aim of ORS to bring two ontologies closer together,
or is it to facilitate the achievement of goals? If we believe the former, then ontologi-
cal mismatch should always be investigated, diagnosed and refined, even if it may be
possible to reach the goal without doing this. However, the purpose of the system may
be regarded not as simply converging differing ontologies, but as facilitating agents to
reach their goals by refining their ontologies where necessary, and from this point of
view ontological mismatches can be ignored if there are alternative ways to reach the
goal. This latter philosophy may be more appropriate for a Semantic Web scenario,
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where an agent may encounter many hundreds of other agents, who may all have on¬
tologies that differ in some regard. Thus aligning the ontologies in general becomes an
unreasonable goal; the focus must be on refining ontologies only as a means to facil¬
itate problematic communication. In the latter case, more complex forms of planning
could be useful, as they may reduce the necessity of ontology refinement.
However, if introducing complex planning could reduce the need for ontology refine¬
ment, it would not greatly alter the way in which ontology refinement was done when
it was necessary. If, for example, all the possible routes in a partial-order plan had
been explored, and each option ended in failure, then ontology refinement would be
performed just as is currently done in the system, and planning would begin again with
the new ontology. This change would clearly affect the planning system, and may re¬
quire some alteration in the plan execution ability of the PA, but it need not affect the
diagnostic and refinement aspects of the system. There would be scope for some extra
complexity. For example, some additional diagnostic information could be gleaned
from knowledge of other potential branches of a plan that failed, and perhaps some
ability to decide which branch to try to repair if all of them fails should be added in.
However, this would not be necessary to allow more complex planning, it merely pro¬
vides a means of making the best possible use of the information complex planning
would provide.
8.4.6 E-institutions
Another approach to agent communication that we have investigated is the possibility
of conducting it within the electronic institution framework [Sierra et ah, 1998,Vascon-
celos, 2002,Esteva et ah, 2001], E-institutions control agent interactions by providing
a framework in which the interactions occur. Certain roles are defined by an institution,
and an agent entering the institution must take on at least one of the roles. Some of
these roles are available for any agent entering the system; in an auction scenario, this
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might be a buyer or seller role. Other roles can only be fulfilled by institution agents;
for example, auctioneer. A dialogical framework outlines acceptable speech acts, and
group meetings are defined using scenes. Certain roles are permitted in each scene: for
example, an auction scene might have exactly one auctioneer role (fulfilled by an in¬
stitution agent) and one or more buyer roles (fulfilled by external agents). Agents that
are not fulfilling these roles are not allowed to participate in the scene. The protocol
of a scene is the possible dialogues agents may have. Scenes are connected by the per¬
formative structure, which prescribes how agents move from scene to scene. Agents
are only allowed to leave or enter scenes at certain points. Obligations and effects of
actions are kept track of by the normative rules of the system.
We chose not to use e-institutions in ORS because we wanted to avoid directing effort
away from the central issues of diagnosis and refinement, and because e-institutions
provided a tighter control on agent ontologies than we were interested in. If we were
to extend the agent communication aspect of ORS, then e-institutions may be some¬
thing we would consider using. Certainly, a more important first step for the agent
communication system would be to make it FIPA-compliant; this would be a much
less difficult transition and would have more obvious benefits. There are some rea¬
sons why we might not consider e-institutions appropriate for an extended version of
ORS. Firstly, e-institutions place strict controls on the agents entering the institution;
in particular, they must have the same ontology. We would therefore be interested in
a more relaxed version of a standard e-institution, where this stringent approach to e-
institutions would be loosened. However, we would not wish to loosen this constraint
to the extent where agents with any kind of ontology would be able to enter: ORS
can only be used when agents have similar ontologies. We would therefore need to
investigate how constraints could be developed such that agents would only be able to
enter the institution if their ontologies were appropriately similar to the ontology used
by the e-institution.
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Adding the functionality of ORS might be useful to e-institutions, so that they would
not have to place such stringent restrictions on agents entering the institution but in¬
stead allow some amount of leeway, so that agents with updated, out of date or altered
versions of the correct ontology could make use of the e-institution, thus increasing its
applicability. However, from the point of view of ORS, such work is not as obviously
useful as some of the other issues discussed in this chapter, which would make ORS
better able to perform in its most natural environment: the Semantic Web or similar
large open-agent communication architectures.
8.4.7 Patching the Plan
Currently, ORS makes no attempt to update plans after plan execution failure is en¬
countered and diagnosis and refinement performed. Instead, the existing plan is dis¬
carded and a completely new plan is formed from the updated ontology. As can be seen
in 7.3, plans formed from updated ontologies are often very similar or even identical
to the original plan. It might therefore be better to patch the plans so that the changes
to the ontology were reflected in it, rather than forming a new plan.
One framework for creating this functionality could be the work on management of
change carried out by Hutter and Autexier [Autexier et al., 2002, Autexier and Hutter,
2002,Hutter, 2000]. This work is focused on patching formal verifications of specifica¬
tions after small changes have been made to them. It involves creating a development
graph to track the dependencies within the specification, and this can be used to de¬
duce which parts of the specifications will, or might, have been affected by the changes.
Similar techniques could be developed to track the dependencies between a plan and
its underlying ontology. In fact, this information is already provided to some extent
by the plan justification; this could be altered so as to provide the relevant informa¬
tion. Applying these ideas to a planning context would be somewhat complicated by
the non-monotonicity of planning: finding evidence that a precondition has been true
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before an action is performed is not sufficient justification to prove that it is true when
the action is performed: it must be shown that it has not been made false at any in¬
termediate point. The resulting system would be similar to an assumption-based truth
maintenance system (ATMS; see Section 3.2.4).
Forming plans that are only a few steps long, such as those illustrated in Section 7.3,
is a fairly speedy process, and thus the benefits of patching plans may not outweigh
the costs. However, if ORS were forming longer plans, which it is equipped to do, the
balance may be tipped in the other direction. An additional benefit of this approach
would be that it would not be necessary to produce new PDDL files from the updated
ontology, and thus much effort in translation would also be spared; this is especially
relevant if the ontology is complex, as translating to PDDL is currently the slowest part
of running ORS.
A minimal implementation of this idea could be to check whether a plan produced
from this updated ontology would be identical to the original plan; thereby avoiding
the need either for replanning or for patching the plan. However, this is slightly more
difficult than a first glance might suggest. Obvious changes to plans involve changing
the action steps, but more subtle changes involve changing the arguments those action
steps take. If, for example, propositional anti-abstraction is performed, this may not
affect the plan steps of a plan but it will sometimes affect the arguments of one or more
of the plan steps. This new argument will appear in the arguments of any action to
which it is relevant. It may be that this argument already appears as part of that action,
in which case there will be no change to the action step. On the other hand, it may not
be already listed: in this case, there will be a change to the arguments of the actions.
This kind of information would have to be calculated before it could be determined
whether the plan needed to be altered or not. Some research would need to be done to




The ideas discussed in this chapter could not be added to ORS without a considerable
amount of work. We feel that the most important aspects to address are those that
would prepare ORS for use on the Semantic Web, or within a large multi-agent system
where the agents were diverse and owned by many different users. Ideas that would
improve the performance of ORS but are not essential for its use in such a situation




Communication is an issue of increasing importance in Artificial Intelligence. A
greater emphasis is being placed on the development of large-scale systems where
huge numbers of users with different aims, locations and backgrounds can interact and
communicate easily in areas where their interests overlap: the Semantic Web and the
Grid are the two most well known examples of this. A prerequisite to the success of
such systems is that they have to be easy to use; if it is only possible to use them
by investing a large amount of time and effort into complying with their restrictions,
potential users will be disinclined to become involved with them.
A crucial aspect of the ability to communicate, as discussed in Chapter 1, is the exis¬
tence of shared language to describe the world. However, insisting on this clashes with
the need to create open, usable systems where tight restrictions are not enforced. The
problem of how to create this shared language from two representations that may not
initially be identical, and to do this during runtime as the interactions are taking place,
is thus an important function of any large-scale, multi-user system. We claim that an
effective method of doing this is through dynamic ontology refinement.
In this thesis, we have outlined why we believe this to be a good approach, and ex¬
plained how our specific approach differs from that taken by other people. We have
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introduced our system ORS, and explained how the theory behind the implementation
addresses this tension between the need to refrain from enforcing strict constraints and
the need for mutual comprehension between agents. We have evaluated ORS in order
to demonstrate that it is both usable and useful.
9.1 Contributions
We summarise the contributions of the thesis, both those that are achieved by fulfilling
the hypothesis and aims of the project, outlined in Chapter 1, and those that have
been achieved in addition to this, through the development of the subsystems and the
functionality required to achieve the central aims.
9.1.1 Central Contribution
The hypothesis of the thesis was stated as:
Using dynamic ontology refinement to locate and correct ontological
mismatches between agents can enable successful communication which
would otherwise be impossible.
We claim that this hypothesis is proved through the fulfilment of three aims, listed
below. We revisit the aims of the project, and explain how these have been achieved.
• To provide a framework in which agents with first-order, largely similar ontolo¬
gies can diagnose ontological mismatches between them:
Chapter 5 describes the diagnostic process that allows agents to identify mis¬
matches between their first-order ontologies. Figure 5.9 describes all of the po¬
tential mismatches between first-order theories, and highlights which of these
ORS can always, or sometimes, or never deal with. The diagnostic algorithms
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are designed for agents that are using plan failure and plan justification to de¬
duce what mismatch they are encountering, and this method of detecting failure
is not suitable for discovering all possible mismatches. Additionally, adding in¬
formation into an ontology can be hard, as it is not always clear what this new
information should be. We explain how these lead to the areas of the chart where
we encounter mismatches that are sometimes or never diagnosable in ORS.
To integrate this framework into a system, ORS, that enables an environment
where planning agents can use this ability to reach goals that would otherwise
have been unreachable. This system must be fully automated:
Chapter 4 describes how the diagnostic capabilities of ORS are embedded in a
fully automated system which facilitates this behaviour. It explains the contribu¬
tion of each subsystem to the whole, and the manner in which they are integrated.
Chapter 6 explains in more detail the theory and implementations behind these
subsystems.
To evaluate these abilities against genuine examples ofontological mismatches,
to demonstrate that these abilities are useful:
In Chapter 5 we outlined the space of possible mismatches in first-order ontolo¬
gies, explaining which ORS could and could not identify. Chapter 7 evaluates
the performance of ORS with reference to genuine ontological mismatches from
different versions of ontologies. The results highlight some areas where ORS
could be improved and extended, and also illustrate the limitations of perform¬
ing this refinement process within a planning context. Nevertheless, the results
were mostly positive for ORS, indicating that this kind of matching is not only
theoretically useful, but can also deal with real mismatches. Unfortunately, the
development of the Semantic Web and similar systems is not complete enough to
give us access to many different kinds of ontologies and ontological mismatches;
thus the evaluation of ORS is not as thorough as we would wish. We hope to ex-
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tend this evaluation as more examples of such ontologies become available and
as ORS is developed to become increasingly sophisticated; this evaluation and
development is envisaged as an interleaved process.
The realisation of these aims has allowed us to produce a prototype of a system that
allows dynamic, fully automated ontology matching during runtime. Chapter 3 and
Section 7.5 explain how this need is not already being met in a satisfactory way by the
current technology, and motivate why this is an important ability. We feel, therefore,
that we have contributed to the field by exploring ways in which this might be done,
and producing a working system that demonstrates that these ideas can work in practise
on real ontologies. The system is not currently suitable for use on the Semantic Web;
we have explained in Chapter 4 why this was not a reasonable aim for the project, and
detail in Chapter 8 the extra work that would be required to facilitate this. We believe
that more investment in ontology matching of this sort, which, as we explain in Section
7.5, is quite different from standard ontology mapping, would bring the existence of a
fully-realised Semantic Web a step closer.
9.1.2 Additional Contributions
The aim and focus of this project has been the investigation of solutions to ontology
mismatch, with diagnosis and refinement as the key components of the resulting sys¬
tem. However, we believe this project has made additional contributions that are not
directly related to this issue, but instead were developed as part of the sub-systems of
ORS.
The main area in which this lies is in the interaction between ontologies and planning.
Since we have placed our ontology refinement system in a planning domain, we have
had to address this problem. This is a field that has traditionally been ignored by
the planning community, but which is beginning to generate more interest. As the
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importance of planning for agents in large, multi-agent systems such as the Semantic
Web becomes clearer, this issue is being addressed more urgently by both the planning
and the ontology communities.
We have contributed to this field in two particular ways:
• The Plan Deconstructor
As we have discussed in Chapter 4 and Section 6.3, one of the drawbacks of
the efficient search techniques employed by modern planners is that there is very
little feedback about how the plan produced is related to the underlying ontology.
This is acceptable if successful plan execution is inevitable, but it means that
there is no scope for learning about the domain through plan failure in a domain
in which plan execution is not assured, due to the unpredictability of the domain
or the potential errors inherent in representing a domain. We have solved this
problem in ORS through the use of the plan deconstructor, which we believe to
be a unique approach to the problem. This work was presented to the planning
community in [McNeill et al., 2003b].
• Translation from KIF to PDDL
Another significant issue in this field is that representations required for mod¬
ern planners are significantly different from standard ontological representations.
This is because it is important in planning to limit the expressivity of the repre¬
sentation, as otherwise the search problems are enormous. Standard ontological
representations, on the other hand, are usually quite expressive, as this allows
more complex information about the domain to be encoded. We have dealt with
this problem by creating a translation process between restricted KIF and PDDL.
Since we are translating from a more expressive representation to a less expres¬
sive one, there is the potential for some information to be lost. We believe that
this loss of expressivity is acceptable because the expressivity needs of the two
domains are too different to be combined. We cope with this loss of expressivity
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in ORS by using the PDDL ontology only for planning, and retaining the KIF
ontology. The work was presented to the planning community in [McNeill et al.,
2004a] and [McNeill et al., 2005],
9.1.3 Future Contributions
ORS currently demonstrates the applicability of the theory to the problem of ontolog-
ical mismatch in real-world domains. However, it is not yet sufficiently adaptable and
sophisticated to be used on a system such as the Semantic Web. We have outlined
in Chapter 8 how we would like to extend ORS so that it would be possible for it to
operate in such a domain, and to operate more successfully than it is currently able to.
We envisage dynamic ontology refinement systems such as ORS having an important
role to play in the Semantic Web and other large multi-user systems.
Appendix A
Example Ontology











'This is the ontology with which much of the development was done. The full ontology, the meta-
ontology, and all the ontologies used for evaluation (those mentioned in Chapter 7) can be found on the
project webpage(http://dream.inf.ed.ac.uk/proj ects/dor/)
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(Define-Class Action (?X) :Def (And (Thing ?X)))
;;; Agent
(Define-Class Agent (?X) :Def (And (Thing ?X)))
;;; Confirmation-Number
(Define-Class Confirmation-Number (?X) :Def (And (Thing ?X)))
;;; Event
(Define-Class Event (?X) :Def (And (Thing ?X)))
;;; Conference
(Define-Class Conference (?X) :Def (And (Event ?X)))
;;; Object
(Define-Class Object (?X) :Def (And (Thing ?X)))
;;; Paper
(Define-Class Paper (?X) :Def (And (Object ?X)))
;;; Dvi-Paper
(Define-Class Dvi-Paper (?X) :Def (And (Paper ?X)))
;;; Pdf-Paper
(Define-Class Pdf-Paper (?X) :Def (And (Paper ?X)))
;;; Ps-Paper
(Define-Class Ps-Paper (?X) :Def (And (Paper ?X)))
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; ;; Place
(Define-Class Place (?X) :Def (And (Thing ?X)))
;;; City
(Define-Class City (?X) :Def (And (Place ?X)))
RELATIONS
;;; Has-Paper
(Define-Relation Has-Paper (?Agent ?Paper ?Situation)
:Def (And (Agent ?Agent) (Paper ?Paper) (Sit-Var ?Situation)))
;;; Location
(Define-Relation Location (?Thing ?Place ?Situation)




(?Agent-0 ?Paper-l ?Conference-2 ?Situation) :-> ?Value
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;;; Flight
(Define-Function Flight (?Place-0 ?Place-l ?Situation) :-> ?Value
:Def (And (Place ?Place-0)




(?Agent-0 ?Conference-l ?Situation) :-> ?Value





(Define-Function Has-Ticket (?Agent-0 ?Situation) :-> ?Value
:Def (And (Agent ?Agent-0) (Confirmation-Number ?Value)
(Sit-Var ?Situation)))
;;; Money
(Define-Function Money (?Agent-0 ?Situation) :-> ?Value





(?Agent-0 ?Conference-l ?Situation) :-> ?Value






:0wn-Slots ((Documentation) (Instance-Of Conference)
(Location Miami [(Start)])
(Registration-Fee 200 [(Start)]))
:Axioms ((Accomodation-Info Cade 50 [(Start)])))
;;; Edinburgh
(Define-Frame Edinburgh
:Own-Slots ((Documentation) (Instance-Of City))
:Axioms ((Flight Edinburgh Miami 300 [(Start)])))
;;; Isabelle-Paper-Dvi
(Define-Individual Isabelle-Paper-Dvi (Dvi-Paper) )
; ;; Isabelle-Paper-Ps
(Define-Individual Isabelle-Paper-Ps (Ps-Paper) )
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;;; Lucas
(Define-Frame Lucas
:Own-Slots ((Documentation ) (Has-Paper Isabelle-Paper-Dvi)
(Instance-Of Agent) (Location Edinburgh [(Start)]))
:Axioms ((Money Lucas 1000 [(Start)])))
;;; Miami
(Define-Individual Miami (City) )
;;; Pseudo-Var





(And (Accomodation-Info ?Conference ?Cost ?Sitl)
(Money ?Agent ?Amount ?Sitl) (< ?Cost ?Amount))
(And (Has-Accom ?Agent Pseudo-Var ?Sit2)
(= ?Newamount (- ?Amount ?Cost))
(Money ?Agent ?Newamount ?Sit2)




(And (Location ?Agent ?Agent-Loc ?Sitl)
(Location ?Conference ?Conf-Loc ?Sitl)
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(Flight ?Agent-Loc ?Conf-Loc ?Price ?Sitl)
(Money ?Agent ?Amount ?Sitl)
(< ?Price ?Amount))
(And (Has-Ticket ?Agent Pseudo-Var ?Sit2)
(Money ?Agent ?Newamount ?Sit2)
(= ?Newamount (- ?Amount ?Price))




(And (Has-Paper ?Agent ?Paper-Dvi ?Sitl)
(Dvi-Paper ?Paper-Dvi ?Sitl))
(And (Has-Paper ?Agent ?Paper-Ps ?Sit2)
(Ps-Paper ?Paper-Ps ?Sit2))-))
;;; Register
(Define-Axiom Register : =
(=>
(And (Accepted-Paper ?Agent ?Paper ?Conference Pseudo-Var ?Sitl)
(Money ?Agent ?Amount ?Sitl)
(Registration-Fee ?Conference ?Cost ?Sitl)
(< ?Cost ?Amount))
(And (Registered ?Agent ?Conference Pseudo-Var ?Sit2)
(Money ?Agent ?Newamount ?Sit2)
[- ?Newamount (-?Amount ?Cost))













refine/2 will read in the old ontology and write to a new ontology, ont. out. A list of
classes (types) in the old ontology is built, so that it is possible to tell if classes which
appear as part of a refinement are already in the class hierarchy, or if they need to be
added. A class list, which includes information about new classes together with their
superclasses, is built up and these are added to the new ontology after the process has
been completed. performRef/2 is the command that actually performs the refinement.
After the whole process is completed, the new ontology is copied onto the old ontology,
so that the name of the ontology remains constant.
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performRef/2 reads the ontology line by line (since refine/2 sent the input stream to
ont. in, a read instruction will find the first line of that which has not already been
read). The end of file indicator is checked for, and if this is found, the rest of the line
is processed and the procedure terminates. If not, the line is processed and then the
rest of the ontology is read. checkLine/3 will analyse a particular line to see if it is a
line that needs to be changed as part of the refinement process. If so, this is carried out
(processLine/3). If not, it is copied verbatim to the ontology (copyLine/1).
An example of the code for precondition anti-abstraction is given below. This is the
easiest refinement to perform, and thus the code is the most concise. Note that in
precondition anti-abstraction, we only need be concerned with one line of the ontology:
the line defining the relevant action. Some of the other refinements are more complex
and require us to look at several lines of the ontology. For example, propositional
refinement requires us to alter not only the definition of the relation, but also every
occurrence of it.
processLine(precond,[Rule,Precond] ,Line)




ifso, find the ASCII name of the rule, append a space and see if this matches the name













then we convert the precond into ASCII and append it
name(Precond,PrecondChars),
append(PrecondChars,PrecondsAndSpace,NewPrecondsAndRest),
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The output shown here is produced by two of the six ontologies we have run on the
system, edited for readability and conciseness. For the complete output of all the
ontologies, see the project website1.
C.l AKT Ontology
?- plan,
consulting the translator ...
consulting the plan finder ...
consulting the plan deconstructor ...
consulting the ontology updater ...
consulting the diagnostic algorithm ...
consulting the refinement system ...
What is the goal?
'http://dream.inf.ed.ac.uk/proj ects/dor/
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need to find a plan ...
This is the plan:
[becomeMemberOrganization(refinementSig,researchAgent,
schoolOfInformaticsAtEdinburgh,subscriptionFee,ontologyRefinement)]
deconstructing the plan ...
executing the plan ...




plan has failed at
becomeMemberOrganization(refinementSig,researchAgent,
schoolOfInformaticsAtEdinburgh,subscriptionFee,ontologyRefinement)
The KIF ontology has been updated
Im diagnosing what the problem is ...
I received a query about hasEmailAddress(researchAgent,_297427), which
C.l. AKT Ontology 313
I was not expecting to be asked about.




requires an extra precondition: hasEmailAddress(researchAgent, 297427)
WARNING: this is a guess
I know that researchAgent is of class agent
I know that pseudoVar is of class confirmationNumber
this is the precond I need to add:
(Has-Email-Address ?Agent ?Confirmation-Number)




need to find a plan ...
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deconstructing the plan ...
executing the plan ...










plan has failed at
becomeMemberOrganization(refinementSig,researchAgent,
schoolOfInformaticsAtEdinburgh,subscriptionFee,ontologyRefinement)
The KIF ontology has been updated
I'm diagnosing what the problem is ...
I received a query about memberAcademicUnit(researchAgent,
schoolOfInformaticsAtEdinburgh,ukCsDepts),
which I was not expecting to be asked about.
memberAcademicUnit(researchAgent,schoolOfInformaticsAtEdinburgh,ukCsDepts)
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has the same name as the precondition
memberAcademicUnit(researchAgent,schoolOfInformaticsAtEdinburgh)
They have different arity (3 and 2)
diagnosis: propositional anti-abstraction
my arguments are of these classes : [academicUnit,agent]
membershipAgent tells me that ukCsDepts is of class
educationalOrganizationalUnit
membershipAgent tells me that educationalOrganizationalUnit is of
class organizationUnit




need to find a plan ...




deconstructing the plan ...
executing the plan ...
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The KIF ontology has been updated
The plan is completed
C.2 Lift Scheduling Ontology
| ?- plan.
consulting the translator . . .
consulting the plan finder ...
consulting the plan deconstructor ...
consulting the ontology updater ...
consulting the diagnostic algorithm ...
consulting the refinement system ...
?- and(served(personOne),served(personTwo),served(personThree))
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translating . . .
translation done
need to find a plan ...






deconstructing the plan ...
executing the plan ...




plan has failed at
serveLiftCustomer(personOne,floorOne,liftOne,securityCleared,
floorZero,onsiteEngineer)
The KIF ontology has been updated
I'm diagnosing what the problem is ...
this plan failed immediately after a request was made to perform
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serveLiftCustomer(personOne,floorOne,liftOne,securityCleared,
floorZero,onsiteEngineer)
serveAgent says that he can perform this task
diagnosis: problem precond: inService(liftOne,onsiteEngineer)
inService(liftOne,onsiteEngineer) is an original fact in my ontology




need to find a plan ...







deconstructing the plan ...
executing the plan ...
I'm going to ask moveAgent to perform
moveEmptyLift(floorOne,liftOne,floorZero)
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for me
moveEmptyLift(floorOne,liftOne,floorZero) completed satisfactorily








plan has failed at serveLiftCustomer(personOne,floorOne,liftOne,
securityCleared,floorZero,onsiteEngineer)
The KIF ontology has been updated
I'm diagnosing what the problem is ...
There seems to be a problem with hasAccess(personOne,floorOne)
although I knew that I would be asked about it.
this is fully instantiated: therefore, I must negate my expectations
about hasAccess(personOne,floorOne)
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have to unnegate this




need to find a plan ...
This is the plan:
[grantAccess(floorOne,personOne),grantAccess(floorZero,personTwo),
grantAccess(floorTwo,personThree),serveLiftCustomer(personOne,floorOne,




deconstructing the plan ...
executing the plan ...
I'm going to ask accessAgent to perform
grantAccess(floorOne,personOne) for me
grantAccess(floorOne,personOne) completed satisfactorily
I'm going to ask accessAgent to perform
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grantAccess(floorZero,personTwo) for me
grantAccess(floorZero,personTwo) completed satisfactorily
I'm going to ask accessAgent to perform
grantAccess(floorTwo,personThree) for me
grantAccess(floorTwo,personThree) completed satisfactorily
I'm going to ask serveAgent to perform
serveLiftCustomer(personOne,floorOne,liftOne,securityCleared,
floorZero,onsiteEngineer) for me
plan has failed at serveLiftCustomer(personOne,floorOne,liftOne,
securityCleared,floorZero,onsiteEngineer)
The KIF ontology has been updated
I'm diagnosing what the problem is ...
I received a query about call(personOne,liftOne),
which I was not expecting to be asked about,
call(personOne,liftOne) has the same name as the
precondition call(personOne,liftOne,securityCleared)
They have different arity (2 and 3)
diagnosis: propositional abstraction.
my arguments are of these classes : [authorization,lift,person]
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need to find a plan ...




deconstructing the plan ...
executing the plan ...





I'm going to ask serveAgent to perform serveLiftCustomer(personTwo,
floorZero,liftOne,floorOne,onsiteEngineer) for me
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serveLiftCustomer(personTwo,floorZero,liftOne,floorOne,onsiteEngineer)
completed satisfactorily






The KIF ontology has been updated







Abstraction - removal of detail from the signature and, consequently, the theory.
Anti-abstraction - addition of detail to the signature and, consequently, the theory.
Domain refinement - alteration of the class of an argument of a predicate. This in¬
cludes domain abstraction and domain anti-abstraction.
KIF - Knowledge Interchange Format: first-order ontology language.
Meta-Ontology - higher-level ontology that provides information about objects in the
standard ontology.
Metric-FF - planner used by ORS.
Ontology - domain information that consists of a signature or language in which the
domain can be described and a theory or set of axioms written in the signature terms.
Ontology mismatch - terms in two different ontologies which refer to the same thing
are not identically expressed, or an ontological object expressed in one is not expressed
in the other.
Ontology refinement - alteration of a single term or multiple terms in an ontology.
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ORS - Ontology Refinement System: the system described in this project.
PA - Planning Agent: an agent that is engaged in plan execution, considered in this
project to be the agent that is performing, when necessary, dynamic ontology refine¬
ment.
PDDL - propositional language used in planning.
Plan deconstruction - meta-interpretation of a plan with reference to the underlying
ontology.
Plan justification - the link between the plan and the underlying ontology that is pro¬
duced by plan deconstruction.
Precondition refinement - alteration of the number of preconditions that a rule has.
This includes precondition abstraction and anti-abstraction.
Predicate refinement - alteration of the name of a predicate. This includes predicate
abstraction and anti-abstraction.
Propositional refinement - alteration of the number of arguments a predicate has.
This includes propositional abstraction and anti-abstraction.
Pseudo-variables - used in planning in place of ordinary variables, which are not
permitted in PDDL. A pseudo-variable is interpreted by the planner as an individual,
but by the PA as a variable.
Service-providing Agent - an agent that is able to perform services for other agents
under specific circumstances. The PA performs plan steps through interaction with
service-providing agents.
Signature - description of the representation language in which the ontology is written:
what predicates exist, what arity they have, what classes their arguments have, the class
hierarchy and so on.
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Theory - when used in the context of being part of an ontology, it is a reference to the
formulae written in the representation language (or signature).
►
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